

1. ADDRESSEE		1. DATE	
2. FROM		2. TIME	
3. SUBJECT		3. OFFICE	
4. APPROVED		(Signature)	
5. APPROVED		Colonel Hubert W. Gainer	
		(Typed Grade and Surname)	

SUBJECT: SAMOS

- SUMMARY:**
1. General Schriever forwarded a letter, subject as above, dated 19 September 1960 to General White (TAB A) which contained recommendations for:
    - a. Establishing a Science Advisory Committee for the SAMOS.
    - b. Avoiding any delay in the SAMOS launching schedule.
    - c. Strengthening and revising the informational plan for SAMOS to avoid Press speculative accounts, emphasizing "Spy in the Sky" theme.
  2. The proposed reply (TAB B) outlines the actions taken by the Air Force regarding General Schriever's recommendations.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

3. That the attached reply be signed and dispatched.

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1. TAB A - Ltr from Gen Schriever to Gen White
  2. TAB B - Proposed Ltr from Gen White to Gen Schriever

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I appreciate the detailed suggestions which you outlined in your letter of 19 [unclear] 1960. The importance of developing a satellite system at the earliest practicable date is certainly of utmost importance to the United States as well as the Free World.

Your plan for a Joint Advisory Committee are well taken and you will be pleased to know that the Department is establishing a Satellite of [unclear] This group will be made up of [unclear] who will be well [unclear] agencies. It is the plan to have [unclear] military qualified experts as [unclear] your thinking. Others may [unclear] involving specific problems

any delay in the [unclear] of events. As [unclear] the scope of the [unclear] Plan and specifically [unclear] we can get.

project, the [unclear] approved [unclear] 1960. Although [unclear] not [unclear] in connection [unclear] that they will [unclear] also that the Department [unclear] the "Buy in the Bay" [unclear] our [unclear] believe that we must [unclear] use of this term.

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I am sure you will be pleased to know also that the Under Secretary has been in close contact with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and other officials in the Department of Defense and the Executive Department and has presented a position for the Air Force which I think generally is compatible with your views on the subject.

Sincerely

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HEADQUARTERS  
**AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND**

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
Andrew Air Force Station  
Washington 25, D.C.



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF

RDY

*22/9/60  
73557*

*60512  
912  
015  
1/11/60*

19 September 1960

SUBJECT: **SAMOS Program**

TO: **General Thomas D. White**  
Chief of Staff  
Headquarters USAF  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General

I appreciate your prompt action in designating General Greer as "Mr. SAMOS" and in establishing top priority for the assignment of his needed assistants as summarized in your **CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY** memorandum of 4 August 1960. General Greer is now operating as Vice Commander, AFEND, for Space Security Satellites; requests for proposals have gone out and we have briefed the contractors relative to the requirements of the E-6 Program; and the recent successes in returning orbiting payloads to earth, all add to our confidence in the success of the over-all program.

However, for your consideration, I want to give you a few more thoughts on the proposal to establish a Science Advisory Committee to serve in a role for SAMOS similar to the Von Neumann Committee on Ballistic missiles. My idea is to create a buffer from the criticism which we expect from civilian committees such as the ones headed by Dr. Kilian and Dr. Baker, because it is so difficult and time consuming for key Air Force personnel to counter the criticisms of such committees. In this connection we can expect the unfortunate defection of NSA personnel to give impetus to investigations and reviews of intelligence and intelligence systems. This lends further weight to the idea of establishing the proposed committee. I believe a Science Advisory Committee composed of members compatible to the several interested agencies would function as a buffer, would facilitate solution of some of the technical and vested interest problems with which we are confronted and, perhaps, most important, would demonstrate Air Force initiative in developing SAMOS to serve the variety of national purposes of which it is capable. This could help to counter, in the incipient stages, any charges that the Air Force is attempting to hold SAMOS to serve its own parochial purposes. This latter consideration could be very important and could negate the requirement to reaffirm ARDC's charter for the conduct of the program.

We should also concern ourselves with the world-wide impact of the forthcoming launching of the first R&D SAMOS satellite now scheduled for

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4 October. This falls within the time span of the next United Nations' Assembly Meeting which commences on or about 20 September. We can expect the Russians to launch another propaganda attack during this meeting, which will be designed to further inhibit U. S. intelligence efforts, especially reconnaissance activities. This attack, together with pressures which may originate within the framework of our own Government or from public opinion must not be permitted to delay or interfere with the scheduled launching for the following reasons:

1. The loss of the Genatrix, the U-2 and the recent B-47 incident have re-emphasized the urgency of a successful and timely achievement of photographic and electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and other denied areas.
2. A successful SAMOS launch shortly after convening of the U. N. General Assembly (20 September 1960), would provide the U. S. and other Western powers with a propaganda victory and strengthen the position of the West at this meeting.
3. The Communist position, on the other hand, might be weakened by such a development and could result in a more conciliatory Soviet attitude. This could conceivably serve to lessen the existing East-West tensions.
4. A successful SAMOS launching could be portrayed as a scientific development which could serve the purposes of furthering disarmament by demonstrating an inspection and monitoring capability for certain specific arms control proposals.
5. In like manner, the SAMOS could be portrayed as an effective contribution toward an open world and thereby further serve to reduce existing tensions.
6. One of the Soviet lines of attack at the U. N. probably will be to continue to play the U-2 theme. A successful launch of SAMOS could confirm that such flights (U-2) would be unnecessary in the future and could deflate the Soviet bombast.
7. The SAMOS launching should be considered as a normal, routine development in our research and development program. Any decision to delay the launching would require a subsequent positive decision as to when the appropriate time might exist to re-establish a launch date. Such a subsequent decision might be hard to obtain inasmuch as a judgment would be required as to the "right" time. Conceivably, a continuing slippage could occur in arriving at such a positive decision and we could find ourselves in a situation similar to that existing in the test cessation negotiations where we have for a prolonged period of time been unable to test nuclear weapons.
8. There is a good possibility that the Soviets may not choose to react immediately to a U. S. reconnaissance satellite. This has been evidenced in the past by the fact that the Soviets have made no formal protest about TIROS (NLE 100-6-60). The Soviets might deliberately adopt such a position in order not to give further recognition to such a U. S. achievement.

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...should be... further... special...  
...adverse criticism...  
...continue these...  
...indication that the...  
...adverse effect... should...

...should strengthen and revise the currently proposed...  
...In the absence of a clear line of guidance...  
...the press is very likely to respond to...  
...with highly speculative accounts, emphasizing the "Spy in the Sky" theme...  
...this kind of publicity could provoke a strong Soviet reaction which...  
...Against the background of disarmament discussions in the U. S., high...  
...intelligence... government quarters to the point of impairing the...  
...The preferred public rationale for... which would be con-  
...sistent with... policy considerations, should include the following:

1. The initial... shot is the continuation of a series of... launchings...  
...which would advance the state-of-the-art in the field of observation...  
...intelligence... that which was demonstrated to the world by... the...  
...and photographic... of April 1946.

2. Research and technical progress expected to result from the initial...  
...and subsequent... launchings would provide a significant technical tool...  
...to help maintain the security posture of the United States...  
...World partners, in the absence of adequate international...  
...agreements.

...can be reached... control...  
...equally significant...  
...technically...  
...in this...  
...agreements...  
...similar... (it is...)

...the primary contributions which...  
...ultimately... of all... other...  
...as...  
...agreements...

...the above points...  
...in order to...  
...otherwise be adopted and which...  
...aggressive U. S. recon-



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should be made to be in the hands of the U. S. Government and should be placed in a manner U. S. officials would be able to handle. It is suggested that such a reconnaissance satellite program be established to insure that such a program is not in the hands of the enemy.

1. Avoid recommending at this time that the U. S. place the capability of a reconnaissance satellite such as those of the disposition of an international control organization since this action could result in undesirable interference in the development and operation of an essential U. S. intelligence gathering system.
2. Proposes that the U. S. would make available appropriate results from the KASIS program. Such a proposal should enhance international acceptance of the current reconnaissance development program as well as further undermining the Soviet propaganda offensive against reconnaissance.

It is recommended that you urge the Secretary to obtain assurances from the Department of Defense and the Executive Department of compatibility of views as expressed in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 above.

Sincerely

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