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FUNCTIONS IN BYEMAN  
SECURITY POLICY

SAFSS

Mr. Mazza/18 May 65/mhr

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18 MAY 1965

DORIAN

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STEWART  
GENERAL EVANS

SUBJECT: DOD/MOL Program Security

I have reviewed the existing DOD MOL security policy against technical and management concepts in the process of development, and I find that, with one small exception, the policy is appropriate to MOL follow-on activities and should not be changed.

The concept of a publicly acknowledged DOD/MOL program with maximum security oriented toward the payload/mission aspects of the program, using normal security and SAR provisions of DOD Directive 5200.13 and AFR 205-23 as a security cover for BYEMAN security, is still valid.

There are security problems related to MOL, however, which I have listed below in what I believe is the order of priority. Two are discussed at length along with recommendations in attachments to this memorandum and a third is presently being worked on.

1. Public Affairs: There has been considerable U. S. press identifying reconnaissance as the primary mission of MOL. The reasons for this and suggested corrective action are contained in TAB A.

2. Mission Reorientation: The reorientation of MOL away from the "black" and "white" experiments mode to a mode focused upon stated program objectives, creates the need for actions designed to reorient existing "white" experimentation security-wise to be compatible with the security guide. This matter is covered in TAB B which is a security concept study appropriate to this phase of the program.

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3. Program Director E Security Guide: A sort of encyclopedia on how to run the security of a covert program, stated in clear concise terms and specifically tailored to this program, is needed for Program Directorate E. Such a document is being prepared. We will make effective use of Col Ford's draft on this subject. I regard this as a journeyman's paper.

Attachments

1. Public Affairs
2. Reorientation Plan

LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Chief Security Officer  
NRO Staff

Distribution

- Cy #1 - Gen Stewart
- Cy #2 - Gen Evans
- Cy #3 - SS-3
- Cy #4 - RF #1
- Cy #5 - RF #2

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MOL PUBLIC INFORMATION

A review of available press concerning the DOD MOL Program has been conducted. It is found that we have by no means succeeded in removing the image of reconnaissance from this program. The following factors have contributed most significantly to this state of affairs:

1. Early decision to permit certain limited "white experimentation bearing upon man's ability to improve upon the function of military observation from space.

2. [REDACTED]

3. U. S. Navy preoccupation with the matter of sea surveillance as related to MOL (P-13) which, based upon prior study efforts included consideration of such sensors as: variable focal-length TV cameras, multiple radar systems, earth oriented range and view finders, electronic sensors, multi-spectral sensors and earth-directed sensors.

The problem of the press must be examined recognizing that there exists no conceivable "cover" for MOL reconnaissance mission. We are forced to rely completely upon a system of rigid security. On the positive side, however, news reporters are, of necessity, constrained by: (1) the need for a newsworthy event, (2) the need for presenting the event in an interesting fashion. A speech is a newsworthy event. If the speech is uninteresting from the standpoint of the public, it compels the reporter to search his archives for correlative data - past spy-in-sky stories, etc. Thus, an unclassified speech becomes provocative of an undesirable news story. The requirement for a pure security review of public releases and speeches is not adequate to meet this problem. The matter of public affairs with respect to MOL must be cleverly programmed to meet the newsman's needs and to avoid the possibility of undesirable press articles from the standpoint of national policy.

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Recommendation: That a planned MOL public affairs program controlled from the Pentagon level (NRO Staff in conjunction with OSD/Public Affairs) be initiated. The program should play up the dramatic aspects of man in space, de-emphasize technical details which might be provocative of mission oriented press speculation, meet the needs of that segment of the news media responsive to the man in the street, who, by in large, is not technically oriented. The right to make speeches or public releases on the subject of MOL, not a considered part of this master-plan, public affairs program, should be expressly prohibited.

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SECURITY REORIENTATION PLAN

I. Purpose:

The purpose of this paper is to set forth proposed actions required to align security with the reoriented project plan for MOL.

II. Assumptions:

A. An autonomous SPO (the MOL program office) identified as Project B under the DNRO will be responsible for the in-phase definition and development of the MOL vehicle, laboratory, and payload to meet specific objectives set forth in WHIG 2817.

B. The SPO will be responsible for all program unique aspects of MOL to include:

Fund Control	-	Overt	Covert
Security Control	-	Overt	Covert
Contracting	-	Overt	Covert
Communications	-	Overt	Covert

III. General Security Concepts

A. Admit we have a DOD manned orbital laboratory and its mission is to determine man's potential usefulness in space. (IN THE MILITARY SENSE)

B. Do not try to build the MOL in a completely covert atmosphere.

C. Do not try to launch the MOL under a covert condition.

D. Do not try to control all activities under EYEMAN or clear all participants DORIAN.

DO:

A. Conduct selected operations covertly (those revealing reconnaissance missions).

B. Set up hard overt security rules around project information areas and activities.

MOL  
RESTRICTED AREA

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C. Exploit hard security rules around peripheral sections to insulate actual reconnaissance activity.

D. Exploit NASA's association with program by allowing selected press releases.

IV. Security Review:

A. Past situation with regard to security.

1 February - 30 April 1965

1. Experiment studies were performed in technical white or black cells, directed by different management.
2. People were physically separated according to black or white activity and directed by different management.
3. Vehicle design study has been accomplished in the white with cleansed interface information provided from DORIAN studies.
4. In each of 1, 2, and 3 above, strict rules were in force to keep SAFSP people from being identified with the MOL project.
5. Reconnaissance information in white studies was controlled under S200.13 and AFR 205-23.

B. Present situation with regard to security:

1. A DORIAN cleared group prepared the MOL summary presentation which is oriented to program objectives rather than individual experiments.
2. Formulative planning has been initiated for Program E.

C. Security activities during the phases identified as PAST and PRESENT were governed by criteria set forth by the DMSO in documents entitled:

1. Special Security Procedures for the Department of Defense Manned Orbital Laboratory (~~Top Secret/DORIAN/EYEMAN~~).

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2. Security Policies and Procedures for the Department of Defense Manned Orbital Laboratory, dated 19 February 1965, from the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, classified Confidential.

D. An SSD Program 632A Guide has been approved for publication. It will be implemented 1 June 1965. This guide implements and further amplifies white security classification policy.

E. Generally (except for one item to be corrected) the criteria in the existing guidance for determining the type of security system and controls to be used to protect the various elements of the program remain valid even with emphasis directed toward mission objectives and a change in the management structure. These criteria are:

1. Material, information, and activities revealing a mission or objective of terrestrial (of the earth) reconnaissance is to be controlled by the EYEMAN security control system as Project DORIAN.

2. Military payloads and military vehicle/payload interface data not revealing a reconnaissance mission is to be controlled under DOD Directive 5200.13 and AFR 205-23.

3. Other activities related to the MOL project such as booster information and vehicle data not revealing of above will be controlled under normal security.

4. Non-military activities related to the MOL will be conducted under normal security - unclassified in some instances.

V. ACTION ITEMS:

A. MOL SPO (Project E)

The combining of Project E with the MOL Program office as a monolithic management unit establishes a single

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point where security for future action with regard to R&D contractor operations and operational planning can be directed. The abolishment of the concept of individual experiments allows us to view relationships of various elements and actions in a broadened perspective. When future actions are being planned or established; i.e., work statements, plans, etc., each element of activity will be checked against the DORIAN classification guide (IV.C.1) to determine the appropriate security system and controls to be applied.

### B. Navy MOL Activity

1. It is assumed that all-weather sea surveillance activities will be managed in one of the following fashions:

Situation #1: Program E is responsible for all MOL R&D under the direction of DNRO. Navy personnel are assigned to Program E and are responsible for providing Navy sea surveillance requirements.

Situation #2: DNRO assigns directly to U. S. Navy/BUWEPS and also to Program E, as appropriate to circumstances, R&D in response to U. S. Navy stated sea surveillance requirements. Navy personnel are assigned to Program E for interface.

If situation #1 prevails, Program E shall be responsible to review all MOL sea surveillance elements against the DORIAN guide to determine appropriate security system and controls to be applied.

If situation #2 prevails, Program E shall be responsible to assure all MOL sea surveillance elements assigned to Program E are controlled under the appropriate security system. A BUWEPS DORIAN activity will have to be established to insure Navy MOL activities are provided appropriate security.

In either case, action must be initiated with regard to the elimination of overt P-13 activity which reveals reconnaissance. A significant portion of P-13 activity is revealing of the reconnaissance mission. These activities must be accomplished as DORIAN under EYEMAN rules. A letter from the DNRO to an appropriate Navy authority must be delivered stating the problem and indicating need for action.

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2. Public release policy regarding Navy MOL activities must be more restricted.

C. NASA MOL Activity

1. NASA should continue to refer to MOL activities as experiments.

2. NASA must be provided through appropriate channels the DORIAN (BYEMAN) classification guide as well as all overt MOL classification guides.

3. Future information provided to or generated by NASA revealing of reconnaissance activity by the MOL must be under DORIAN rules.

4. Retrieval or directed destruction of SECRET SAR documents provided to NASA which contain reconnaissance information should not be attempted. Such action will stir up too much activity.

5. Public releases by NASA, like Air Force and Navy, need to come under special controls.

D. ARPA MOL Activity

1. If ARPA continues MOL actions, a small number of ARPA's highest management must be briefed DORIAN. The purpose of the briefing will be to enlist the aid and support of ARPA's highest level officials in constraining their personnel and contractors from delving into the reconnaissance aspects of the MOL.

2. If ARPA does not plan further MOL related activity, the highest ARPA official and his deputy should be briefed DORIAN. The purpose of this briefing would be to prevent provocative public releases pertaining to the MOL.

3. We should not attempt to withdraw or effect special controls on ARPA studies which have been completed and distributed.

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E. The crux of the future policy concerning peripheral activity must be to brief selected key individuals of government agencies having a function or interest in DORIAN to prevent unwitting people from making statements, initiating, authorizing or allowing activity that makes known or implies the reconnaissance mission of MOL.

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