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14 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Agency Relationship to Space Policy

REFERENCE : Memorandum for DDCI, dated 12 April 1962,
from Assistant Chief, DPD. Same Subject.
[REDACTED]

1. One space policy group not mentioned in this paper is the U. S. Space Council of which the Vice President is the Chairman. CIA is not represented on this body and as a consequence policy relative to reconnaissance satellites has, to the best of my knowledge, not been discussed in this group. However, from time to time OSI has briefed the Council on Soviet space capabilities in order to provide the intelligence background for the U. S. space program.

2. As you know, at a recent Staff Meeting the Director assigned to the DD/R the responsibility for developing the CIA position on the subject of space policy. To date I have not formalized any organizational structure for this purpose but General Strong, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have been working together as a team in this area. When it is a little clearer what elements will be under the DD/R, I shall assign the responsibilities a little more formally.


HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)

Attachment:

Copy [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Copy No. [REDACTED]

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in Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1997

Mr. McCone:
Of interest - we still
seem to have a long
way to go

APC

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12 APR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Acting Chief, Development Projects Division
Deputy Director (Research)

SUBJECT : Agency Relationship to Space Policy

1. In response to your informal inquiry made through [redacted] on the subject above, the following comments seem to the writer appropriate:

a. Agency participation in space policy-making does not have a long history, despite our involvement for several years in space satellite systems (Project CORONA/ARGON). Under the Eisenhower Administration, space policy was, in effect, in its infancy, and since CORONA was really the first active, continuously-operating space satellite system, such policy as existed was made rather informally by the President himself. As far as CIA was concerned, this policy consisted of seeking Presidential approval for CORONA launches prior to each such event. The DD/P was delegated the task of obtaining these approvals, which he did through General Clifton's predecessor, General Goodpaster, or on infrequent occasions from the President directly. It is well to note that during this period, i.e., mid-1960 through January 1961, international space policy had really not been clearly defined, even in the U. N.

b. Space policy, as far as the Agency is concerned, became a burning issue only with the passage of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) sponsored by the United States Delegation on 20 December 1961, calling upon all member nations to register with the U. N. all objects launched into orbit or beyond. This action was undertaken in the name of the U. N. Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the Resolution originated with the Under Secretary of State and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, [redacted]

[redacted]

The restrictive aspects of its language and the necessity for compliance impacted on the DOD on 28 December 1961, when it was revealed that State had apparently not effected complete coordination with DOD and the Air Force prior to initiating the Resolution in the General Assembly. Such coordination as had been effected in DOD was apparently limited to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

c. DPD was represented in a meeting held in the Office of the Under Secretary of State on 29 December 1961, attended also by the Under Secretary of the Air Force and [REDACTED]. This meeting was in the nature of a damage assessment session, with State admitting their error in failing to effect full coordination. Discussion was held regarding the formulation of a directive to the United States U. N. Delegation, having to do with the terms of reference of compliance with the Resolution 1721 (XVI). This instruction was sent to Ambassador Stevenson through the Assistant Secretary of State for U. N. Affairs in mid-January. Since that time, this Division has continued its interest in the problem of satellite registration with the U. N. in view of its impact on satellite reconnaissance, and at the invitation of [REDACTED] a delegate from DPD became a representative on the working group, drafting a U. S. position paper on the subject. This formal paper was transmitted to the United States U. N. Delegation in mid-March of this year.

d. In early January General Philip Strong, Deputy Assistant Director for Collection, OSI, was designated by Dr. Scoville as the Agency representative on an Ad Hoc Committee, established under the chairmanship of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to deal with the international legal aspects of space launches and related matters. Since the establishment of the DD/R, DPD, in the person of the undersigned, has joined forces with General Strong and [REDACTED] of the Office of General Counsel when questions involving satellite registration or the U. S. position on the legality of space launches were discussed both in the Agency and in an informal working group presently chaired by [REDACTED] Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, which acts in support of the meetings of the 5412 Group under General Taylor. In addition to CIA, DOD, Air Force, and State are also represented, mirroring the make-up of the 5412 Committee. The

most recent meeting of this group was held 10 April to frame a recommended position to General Taylor's committee for the 12 April meeting of the Special Group, which will take up the question of establishing the area of compliance with Resolution 1721 (XVI). On the question of the international legal aspects of satellite reconnaissance, as the Agency representative, General Strong has been in a position to review position papers submitted by other Government Agencies such as Defense, NASA, FAA, and AEC. In addition, General Strong is the principal action officer in the Agency on [redacted] satellite capabilities.

2. With the above rather general statements on the record, it is evident that there is a fair degree of informality at the moment in terms of the Agency representation on space policy-making bodies. Our basic premise from which all points thus far have been argued is that we should take a position which to the maximum extent possible preserves freedom of action to the Agency, and inferentially to the Defense Department, to protect satellite reconnaissance from either witting or unwitting compromise in the international political arena. Thus far this stand has put us clearly on the side of the DOD and Air Force, as can be determined from a reading of the minutes of the last Special Group meeting, as well as the DOD proposal on establishment of a national policy on satellite reconnaissance tabled for discussion at the 12 April meeting of the 5412 Group. It would seem to those of us actively concerned with the operation of reconnaissance satellite systems that the DCI has three areas where his influence can be made felt in the formulation of space policy. These are:

a. In his role as the central figure in the intelligence community his total appreciation of the entire Soviet posture when transmitted to the President, either directly or indirectly through the National Security Council, can definitely influence the entire U. S. space program in terms of relative emphasis.

b. Acting through General Taylor's committee, the DCI can make his influence felt in this forum on space policy matters, particularly those having a military and/or clandestine connotation. The line to the President here, of course, is not quite as direct as through a. above.

c. As chairman of the USIB, the DCI is also in a position to reconcile conflicting points of view within the intelligence community on space policy matters as they deal with national security.

In any of the above three categories, the DCI can propose alterations in United States space policy or new policies themselves insofar as they bear upon his delegated responsibilities to the President.

(1) 3. It is obvious from the above that within the Government there exists at the moment no firmly fixed and all-inclusive form for the active discussion of space policy matters as they deal with the national interest. For the time being then, the question of Agency representation on such a body appears academic. It seems to us that as time goes on and as further sophistication in intelligence collection systems takes place, there will be a need for a more crystalized form of Agency concern with this whole matter. Beginning steps have already been made with the Air Force in the form of the National Reconnaissance Office, where the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Research) have already found it possible to exchange useful views on the whole spectrum of reconnaissance problems, both technical and political. However, since the lines upwards from the NRO lead either to the Secretary of Defense or to the DCI, this body may not be the answer when it comes to actually formulating United States space policy in the future, simply because the policy-making element from State is not represented thereon. It is worth noting that even within the Department of State there is a visible reluctance to fully inform the United States U. N. Delegation of the various clandestine reconnaissance capabilities in being or in prospect. For example, Ambassador Stevenson has not been briefed on any clandestine satellite reconnaissance capability to my knowledge, even though the Agency in January of this year briefed Mr. Cleveland, the Assistant Secretary of State for U. N. Affairs, on CORONA operations and invited him to suggest a time for a briefing of Ambassador Stevenson on the CORONA/ARGON/MURAL capability. With the real prospect that the Soviets may launch an active campaign to politically negate the satellite reconnaissance capability of the United States and the Free World this spring at either the forthcoming COSPAR meeting in Washington 30 April or the 28 May meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, of the Legal Section of the U. N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, it seems high time that we prepare a staff element at the working level in the Agency to deal with this situation and to provide the Director with the necessary staff assistance he will need as the Soviet line develops. In the event that the Soviets directly attack the satellite reconnaissance capability by attempts at active interference with CORONA/ARGON, CIA will be at once drawn further into the space policy matter to a degree perhaps analogous to the events following 1 May 1960.

cc: DD/R
DAD/C/OSI

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27 March 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

Purely as a matter of internal information, would you please have someone brief me on the extent or degree to which the Agency is able to influence Governmental action on "Space Agreements." Are we represented in the deliberations, and are our views compelling?

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, United States Army

General Carter -

Essence of the attached memo would have been relayed to you at Monday's briefing by DPD - if time had permitted.

Does this - even partially - answer your questions? There appears to be considerable doubt over this whole problem.

Please return attached memo to me.

→ Only barely touches my concern - where does Agency fit into decision making process in USG as to what we might propose or agree to on bans, cross agreements, etc etc