



25 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. At about 6:00 p. m., 24 March, I returned Dr. McMillan's telephone call. He had initiated the call earlier in the day and we had been unable to establish contact. Dr. McMillan stated that he had been out on the West Coast (I presume for the launch of mission 1018, although he did not state) and had seen the message which I had sent out to [REDACTED] (This was [REDACTED] dated 23 March.) McMillan said he did not think he could negotiate this matter with me over the telephone from there and he had therefore postponed the mission one day. McMillan stated that he interpreted my message to indicate that conditions would be the same as those in the past and he objected to this. He said that [REDACTED] had called [REDACTED] and verified the interpretation. McMillan said he had told Vance he was not willing to operate under these conditions. He said that until August of '64 our people at the AP facility were over at the [REDACTED] all the time and freely discussed everything, to include putting up history charts on payload parameters, health of the vehicle, etc.

Declassified and Released by the NRO

In accordance with E.O. 12958

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

He said that on the last mission (1017), two difficulties occurred which cut across the interface. He said one difficulty was never reported to his people and the other was one that his people observed but they were not allowed to have any information with which to diagnose it. McMillan said he could not tolerate this and that my people were completely irresponsible to refuse that kind of information. McMillan asked for a statement in writing that [redacted] would release any and all technical information on the payload as requested by [redacted] or his representative. He said our people were refusing to give information that was necessary in diagnosing the health of the payload. He said that in his judgment all facts about the payload must be freely available to the people in STC. He said that prior to 1 August this was done and everything was available to the STC. He said that it was evident that [redacted] had been directed "to be as uncooperative as possible." McMillan said he would try to write a memorandum for record which I would not be able to refute later, and promised to send me a copy.

2. Carter told McMillan that the instructions to [redacted] were to ensure continuation of the procedures which had been

followed in the past, and to make sure that there was no slip-up in the passage of information about the payload necessary to determine the health of the bird or to make a decision on de-orbit. Carter implored McMillan to consider the proposed agreement on West Coast organization that Carter had sent to McMillan back in January and which had been worked out with McMillan's staff. Carter said he did not have information on the alleged mishandling by his people of Mission 1017 but that he would look into it. Carter stated he was not prepared to release to the STC people all of the technical facts and calibration data and technical parameters about the payload but he assured McMillan that his people would discuss with Director, Program A, or his representative, in great detail anything concerning the payload which would have an adverse effect on the health of the vehicle or would have a bearing on the de-orbit decision. He said that the other matters would continue to be handled on a "need-to-know basis," since the Agency had responsibility for the payload. General Carter said that [REDACTED] is a remarkably able officer, a good man, and he did not anticipate any problems arising between [REDACTED] and the people in STC.

[REDACTED]

He said he had charged [redacted] with making the judgments as to what occurrences in the payload would have an effect on the health of the bird. Carter said it was his intention to keep the Agency in the satellite business and he had no intention of proliferating away the Agency's responsibilities, authorities, and equity in the program on piecemeal matters. He again urged McMillan to come to some agreement on the West Coast organization along the lines of his prior proposals so that we could get away from this sort of basic organizational problems. Carter denied that he was in the habit of refuting memoranda for record and stated that he would furnish McMillan a copy of his memorandum for record.

* * * * *

Subsequent information received from CIA representatives on the West Coast in connection with the foregoing states that:

- a. [redacted] representatives on the West Coast had been informed at the time of the suspected malfunctions in both instances -- the SI malfunction and cycle count deviation, and the yaw programmer malfunction.

[redacted]

b. [redacted] representatives did not 'discover' either malfunction -- both were noticed by the CIA element and both were called to the attention of Director, Program [redacted] representatives.

c. There was close and continuing contact with Air Force representatives, Program Director representatives, STC, and the AP in real time. This also included Lockheed and ITEK technicians.

d. All film was expended and recovered and the intelligence mission was accomplished. At no time did a recovery hazard exist. The mission was a total success.

Since August 1964 more operational data on the payload has been made available to Director, Program [redacted] than at any period prior to that date. The Field Test Force Director at STC is provided with a data book that contains all payload information necessary for the conduct of his function. He has been kept promptly briefed on the results of analysis of payload telemetry data. No payload data required by him to support his operational position has ever been denied.

The only possible use for intimate payload telemetry calibration data would be to duplicate a payload analysis function that is already [redacted]

adequately covered by a Government-funded effort by locally experi-
enced personnel at the AP facility who are almost entirely Lockheed
technicians fully trained and fully operational in this phase. There
is neither a need for this duplication, nor in fact time for it. Insofar
as we know, there has never been a complaint that the payload
analysis was inadequate nor has such analysis of payload status
adversely affected the operations of Director, Program. [REDACTED]

Since August 1964 the payload has averaged more and better
returns than during the same time span previous to that date.

/ S
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

cc: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

14-00000-5

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

Corrow

March 25, 1965

General Carter,

The facts about our conversation reported in your draft memorandum for record of 25 March are correct as I remember it. The memorandum omits reference to an exchange in which, after some discussion, you agreed, I believe, that it was [redacted] judgment which would determine what information was to be released to [redacted] people.

Your inference that I was West for the launch of 1018 is not correct. I was in Los Angeles on another matter.

Subsequent to our call, as you will remember, I have determined and reported to you that the two malfunctions mentioned in your memorandum were reported to [redacted] people. There was an indicated malfunction in the power system of the Agena, observed by [redacted] people, which could have related to problems in the payload. This was one of the two difficulties I was referring to in our conversation.

Brockway
Brockway McMillan

[redacted] SA

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Frank -

Per our agreement
to exchange M/R's on
our program -

you see the
situation from that point
and we have no change.



~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] to AF Facility, Info Program A from CIA

AS ON PREVIOUS CORONA FLIGHTS, IT IS DESIRED THAT AN AUTHORITY REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA BE PRESENT AT THE SATELLITE TEST CENTER DURING ALL CRITICAL PHASES OF THE ORBITAL OPERATION OF CORONA 1018. AS USUAL, THIS REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE DIRECTOR, PROGRAM A, OR DIRECTOR PROGRAM [REDACTED] INFORMATION ON THE CONDITION AND OPERATION OF THE PAYLOAD AND THE PAYLOAD SECTION OF THE VEHICLE WHICH COULD IN ANY WAY AFFECT THE HEALTH OF THE VEHICLE OR BEAR ON THE DECISION TO DE-ORBIT. THIS DOES NOT RELIEVE YOU OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE CORONA PAYLOAD."