

Back to  
[redacted] for  
Comments &  
return for  
S. G.  
[redacted] has  
seen.

3 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Projects

SUBJECT: Intelligence Impact Forecast for KH-4 FY 1968 Progra

1. Like all forecasts, this one is labeled "preliminary". The following are my thoughts on the subject.

2. In general, intelligence will be satisfied with eight evenly-spaced missions, despite the probability such a schedule will fall somewhat short of the semi-annual search requirement of 80-90% of the built-up area. That is to say, assuming 1041 and 1042 are successful, the search coverage provided by the 8 FY 1967 missions will be adequate. I understand the mix of J-1's and J-3's in FY 1968 may require a total of 9 successful missions to maintain the level of coverage obtained in FY 1967.

3. The following intelligence needs or possible events have been considered:

- a. Possibly of greatest importance will be the need to confirm or negate additional deployment of the Moscow ABM system at other sites.
- b. The need to confirm or negate additional deployment of HEN HOUSES, for example, in the southwest to cover the Polaris threat.
- c. The need to confirm the suspicion the SS-11 deployment is tapering off at about 500 silos, which would appear to be a logical strategy for this city oriented system.

*dimed*

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Intelligence Impact Forecast for KH-4 FY 1968 Program

- d. The need to study deployment of the Tallin system, regardless of whether it is an ABM system or not.
- e. The need to "search" the Shary Shagan Test Center, the Kapustin Yar Center, and the Moscow area to insure [REDACTED] is properly targeted and does not become so pre-occupied with known targets in these areas that it misses any new, adjacent targets.
- f. The need to search for Shuang-cheng-tzu Missile Test center down-range instrumentation (we haven't found any yet), either along the present axis, or, possibly in a southwestern direction (this would suggest an ICBM range into the Indian Ocean).
- g. The need to search to determine the nature of the initial ChiCom MRBM deployment which will occur in FY 1968, or sooner. While from a military viewpoint, southeast and northeast China are logical areas, there has been interesting speculation the first several might be deployed in Peking for political purposes. This scheme would facilitate exposure to the Chinese people and foreign visitors, thus achieving maximum political impact.
- h. The probability Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSOVG) will undergo some re-deployment as the result of the January 1968 U.S. and UK NATO re-deployments, and the subsequent need to determine the new locations of the Soviet units involved.
- i. Independent of h. above, the need to search the Sino-Soviet border areas.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Intelligence Impact Forecast for KH-4 FY 1968 Program

3. There is, of course, the possibility of initial deployment of a Soviet "mobile" system. It is still not clear to me, however, what if anything we should do in the next few years in this event. Should Mao die soon, and a new leadership friendly to the Soviets evolve, initial rapprochement would be in the economic rather than military sphere. Thus, I have ruled out this unlikely event as having any possible impact in FY 1968.

4. Assuming our tactical photographic reconnaissance in North Vietnam is indeed completely inadequate, and the U.S. air attack is either turned off (likely), or is intensified (unlikely), the effect on KH-4 search (or surveillance) should be negligible. Conceding that in the former case the reconnaissance requirement may become "strategic" rather than "tactical," the need can far better be served by OXCART, during FY 68.

5. Assuming J-3 performs as planned, intelligence will probably clamor for J-3's instead of J-1's. This probability will become a certainty should the increase in scale at 85 nm altitude enable us to identify tanks and other ground force equipment. Excluding for the moment backups and any special missions, we should consider the situation in which we are required to fly 5 J-3's in FY 1968, and 8 in FY 1969 and FY 1970 (i. e., buy 8 more J-3's). *J-1's  
only vehicles  
which  
can carry*

6. I should judge the more time elapses the less likely it is we shall fly a special SAM mission, unless the Soviets or Chinese introduce soon a new weapon system which we must attack. There will be interest in night photography of a few selected targets, and in crop photography. The latter has potential over the long-term but presents a combination of problems which may be difficult to overcome in FY 1968: *(USA)*

- a. The intelligence problem it allegedly attacks, "guns or butter," is not at the top of the priority list; if successful, crop photography will not really solve

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Intelligence Impact Forecast for KH-4 FY 1968 Program

a major intelligence problem--it will enable ORR to produce faster and more accurate estimates (like the use of computers by the networks on election night).

- b. On a four-looks per year basis (ORR's minimum requirement), it does not seem practical to schedule these looks within 8 evenly-spaced missions. By scheduling 9 not-so-evenly spaced missions, we could get over four-looks without a special mission. This may require three consecutive J-3 missions during the late March/early August period (we now have only one planned).
- c. It will probably take ORR at least one complete two-look cycle (June and late July/early August), followed by several months of cross checking with Soviet statistics to arrive at any conclusions on the utility of crop photography. Thus, we shall have to sell COMIREX at least a two-look package.

7. To sum up, the FY 1968 search need will not be less than that achieved in FY 1967, and there are no apparent intelligence needs which would require it to be greater.



SA/IS/OSP

~~TOP SECRET~~