



1809Z 13 MAY 63

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**PRIORITY** *DAIR*  
*CD*  
*RB*

DIRECTOR

OSA (1-15)

S C (16)

1809Z 13 MAY 63

PRIORITY

PRNTY

MAIL


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SIC

CORONA LANYARD SECUR

ATTN:

FROM:



*Satellite / Infrared*


1. FYI. RECENT TECHNICAL DECISIONS HAVE RESULTED IN AN ABSENCE OF CAMOUFLAGE ON THE PAYLOAD KLUGE. A PAINT PATTERN OF WHITE STRIPES IN VARYING WIDTHS IS BEING APPLIED TO ATTAIN DESIRED THERMAL CONTROL CONDITIONS. CONTRACTOR ADVISES THAT RED AND BLACK TAPE PREVIOUSLY APPLIED TO VEHICLE SURFACE IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE TECHNICALLY AS IT TENDS TO DEGRADE THERMAL CONTROLS AND MAY POSSIBLY BE CAUSE OF STREAKING ON FILM AS A RESULT OF PEALING OFF SURFACE. INVESTIGATIONS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY CONTRACTOR TO UTILIZED THERMAL AND NON-THERMAL PAINT PATTERNS AS CAMOUFLAGE WHEREVER APPROPRIATE. THERMAL EXPERTS INDICATE THAT SUCH APPLICATION IS MOST LIMITED IF DESIRED CONTROL CONDITIONS ARE TO BE ATTAINED. AS RESULT VEHICLES CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR FLIGHT IN NEAR FUTURE PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE BENEFIT OF COMPLETE DISGUISE. HOWEVER ANTICIPATE SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IN NEAR FUTURE THROUGH JUDICIOUS USE OF PAINTS AND PATTERNS WITHIN

Declassified and Released by the N R C

In Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1997

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PAGE TWO

ACCEPTED TOLERANCES; MEANTIME SOME SECURITY RISKS WILL BE INCURRED.

2. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT PHOTOGRAPHS OF CORONA MISSION VEHICLES ON LIFT-OFF ARE NOT BEING PROPERLY SCREENED BY CLEARED PERSONNEL. RECENT EVIDENCE THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS SECURITY COMPROMISE OF PROGRAM. IN VIEW OF RECENT CHANGES CITED IN PARA 1 ABOVE, IT SUGGESTED THAT APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR THEIR REVIEW BE INSTITUTED AND ENFORCED.

-END OF MSG-

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7 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Security Incident

1. During mating exercise of Lanyard-1 on the night of 16/17 March 1963, it was discerned that the door of the payload kluge had not been properly camouflaged. The longitudinal thermal paint patterns had been placed on the kluge, however, they ran up to the door and along side but not across. Failure to continue the stripes across the door greatly emphasized and high-lighted the presence of the main L door. The operational schedule would not allow any correction to be made without causing a delay of the flight. The decision was made not to attempt to remedy the situation due to the various tasks then being considerably behind schedule and the unfeasibility of painting the additional patterns while at the pad.

2. Upon return to the A/P Facility on 19 March the matter was brought to the attention of [REDACTED] Manager, LMSC/AP. Inquiries as to why the kluge was not camouflaged were made and he was informed verbally by the Project Resident Security Officer that there was a definite security requirement for deception markings. He agreed that the matter required immediate attention and that it would be corrected at once. The writer requested that he be informed of what measures were decided on to appropriately camouflage the payload kluge. From time to time since that date [REDACTED] has been queried regarding the situation. The contractor has responded with alacrity and has provided interim means of disguising the sensitive features of the kluge. He is procuring a type of gold paint and other colors for this use. Attainment of proper thermal conditions requires appropriate application, amount, and type of paint. Opinions were advanced from these quarters that the black and red tape formerly placed on the kluge interfered with the precise requirements of the thermal condition. In addition, streaking of the payload on M-19 was attributed to the possibility that it was caused by the camouflage tape peeling off from the skin. As a result a decision was made to remove the camouflage tape. In so doing, however, the contractor failed to review this decision with the Project Security Representative or to provide a suitable substitute thereby resulting in the L-1 kluge not being properly camouflaged.

[REDACTED]

Satellite/President

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3. On the morning of 1 May 1963, the writer was informed by Col. Murphy that he had heard a rumor to the effect that [REDACTED] Program Director, LMSC/SV, had seen a photograph of the L-1 lift-off, showing the vehicle minus the cooling blanket. The photograph purportedly showed the outline of the main door. That afternoon the writer viewed a set of color prints of which one photo showed the vehicle as described above. However, the door was not clearly discernable and there is some question whether an unwitting viewer would be able to state that a door existed on the vehicle. However, the failure to bring the thermal print pattern across the door definitely emphasized the blank area and an astute observer could surmise the existence of a door. The photograph in question had the following inscription stamped on the back: Douglas Aircraft Corp., Santa Monica, California, Dep A-346, Color Photo Laboratory, Color Print Number DAC11236.

4. The writer immediately contacted [REDACTED] and requested that he make appropriate inquiries concerning the release of these photos by SSD and any other information concerning the matter. It was also suggested that the photo review procedure be re-examined. In addition, LMSC/AP Management was again requested to take every step to insure that there would be no re-occurrence of the problem. [REDACTED] reported back that the matter was being investigated by SSD and that the photos had been taken by a USAF photo unit. After printing they had been sent to [REDACTED] and distribution was made by them. The number of copies made of the photos was not known immediately. He further stated that inquiries were being made as to why the reviewer released the photo and why it had not been classified. The review and release procedures were also being re-examined in light of this incident.

5. In summary the incident was caused by a series of failures on the part of:

- a. The contractor to inform the Project Resident Security Officer that the camouflage was being deleted.
- b. The contractor to substitute other types of markings to effect disguises of the more sensitive factors of the payload kluge.
- c. The USAF reviewer in not recognizing <sup>the</sup> compromising nature on the photo.
- d. The USAF reviewer in releasing the photo as unclassified without any restrictions as to its distribution.

It might be added that the photographs also pictured very clearly the TAT feature on the Thor. It is most probable that this information also falls into a classified category. At this writing the undersigned is continuing to monitor the situation and remain in close contact with [REDACTED] Project Headquarters has been appraised of the matter by telecon and this office plans to remit a copy of the final report to them.

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[REDACTED]