FURTHER NOTES ON NSAM 156 ARMS CONTROL PAPER

Although the paper euphemistically refers to "observation satellites," it also seems to imply very strongly that all that is being referred to is photographic satellites. This, of course, comprises only one part, although perhaps the most important part of the NRO program, since we also have satellites collecting ELINT, COMINT and telemetry.

It would be foolhardy for us to disclose some of these as yet undeployed capabilities in their entirety, and yet to be thoroughly convincing about our capabilities without on-site inspection, it is necessary to consider these and other intelligence collection methods in their entirety.

The NSAM 156 paper, while it refers to the SNIE, really fails to appreciate that satellite reconnaissance is only one of several methods by which we are expected to be able to detect certain types of violations of the proposed arms control agreement. A great deal is made in the SNIE of our current capabilities (and extensions thereof) to collect telemetry and observe reentry of Soviet missile tests. Much of this collection is from sensitive locations in countries on the Soviet borders. We would not propose now, I presume, to disclose in detail that we intend to use such sites to police the arms control agreement even though I am sure that from an
intelligence standpoint the Soviets are at least as aware of them as are our newspapers.

We obviously should leave our options as wide open as possible with respect to choosing, when the need for evidence arises, the elements of intelligence information which can best make our point with the Soviets, the United Nations, the Congress or the United States public as the case may be. With minimum compromise to intelligence collection methods, to specifically single out one or some intelligence collection methods now and to pass in our discussions with either the Soviets or our own Congress and public only those chosen methods, is not only dangerous but is misleading and may at a later time evolve into a "credibility gap."

As a fallback position, if we insist on mentioning satellites, it would seem that we should refer to satellite intelligence collection rather than observation satellites, since this would span the whole gamut from VELA to GAMBIT and would be nearer to the truth. It would also allow us greater flexibility in the future in the development of new sensors to claim that they too were a part of what we counted on, and would most nearly conform to the kind of security cover which we have also provided to the NRO via the classified satellite program.

Dr. Flax's comments / September 1968