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GAMBIT/DORIAN
HEXAGON

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Comments:

1. As I understand the politics of spying, a nation never admits it. Exceptions have been unpleasant and should not establish a precedent. In this case making the fact of spying unclassified is unnecessary since:

- a. The Russians need not be convinced of our experience in "national verification" only our ^{entire} intelligence to accept it.
- b. The Congress and our Allies can be convinced at T-KH level, selectively, and at a military security level pertinent to technology, capability but not "fact" of spying.
- c. The public can be convinced by statements of capability based on extensive military R&D.

Further releasing the "fact" of spying opens the possibility of political reaction from the Soviets.

a. It might actually be counterproductive to the negotiation if the Soviets felt obliged to say something nasty.

b. It could provide evidence for the Soviets to say arms limitations can't be trusted since we hide big programs anyway.

c. If the negotiations became acrimonious, the Soviets might find it necessary to say - "we will cease talk and we will no longer tolerate your spying." (I, personally, seem to be the only nut around who is continually frightened by this prospect and the facts of a good Soviet anti-satellite capability - a terribly vulnerable recce program becoming much more so - and zero U.S. anti-satellite capability).

HANDLE VIA ~~BYEMAN~~
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The Soviet might do these things anyway - whether the "fact" is released or not - but releasing the "fact" only gives them more options and this is bad from the point of view of the negotiations and the mandatory goal of maintaining our recce capability. The release is obviously hazardous - the only issue is how much and do the benefits justify it. These benefits do not relate to the negotiations - only to raising our credibility with citizens and allies.

2. Therefore, I believe it is essential that the "fact" remain T-KH. The negotiators should be instructed to say that the U.S. has conducted extensive space R&D - civilian and military which leads us to confidence in our acceptance of national verification. This testing has involved space flight - *in* the civilian portion no overflight. The military R&D is classified. No comment as to overflight.


3. The remaining issue is how to establish our credibility with allies and citizens. It is amazing to me that "Chip" obviously fears this point far more than reaching agreement with the Soviets. The U.S. is in a bad way if its prestige is so low that the Soviets will accept a treaty (we appear to offer from weakness?) but our own people and friends will not believe we know what we are doing. But releasing the "fact" doesn't help this situation - it only confirms our duplicity. I think too much is made of the technology hidden behind T-KH and BYEMAN. The hidden capability relates to experience, contractor base, production rate and other factors relating to the magnitude and history of the technical effort. Contrary to egotistical, self-deluding views, the "art" is not in the security system. The biggest and best Cer-Vit mirror will be done for Chile - the most precise large optics flown have been in stratoscopes and OAO. Aden Meinel makes 90" precision pieces on the adjacent machine in an open shop that he finishes 58" stereo, etc., etc.

I am sure I can go to Boeing, NAA, American Optical, Kollsman, etc., and get a white competitive proposal on GAMBIT-CUBED or HEXAGON systems, which will be almost as creditable ~~in or out of the system and~~ those underway - The doubts would relate to - they may underestimate schedule and costs - or, why bring AO up to a production capability like EK - or I would hate to go through that early G failure history again - but these are management arguments not feasibility - credibility arguments.

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Congress and Allies at T-KH level - Ok. Otherwise, release at military classification whatever is felt necessary to be believable. A large extensive military R&D effort - no specifics - but show Dayton 80" system, P&E 36" stratoscope and OAO, bring C-V and ULE into it - consider surfacing follow-on optics as a recce system test by CRL. - use SR-71 optics - if necessary, surface most of our R&D through the Recce Lab - none of that hurts the BYEMAN system.

If the U.S. still is not trusted by friends and citizens - release DORIAN - military R&D - impressive resolution - but not part of NRP. There is plenty of technology to be made white - BYEMAN TKH were never really intended to protect that - but we must not give up on "facts" of spying.



~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA ~~BYEMAN~~

CONTROL SYSTEM