MEMORANDUM

May 16, 1968

Paul:

This is extremely interesting. But, I notice the flap didn't respond to the question related to clearance for the committee members.

Why don't we get this level upset; I assume that he thinks the TM plus the TS memo are enough and see what happens.

Mr. Massa

Amen!

Saeed

Authority for C-4-0

Given by Mr. Massa 1 July 1968
Dear Homer:

I was pleased to receive your letter of April 19 and appreciate your thoughtfulness in keeping us informed of your plans for developing an understanding of satellite observation policy in other governmental agencies.

Dr. Foster, Dr. Wilson, and I have reviewed your proposed in-house policy statement on satellite observation and agree with its content and classification. We believe it would strengthen your position with the in-house audience to add these clarifying sentences to the bottom of page 1, end of paragraph 3, as follows: "The nature and extent of such disclosure at any given time is subject to approval by the appropriate national authorities. Specific studies, plans, projects and programs which are not clearly within permissible levels of disclosure will therefore require review and coordination within the Government prior to action by NASA to initiate or implement such studies, plans, projects and programs." This makes it plain to the NASA reader that the issue goes far beyond technical considerations and that the approval authority is therefore outside any single governmental department.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Alexander H. Flax

Dr. Homer E. Newell
Associate Administrator
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546

[Handwritten note: Top Secret]
1. It is the policy of NASA to support and further the concepts of open skies and freedom of space. The community of nations in general supports both concepts, either explicitly or tacitly; we may expect continued and even expanded acceptance unless governments or peoples believe that the exercise of these freedoms violates national sovereignty, invades domestic privacy, or usurps property rights.

2. NASA must therefore carry out its aeronautical and space activities under carefully developed ground rules that permit technological progress while avoiding confrontations that could jeopardize the nation’s ability to work freely in space and in the air, either on a national or global scale.

3. One of the potentially most sensitive areas of NASA activities is earth observation from aircraft and spacecraft. Such applications programs as those in meteorology or earth resources surveys run the risk of being misconstrued as unfriendly acts on the part of the United States Government. NASA must, in the execution of its programs, protect the possibility of continued useful research and development activity in these areas. Public acceptance of earth sensing from space can best be achieved over a period of time. This calls for a gradual and controlled disclosure of spaceborne sensor capabilities rather than for any sudden revelation thereof.
4. Since NASA's experience to date with earth sensor systems in space extends only to meteorological satellites and astronaut photography, the first phase of technological disclosure should not indicate too radical a departure from this prior base of published and open data. Therefore, for the present NASA will not discuss publicly, propose, fund, define, develop, or include in any mission:
   a. spaceborne image-forming devices capable of a ground resolution of less than 100 feet from 100 nautical miles altitude.
   b. spaceborne image-forming active emitters, such as lasers or radars, in any form.

5. To assure that, even within these constraints, international or security sensitivities are properly considered, all space-acquired earth imagery will be subject to classified review prior to public or in-house release. Procedures for such review are being developed by the Office of DOD and Interagency Affairs.

6. While airborne sensor technology is not under the same limitations as are space systems, sensors tested in aircraft for space application will conform to the ground rules noted above.

7. The security classification of this document is TOP SECRET. This classification extends to the existence of the policy as well as to its substance. Addressees will become thoroughly familiar with its contents, will abide by its spirit as well as its contents, and will so conduct their assigned duties as to assure that the stated policy is not contravened.
8. Addressees are not authorized to discuss this policy or its implementation except with those officials indicated on the distribution list.

James E. Webb
Administrator
Honorable Alexander H. Flex
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Research and Development)
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Al:

In reviewing the security and management considerations of the NASA earth resources survey effort, we have determined that it is necessary to work with the user community through some formal mechanism rather than on an ad-hoc or informal basis. We feel that an interagency committee chaired by NASA would provide a controlled means for information exchange, policy review, requirements validation, and planning coordination. We are planning to structure this group with the following membership:

Department of Agriculture  Dr. George Mehren
                                 Assistant Secretary
                                 of Agriculture

U. S. Geological Survey       Dr. William Pecora
                                 Director

Environmental Science        Dr. Robert M. White
                                 Services Administration
                                 Administrator

Department of the Navy        Dr. Robert Prosh
                                 Assistant Secretary
                                 of the Navy (SEC)

To our knowledge, only Dr. Prosh has the BYEAN clearances necessary for access to the policy background and coordination activities that are concerned with sensor thresholds and development constraints.

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take decisive action.

I would much appreciate your guidance on those questions, since we are

committee meeting in the near future.

we should plan to discuss this matter and look for possible options of mutual interest. However,

I can't make the decision of accepting a copy of this letter.

committee meeting, which was the occasion on which the International Atomic Energy Agency's report, AIEA report, or its counterpart, would be presented to the needs of the

as the coordinator more of the meeting, not of the proceedings or the

of the proceedings of the meeting, I do not feel the

shall produce a document on the occasion of the meeting, which would provide

on this last point. I am endorsing a decision of a possible 105

unusual meeting in November, (as it was expected for the reactions to the possible effects of the

by your office, or it may also be reported to the Secretariat in New York,

on the basis of the recommendations contained in

the Inter-American report, I believe the committee should

100 and your office and why they were not made available.

Supreme Court of the United States on Wednesday, which was expected to take place

we feel strongly that the Inter-American

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