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WASHINGTON, D.C.



THE NRO STAFF

October 9, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL  ALLEN

SUBJECT: Air Reconnaissance of South China

Captain Wilson called me with reference to Dr. McLucas' memo of October 7 (attached) for Mr. Packard on the subject: Air Reconnaissance of South China.

Captain Wilson indicated that Mr. Packard had reviewed the memo and had some concern about the substantive recommendation (paragraph 2 of Dr. McLucas' letter) and had related to Captain Wilson his feelings: Mr. Packard understands Dr. McLucas' recommendation and agrees that the technical and operational considerations in selecting the appropriate asset would certainly be based on Dr. McLucas' advice. However, Mr. Packard points out that such advice is always sought by Mr. Packard and is usually provided by Dr. McLucas through his direct line (DNRO) responsibility to Mr. Packard. Mr. Packard is concerned that if he were to suggest a modification of the particular option as written, the 303 Committee might misunderstand the modified option and conclude that we are attempting to usurp its prerogatives, particularly since there are some peculiar political considerations involved in this decision. Mr. Packard feels that the Committee clearly understands the option as written and recognizes the Dr. McLucas/Mr. Packard role in such a decision. Further, Mr. Packard points out that he is in a position to insure that Dr. McLucas' advice in such a selection is sought since it would obviously be the basis for his position in the Committee deliberations. Accordingly, Mr. Packard prefers not to deal with the proposed modification of the option. He asked that we be sure to pass this word to Dr. McLucas.

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I did have an opportunity to explain to Captain Wilson that we had no intention of becoming involved in the political considerations and recognized that they were paramount in the decision on this particular item, but that we were simply trying to assure that, should a resumption of overflight be authorized, the DNRO's advice in the selection of the appropriate asset would be represented in any decision by the Committee or higher authority. As I understand Mr. Packard's comments, we have that assurance without a modification of the option.


WILLIAM R. YOST
Colonel, USAF

Copy to Colonel Sweeney

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 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

OCT 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PACKARD

SUBJECT: Air Reconnaissance of South China

REFERENCE: Draft Memorandum for the President, subject as above,
from Henry A. Kissinger

The proposed memorandum to the President has been broadened since I commented on the previous draft to include not only the satisfaction of priority tactical intelligence targets, but also priority strategic intelligence targets.

Should the President authorize overflights to satisfy both tactical and strategic requirements without personally designating which collection platform is to be used, the memorandum now states that the 303 Committee will make the selection. I believe that the deficient intelligence requirements should be provided to the National Reconnaissance Office which can make an analysis of the available NRP resources to identify the best platform to satisfy the requirements. Recommendations would be made to the 303 Committee in accordance with the current procedures for authorizing overflights of denied territory. I recommend deletion of the option in the draft memorandum which implies direct selection of the collection platform by the 303 Committee, or modification of the option to agree with the current procedures.

I also recommend the following minor changes to the draft memorandum:

- a. Page 1, paragraph 5: Change to read "...strongly desire to update in the areas of South China bordering North Vietnam, Laos, and Burma."
- b. Page 2, second sentence: Delete from last line "If the operational test is successful."


 John L. McLucas

Attachment

Memo, dtd Oct 3, 1969 (BYE-106, 265-69B)

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 BYE-106-18
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 3, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Mitchell
 Mr. David Packard
 Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
 Mr. Richard Helms

SUBJECT: Air Reconnaissance of South China

In line with Dr. Kissinger's request following the expanded discussions on aerial reconnaissance over South China in the 303 Committee meeting of September 30th, I attach a revised draft of a proposed memorandum to the President.

I will appreciate your concurrence, comments or suggestions for changes at your early convenience.

Frank M. Chapin

Frank M. Chapin

Attachment
 BYE 106,265-69B-1

BYE 106,265-69B

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