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~~ISI~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

October 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ALLEN

SUBJECT: Verification Working Group Meeting, October 7

Attendees: Mr. Duckett
Mr. Hewitt



Capt Meceda

[Redacted] opened the meeting by asking whether there were any questions on the NSC meeting scheduled for 10 a. m. on the 8th of October. Everybody around the room said yes, there were a number of questions. [Redacted] proceeded then to state that it would be an information meeting only and that an agenda had been put out in the form of a memo requesting briefings. The briefings will be as follows: Mr. Helms will brief on U.S. collection capabilities and limitations and, as time permits, will also discuss recent Soviet weapons developments. The State Department representative will brief on the diplomatic repercussions of Soviet non-compliance with an agreement. Mr. Packard will brief on alternative options. Mr. Smith of ACDA will brief on the impact of verification on SALT. Dr. Kissinger will talk about the verification study in general. His comments will be taken from the summary report. He will discuss problems in verification and understanding of the differing views and issues in verification. He will also attempt to discuss where we are headed and what additional work and evaluations must be done.

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Some general discussion preceded the discussion of changes to the summary report. The only subject of note was the discussion of a limitation on "throw weight" and the fact that this was a very tentative consideration. Several changes to the summary report were discussed in detail; for instance, a discussion of mobile missiles, the discussion of a definition of new or improved missiles, and SS-11 accuracy considerations. It was agreed that the CIA will prepare a paper on mobile missile development and deployment.

The MIRV panel report was discussed. [] mentioned that the report is ready except for the implications of mandatory bans on U.S. satellite intelligence collection activity. [] stated that we know what the current status of Soviet reconnaissance activity is, therefore, we should be able to challenge their activities if we see a change. I pointed out that if such were the basis for a challenge, the first time the KH-9 is launched we'd better be prepared for a challenge that we are developing a MIRV. At this point the discussion of the subject got very fuzzy and again State was put on the spot to attempt to develop a more precise definition of the mandatory collateral constraints. Such a definition should be provided by Friday.

Mr. Duckett mentioned that the telemetry suppression team was meeting and obviously no report as yet. Mr. Duckett also mentioned that there are individuals working in the radar and SAM upgrading problem, and that although it was an extremely involved problem, they might have something by Friday.

The subject of strategic analysis was discussed and Lynn has evidently not been pleased with any of the work in this area. He wanted to know what the strategic risks are and he wants to be able to discuss the range of views on risks with the President. He says he does not understand why ACDA and JCS views are different with regard to strategic risks. He, [] wants an analysis of the options and the related strategic consequences and the different agency views on consequences so that the President can make his own decision. He stated that the Team 2 effort directed by General Kent had tried valiantly but had not succeeded in answering [] concerns and questions on strategic risks. Mr. Nitze had also prepared a paper on strategic consequences and it was discussed at the meeting. Mr. Duckett stated that there was an NIE on Soviet objectives and asked why we had to go and develop new documents on the same subject. [] stated that he had a

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problem with the NIE and he said notwithstanding the NIE, he has not been able to find a clear statement of U. S. strategic objectives anywhere, at which point everybody made the comment that we ought to attempt to obtain a copy of the "Soviet NIE on the U. S. " [] then stated that he guessed that the best method of preparing the strategic consequences paper would be to have the Verification Group write it. He, [] will come up with an outline of about 5-10 pages which will be submitted to the Principals' for their review and approval prior to starting work on the paper.

Several other small subjects were discussed and the meeting broke up at 1230, with [] mentioning again that the NSC meeting was scheduled for Wednesday, October 8 at 10 a.m.


JOHN R. MECEDA
Captain, USAF

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