

M/R:

On July 16, Dr. McLucas returned the attached LHSM with the urgent direction that we immediately redo as a memo for his signature to Mr. Packard. The memo was prepared, with necessary changes, and one added paragraph (see copy, also attached).

Dr. McLucas discussed the memo with Mr. Packard and returned it to us for formal controlled transmittal -- accomplished early PM, July 16.

WRY
July 17, 1969

~~TOP SECRET~~POLARIS
HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM~~ISI~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

July 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: ExCom and the Arms Control Satellite

Problem:

To encourage Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee to review a proposal for an Arms Control Satellite.

Background:

In May 1969, your NRO Staff recommended that the NSSM 28 Committee (responsible for SALT negotiation policy) consider the desirability of an Arms Control Satellite initiative to the USSR. Such an initiative would, we believe, give ACDA the advantage of being able to openly discuss satellite observation without adverse effects on the security protection surrounding (and so vital to) the NRP. In this approach, the United States would negotiate with the Soviets on the basis of an Arms Control Satellite to be developed and operated (1) jointly by the two nations, or (2) bilaterally, like the US-USSR meteorological satellites, or (3) nationally, with each nation agreeing to build and operate its own. In each case, the U.S. development agency would be NASA.

The satellite would be defined in terms of whatever emerged from the negotiations. Resolution -- always a critical question previously -- would be no problem here, and it is estimated that the USSR would propose some value between 2 and 10 meters. By working in this manner, outside the NRP, ACDA could avoid con-

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM~~TOP SECRET~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLYCONTROL NO _____
COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES
PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

fronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or privately with the reality of a major U. S. intelligence collection program. Perhaps even more important -- if that is possible -- ACDA would also avoid domestic confrontation with Congress and the American public. Finally, if the initiative is successful, the U. S. would have achieved a measurable step toward legitimatizing satellite observation at some to-be-negotiated level; if the discussions failed, they would do so without jeopardizing the NRP.

Prior to the May 14 meeting of the NSSM 28 Committee, NRO Staff members met with Mr. Gerard Smith (ACDA), Dr. Seaborg (AEC), Mr. Bruce Clarke (CIA), Mr. Jack Shaw (State), and Major General Allison (JCS) to discuss the Arms Control Satellite. At its meeting, the NSSM 28 Committee decided to ask Ambassador Johnson's NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee to examine the suggestion in the light of satellite reconnaissance policy.

*also
Dr. Nathan
P
L.O.
FISA*

Present Status:

The State Department is showing no sense of urgency in calling the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee into session. As a matter of fact, last Thursday (July 10) in conversations with Mr. Jack Shaw (Executive Secretary of the committee), I was surprised to learn of his open hostility to the proposal. Mr. Shaw says that an Arms Control Satellite would present "more problems than disclosure." In reply to the question, "What would you do to establish verification credibility with the American public?", Shaw replied, "We'll tell them we have national means of verification. If they ask what it is, we'll say we can't tell them." With regard to satellite vulnerability, Shaw said, "I'm told 'they' can't do anything to keep us from flying."

In the meanwhile, Dr. DuBridge has recommended that "the ExCom consider the proposal and decide whether to encourage a 156 review."

Recommendation:

It seems very timely to have an ExCom meeting -- perhaps a luncheon -- to conduct the review recommended by Dr. DuBridge.

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

CONTROL NO. _____
COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES
PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

I suggest that Mr. Packard consider inviting Dr. Tom Paine and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to be guests. This meeting would produce the following results:

1. Acquaint Mr. Helms and Dr. DuBridge directly and for the first time, with the details of the Arms Control Satellite initiative.
2. Give Dr. Paine (who has supported this idea strongly in letters to Mr. Packard and Mr. Helms) an opportunity to express NASA's thoughts on the initiative.
3. Give Ambassador Johnson some facts he is not getting from Jack Shaw plus a sense of urgency in considering the initiative within his committee.
4. Establish important coordinated ground work in DOD, CIA, State, OST, and NASA prior to the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting.

Paul E. Worthman
PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

If Mr. Packard agrees that an ad hoc EXCOM meeting is in order to consider encouraging a 156 meeting on disclosure policy we will be pleased to attempt to set it up. We would also, if you desire, prepare the issues for discussion.

L.O.

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM~~TOP SECRET~~
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLYCONTROL NO _____
COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES
PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES