MEMORANDUM FOR THE NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Revision of ExCom-M-17
(Dtd August 7, 1969)

Please substitute the attached revised pages 2 and 3 in ExCom-M-17. The revisions are indicated by broken underlining. With this revision, I consider the minutes to be formally approved as agreed at the August 15 ExCom.

F. Robert Naka
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Revised pages 2 and 3
for ExCom-M-17
I. **Issue:** Should the ExCom encourage an NSAM 156 Committee consideration of the security and policy implications of SALT with respect to the NRP?

Dr. McLucas introduced the subject of the impact of the SALT negotiations on the NRP. Background material had been previously distributed (see BYE-13062-69, 6 Aug 69).

Mr. Nitze stated that Mr. Gerard Smith, head of the SALT delegation, had asked the CIA to provide guidelines on the various levels of sensitivity associated with our collection capabilities. He said he had read the paper yesterday and it was very good. The NRP was well covered in the paper. As for the SALT negotiations, his impression is that during our talks with the Russians we are to discuss verification last and that in connection with its initial position the delegation has been instructed to state the willingness of the United States to rely on "national means" to the maximum extent possible. If the discussion proceeds beyond that, then the delegation must return for instructions. As a consequence, the NRO and other interested parties should have plenty of time to consider this matter further.

Mr. Helms confirmed the content of the CIA report. He further said that the inspection satellite question should not be brought up because such negotiation would start us down the "slippery slope" and we must not reveal our resolution capability. Dr. DuBridge concurred, saying that NASA was going to have an earth resources satellite so why do we need another program. Mr. Packard said that there are two reasons why it may be desirable to have a verification satellite program:

1. It would indicate how we would verify that the terms of the Treaty are being met, and

2. It would symbolize a joint effort between NASA and the DOD.

Dr. McLucas pointed out that NASA has already sent a proposal on an inspection satellite to the NSSM 28 Committee and to the 383 Committee. Dr. Steininger pointed out that the current NASA time schedule for an earth resources satellite might be too late for SALT. The earth resources satellite plan calls for 300-foot resolution in 1971 or 1972.
Dr. DuBridge suggested that the restriction of 20 meters' resolution which was placed on NASA three years ago could be relaxed considerably. Mr. Helms concurred.

Mr. Packard summarized the feeling of the ExCom that discussion of this subject with the NSAM 156 Committee would be premature and no action should be taken now.

II. Relationship between SALT, High-Resolution Activities

Dr. McLucas raised the question of whether in the period of a budget squeeze we should cut back on our high-resolution activity which is a follow-on to MOL in favor of what? He asked if we did that, how SALT would be affected.

The consensus of the Committee was that the existence of SALT negotiations should not now affect the NRP and that it was too early to tell which is more important for SALT, high resolution or what? Dr. DuBridge asked whether the SALT negotiations would act to shift money from weapons to intelligence. Mr. Packard replied that money is so tight that it probably would not work that way.

III. DOD Intelligence Programs Reorganization Under Mr. Robert F. Froehlke

Dr. DuBridge raised the question of the Laird memorandum on reorganizing the DOD intelligence resources. Dr. DuBridge said that he had understood from Mr. Laird that he intended that the NRO not be affected. Mr. Packard replied that the idea was to organize the activities of NSA and DIA better but not affect activities which were working well, like the NRP. He said that he thought the proposed Executive Council would be made up of members of the NRP Executive Committee and a few others for the purpose of coordinating the DOD intelligence activities. However, the ExCom should continue to function as it has and so should the NRO.

F. Robert Naka
Secretary