MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ALLEN

SUBJECT: NRO Responsibilities for NRP Air Vehicle Reconnaissance Projects

PROBLEM:

This memorandum addresses two matters:

a. The de facto take-over by the Joint Reconnaissance Center of the NRO's responsibility for management and operational control of air vehicle overflight reconnaissance activities.

b. The question of how the DNRO should handle overall supervisory responsibility for these activities.

BACKGROUND:

The DNRO's basic authority and responsibility for management and control of all overflight activities are stated clearly in DOD Directive 5105.23, March 1964, and in the DOD/CIA Agreement of August 1965. DOD Directive 5105.23 (Tab A) assigns to the DNRO responsibility for "consolidation of all DOD satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography and electronic signal collection into a single program, defined as the National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defense" (italics added). He is further told to "establish appropriate interfaces between the National Reconnaissance Office and the USIB, the JCS, the DIA, and the NSA." He is specifically delegated authority to assist the Secretary of Defense in the supervision of aircraft, drone and satellite reconnaissance, mapping and geodetic matters, including both photographic and electronic signal projects, and be his direct representative on those matters both within and outside the Department of Defense" (italics added).
The DOD/CIA Agreement (Tab B) reinforces the DNRO's charter, making him responsible "for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range, for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations)." ExCom is told to "assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DOD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee."

While the DNRO's responsibilities are unequivocal—responsibility for all overflights, including air vehicles—his actual control over air vehicle overflights has become ambiguous, having been eroded steadily over the past six years, particularly in periods of international crisis. The U-2 and low-level Cuban overflights and [ ] were the first examples of "delegation" of DNRO authority to the JRC. These "transfers," like those to follow, were always tacit and informal.

There was one major effort to clarify the situation. In 1963, the DNRO proposed that the Director, JRC, serve a dual function, supervising NRO aircraft and satellite operations, as well as JRC peripheral activities. This proposal was well received by the JCS and OSD, but was opposed by the CIA and eventually abandoned.

The JRC Director's responsibilities for military aerial reconnaissance were discussed in February and March 1968 in two memoranda signed by Mr. Nitze and addressed to the Chairman, JCS; Director, NRO; Director, DIA; and Director, NSA. The key provisions of these memoranda (Tabs C and D) were as follows:

a. The JCS should maintain cognizance and control over all military aerial, surface (land and sea), and submarine reconnaissance operations.

b. The forecast of reconnaissance operations conducted under the overall direction of the DNRO should be transmitted to the 303 Committee in the JCS forecast binder. (It was made clear by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Office that this was intended as a convenience and was not intended to alter the DNRO's authority.)

c. The JCS should prepare appropriate management directives to govern the conduct of all military aerial, surface, and submarine

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
reconnaissance operations, including JCS responsibilities for advising and seeking the approval of higher authority in all military reconnaissance operations of a sensitive or potentially sensitive nature.

These memoranda were intended to strengthen JCS control over military reconnaissance operations of all types. It is probably no coincidence that they followed closely on the seizing of the "Pueblo."

A very recent example of the blurring of JCS-NRO responsibilities occurs in General Steakley's memorandum (see Tab E) in which he stands down the NRO's GLASS LAMP missions over Cuba.

DISCUSSION:

NRO and the JRC. By tacitly accepting increased control by the JCS/JRC of SAC U-2, SR-71, and USAF drone operations, the DNRO has been moved into a disadvantageous position. While the DNRO is still responsible for all overflight programs, he has lost a very significant amount of control over the conduct of these programs. One remaining control element is the fact that the Director, JRC submits to the DNRO his monthly forecast of military aircraft and drone operations which require approval of the 303 Committee. The DNRO has the authority to change these forecasts before submitting them to the 303 Committee, but, in fact, has never done so. On at least one occasion, the Director, JRC has challenged the requirement that he submit his overflight forecasts to the DNRO. Since he receives 303 Committee approval directly (and not through the DNRO), he now regards the NRO Monthly Forecast mechanism as redundant and harmless.

Another NRO-JRC problem, probably of more importance than forecast channels, lies in the fact that the NRO has no dependable mechanism for obtaining information on JRC-controlled flights (planned, underway, or completed). Some data are obtained by strenuous personal negotiation between members of the NRO Staff and JRC, usually after the fact. Likewise, information on the extent to which JRC overflights have satisfied USIB/COMIREX requirements and the interface with COMIREX on feedback and reporting is handled by the DIA member of COMIREX, rather than the NRO COMIREX consultant.

NRO and OSA. The NRO position with regard to OSA-conducted overflights is somewhat better. OSA, as an operating arm of the DNRO (through the Director, CIA Reconnaissance Programs), is responsive to DNRO direction with regard to overflights. A monthly forecast of
such overflights is submitted for DNRO and 303 Committee approval, and 303 Committee approval is, in turn, provided to the DNRO. Before overflights having monthly blanket authority are actually conducted, OSA submits to the DNRO a formal "black book" proposal which lays out the proposed flight routes, the targets to be covered, and other data. Here, again, DNRO interest is cursory; rarely, if ever, is the OSA proposal challenged, evaluated, or replaced by a superior alternative.

The CIA member of COMIREX, not the NRO COMIREX consultant, reports on OSA flight results. Thus, the NRO position with respect to COMIREX is the same for OSA operations as it is for JRC operations.

Upon occasion, the DCI will request the 303 Committee to approve a U-2 peripheral flight. The DNRO has taken the view, and it seems quite properly, that such flights are outside his charter and interest; however, the fact remains that the CIA is using an NRO asset to conduct peripheral reconnaissance. The question that immediately presents itself is "Why?" Should the CIA engage in peripheral reconnaissance? Or should the JCS handle all such flights, avoiding the usual heady conflict with theatre commanders? No one is addressing this issue, which will certainly take on Pueblo/EC-121 overtones in case of an untoward incident.

NRO and COMIREX. While the NRO consultant to COMIREX is heard as the authoritative voice in satellite operational matters, he is not regarded similarly for NRP aircraft and drone operations. These topics are reported, in the case of JRC-controlled overflights, by the DIA member and, in the case of OSA missions, by the CIA member. This arrangement conflicts with the authorities vested in the DNRO by both DOD Directive 5105.23 of March 1964 and the DOD/CIA Agreement of August 1965, which make the DNRO responsible for conducting the interfaces with USIB in NRP matters and, further, specifically give him "authority to require that he be fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP" (italics added).

As the interface with OSA is reasonably good in operational matters, it should be relatively easy for the NRO representatives to COMIREX and SORS to take over the spokesman function on OSA operational matters, assisted perhaps by OSA personnel. This change would be worked out with the Chairmen of COMIREX and SORS and the CIA members of these Committees. The same arrangement should be made with the JRC for any overflight air vehicle operations.
As an illustration of the disparity between the NRO relationship with COMIREX on air vehicles, as opposed to satellites, it is standard practice for COMIREX to provide requirements lists to JRC and OSA for their mission planning, independently of any NRO involvement or awareness of the action. The NRO thus is out of the tasking loop for NRP air vehicle operations, except for the OSA 'black book' proposals submitted to DNRO via the NRO Staff. Results of missions flown against COMIREX targets are fed back to COMIREX from the film processing centers, and the NRO Staff learns of mission accomplishments only through COMIREX documents.

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION:

a. Establish an NRO Aircraft and Drone Operational Center.

This would provide a focal point for NRO aircraft and drone operations similar to that now existing for satellite operations. It would allow the NRO to fulfill its responsibilities as the agent for all NRP aircraft and drone operations. It would insert the NRO into community tasking and control of actual overflight operations, provide the means to establish a data bank of coverage results, and, of great importance, enhance correlation of satellite and air vehicle operation.

While this is a very attractive solution, it may not be practical politically. JRC and OSA already provide this type of facility for their operations, and an attempt to establish an NRO center would be attacked strongly by the JRC and probably by the CIA. Further, with the gradual reduction in the importance of aircraft and drone operations to satisfy USIB reconnaissance requirements, it may be imprudent to attempt such an ambitious undertaking, particularly in view of the working space, personnel staffing, and budgetary requirements, particularly for an around-the-clock operation.

b. Use the JRC Operations Center as a Joint JRC/NRO Center.

This solution, which was proposed in 1963 and opposed by CIA at that time, seems a reasonable way to solve the problem, particularly as most of the NRP aircraft and drone assets are now operated by the Joint Reconnaissance Center.

On the debit side, this arrangement might complete the erosion of DNRO control over NRP aircraft and drone activities that is
already under way. It would probably drive the center of gravity of these activities to the JCS, whatever name is given to the center. Furthermore, it is doubtful that CIA would receive such a proposal with any more equanimity now than in 1963. In addition, it would introduce new security problems by mixing CIA BYEMAN-controlled operations with JCS non-BYEMAN operations. Finally, it is not at all clear that our satellite activities would be improved or flourish in a JCS aircraft-oriented environment.

c. Improve the NRO Capability to Staff Aircraft and Drone Operations.

This solution would have limited objectives designed to:

(1) Gradually reassert basic DNRO management authority in all NRP aircraft and drone operational matters.

(2) Make the NRO Staff a focal point for information on NRP air vehicle capabilities and operations, (a) keeping the Director, NRO Staff and DNRO informed and (b) building a requirements and coverage data base to facilitate comparison and correlation with satellite requirements and operations. Most importantly, such an information data base would permit and encourage the NRO Staff to study alternative approaches to all collection requirements of COMIREX and SORS.

(3) Make the NRO Staff representative the official spokesman for NRP air vehicle matters in COMIREX and SORS.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION:

Alternative (3) would place the NRO Staff in a position to carry on the DNRO's responsibilities for air vehicle overflight (Tab F).

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS:

After approval of Alternative (3) as a best course of action, the NRO Staff would negotiate the following elements of the alternative:


The Staff will negotiate a memorandum of understanding with the JRC, setting forth the responsibilities of the organizations. The
DNRO will be cited as having total management responsibility for air vehicle overflight of denied areas. For example, he will be responsible for ensuring that the military departments program for sufficient reconnaissance assets to accommodate national tasking. He will provide yearly guidance to the JCS, forecasting the number of missions anticipated to be flown in support of the NRP. He will review and approve the yearly programs for the 147 and 154 drones, SR-71 and military U-2 aircraft (these assets will be funded by the military department). Modifications, procurement actions, and deployments involving these assets will be approved by the DNRO. He will also be responsible for adjudicating conflicts where assets are required for both military theater operations and national missions.

The JCS will have total operational responsibility for those overflights designated by the DNRO. The JCS will operate the collection vehicles, ensure necessary support for the operation, and deliver the product to the appropriate national center for exploitation.

b. Relationships with the 303 Committee: The Staff will negotiate with the 303 Committee Secretariat along the following lines: (1) The NRO Staff will prepare a monthly forecast of NRO reconnaissance activities requiring 303 Committee approval, (2) this forecast will be forwarded directly to the 303 Committee by the Staff, and (3) the 303 Committee's response will be transmitted directly to the NRO.

c. Requirements. The Staff will negotiate with the USIB Secretariat to ensure that all USIB requirements calling for overflight reconnaissance (satellite and/or air vehicle) are sent directly to the DNRO.

d. Tasking. The DNRO will task JRC and OSA assets in response to stated USIB requirements. The NRO Staff will evaluate the USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance and assign OSA or JRC assets to satisfy specific requirements. The NRO Staff will task the JRC and OSA monthly for the satisfaction of USIB requirements by airborne vehicles. In response to tasking, the JRC and OSA will submit the proposed number of missions and flight plans to the NRO Staff for approval and 303 Committee action.

e. Evaluation. The JRC and OSA will report to the NRO Staff on the conduct of each mission. The NRO Staff will be responsible for evaluating the degree to which USIB requirements have been satisfied by OSA and JRC missions.
f. Reporting. The NRO Staff will report to the DNRO and to the USIB, as required, on the status of requirements satisfaction.

g. Exploitation. The product of all missions flown in response to NRO tasking will be nationally exploited.

6 Attachments
1. DOD Dir 5105.23
2. DOD/CIA Agreement, 11 Aug 65
3. Memo fr Mr. Nitze, 3 Feb 68
4. Memo fr Mr. Nitze, 21 Mar 68
5. Memo fr Gen Steakley, 26 Apr 69
6. Chart re DNRO Responsibilities
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT

National Reconnaissance Office

Reference (a): DoD Directive 5105.23, subject as above, dated June 14, 1962 (hereby cancelled)

I. GENERAL

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, including the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a National Reconnaissance Office is hereby established as an operating agency of the Department of Defense, under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Defense.

II. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

The National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the Department of Defense under a Director, National Reconnaissance Office, appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director will be responsible for consolidation of all Department of Defense satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence, geosensor and mapping photography and electronic signal collection into a single program, defined as the National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defense.

III. RELATIONSHIPS

A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program, the Director, National Reconnaissance Office shall:
1. Keep the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) personally informed on a regular basis on the status of projects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

2. Similarly inform other Department of Defense personnel as he may determine necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters.

3. Establish appropriate interfaces between the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

4. Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies of the Department of Defense as full time members of the National Reconnaissance Office.

B. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and other DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions. Streamlined management procedures will be utilized whereby individual project directors will report directly to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be given support as required from normal staff elements of the military departments and agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he specifically requests, and these projects will not be subject to normal Department of Defense staff review.

IV. AUTHORITIES

A. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned responsibilities for the
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The National Reconnaissance Office and the National Reconnaissance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

1. Organize, staff, and supervise the National Reconnaissance Office.

2. Establish, manage, and conduct the National Reconnaissance Program.

3. Assist the Secretary of Defense in the supervision of aircraft, drone, and satellite reconnaissance, mapping, and geodesy matters, including photographic and electronic signal projects, and be his direct representative on these matters both within and outside the Department of Defense.

4. Review all Department of Defense budget requests and expenditures for any items falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program, including studies and preliminary research and development of components and techniques to support such existing or future projects.

B. Other authorities specifically delegated to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office by the Secretary of Defense will be referenced in numbered enclosures to this directive.

V. PROJECT ASSIGNMENTS

All projects falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program are assigned to that program and will be managed as outlined herein unless specific exception is made by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Announcements of any such exceptions will be made by numbered enclosures to this directive.
VI. SECURITY

A. The (Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security procedures to be followed for all matters of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, including suitable unclassified names and functions to protect all elements of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Office.

B. All communications pertaining to matters under the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the cognizance of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, except in those instances specifically exempted by either (Director, National Reconnaissance Office or the Secretary of Defense.

C. With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the following titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not controlled under the special security control system(s) referred to in B. above: (TS) National Reconnaissance Program; (TS) National Reconnaissance Office. Where absolutely necessary to refer to the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program in communications not controlled under the prescribed special security systems, such reference will be made by use of the terminology: "Matters under the purview of DoD TS-5105.23."

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective upon publication.

VIII. CANCELLATION

Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of Defense
AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

A. The National Reconnaissance Program

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U. S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.

B. The Secretary of Defense will:

1. Establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD and will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP;

2. Choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions;
3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;

4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget;

5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement could not be reached.

C. The Director of Central Intelligence will:

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage;

2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results;

3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;

4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;

5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby established to guide and participate in the formulation of the NRP through the DNRO. (The DNRO will sit with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member.) If the Executive Committee cannot agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee will:
a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.

c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD.

d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force component, recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. To optimize the primary objective of systems development, design requirement of the sensors will be given priority in their integration within the spacecraft and reentry vehicles.

e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee.
1. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNRO and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence consider desirable.

E. National Reconnaissance Office

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the SOC which shall be jointly manned.

2. The Director of the NRRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director NRRO will:

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, have the responsibility for managing the NRRO and executing the NRP.

b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. (Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIS requirements.

c. Have authority to require that he be kept fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.
d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in a line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect the best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department.

F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities
1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto.

(signed)  
Cyrus Vance  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

(signed)  
W. F. Raborn  
Director of Central Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
   Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
   Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
   Director, National Security Agency (NSA)

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Operations (U)

I wish to reaffirm Secretary McNamara's and my desire that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff maintain cognizance and control over all military aerial,
surface and submarine reconnaissance operations. We look to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to submit recommendations for all such operations and for
reporting on the status of approved missions.

The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all reconnaissance
operations should include assessments of (1) the intelligence objectives to be
achieved, (2) the technical and operational feasibility of proposed missions,
and (3) the risks involved. The Directors of DIA and NSA will provide what-
ever assistance the Joint Chiefs of Staff require in the development of their
recommendations.

Commencing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff submission of the March 1968
monthly forecast for peripheral reconnaissance activities, the following two
supplemental sections will be included in the same binder:

(1) A forecast of all submarine reconnaissance missions, and

(2) A forecast of reconnaissance operations conducted under the over-
all direction of the Director, NRO. (This supplement will be prepared by the
Director, NRO.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to submit for my review and
approval the appropriate management directives they develop for governing
the conduct of all military aerial, surface, and submarine reconnaissance
operations. In these directives, provision should specifically be made for the
special functions the Deputy Director for Reconnaissance, J-3, discharges on
behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Operations (U)

References: (a) Memo for DepSecDef from Dir, Jt Staff, Subj: "Peacetime Reconnaissance Operations in Sensitive Areas (U)," dtd 29 Feb 68

(b) SM 24-68, Subj: "Sensitive Peacetime Reconnaissance Operations," dtd 11 Jan 68 (forwarded by Reference (a) above)

(c) DepSecDef multi-addressee memo, Subj: "Reconnaissance Operations (U)," dtd 3 Feb 68

Having carefully reviewed References (a) and (b) which set forth the general manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan to implement the requirements of Reference (c), I wish to reiterate my decision that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will maintain cognizance and control over all military aerial, surface (land and sea) and submarine reconnaissance operations. This is not to say that in developing a system for discharging this responsibility the Joint Chiefs of Staff are constrained from delegating to the Unified and Specified (U&S) commanders specific functions and responsibilities in the reconnaissance field (e.g., routine aerial, surface, and submarine reconnaissance associated with task force operations on the high seas; ground reconnaissance patrols in the Korean DMZ), nor are the U&S commanders constrained from subdelegating reconnaissance functions delegated to them. I should like, however, to be kept apprized of those operations for which approval authority is delegated by the JCS to the U&S commanders or retained by the JCS. In determining those reconnaissance operations which the JCS are obliged to submit to higher authority for approval, those for which the JCS decide to retain approval authority, and those for which the JCS delegate approval authority to U&S commanders, in final analysis I must rely on the good judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since all situations which could become politically or militarily important to higher authority cannot be arbitrarily defined in advance. In this regard, I found the Appendices to Reference (b) in the main useful documents but believe they may require more substantive revision than Reference (a) suggests. I assume that in addition you will develop management guidance memoranda for OJCS use.

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As a general rule, in the development of your new management directives, please keep in mind my desire that all submarine, surface vessel, and aircraft reconnaissance operations which are specifically tasked to collect intelligence against foreign countries and the military forces, equipment, and operations thereof, are to be reported.

Also please include in your new reconnaissance management directives, as requested by Reference (c), the following points:

First, in consonance with the discussion of sensitive peacetime reconnaissance operations as contained in the Appendices to Reference (b), explicit provision should be made to establish the responsibility of the JCS for advising, and obtaining approval from, higher authority of all sensitive peacetime reconnaissance operations.

Second, provision should be made for promptly advising higher authority of any geographic area, reconnaissance function, or reconnaissance platform, which is designated or considered "sensitive," and the reasons therefor, by the JCS or U.S. commanders. Similarly, provision should be made to report any changes in such designations to higher authority. In this context, I believe that your new management directives should include specific provision for quickly designating areas, operations, or functions as sensitive in which political or military events suddenly emerge (e.g., the recent developments in Korea) which generate concern or interest by higher authority.

Third, I believe that the new management directives should also contain the principal instructions and policies for the conduct of all sensitive military reconnaissance operations. I noted that in Reference (b) citations are included to some six other JCS management directives. For example, DoD policies governing the conduct of sensitive submarine and surface vessel reconnaissance operations are not set forth in Reference (b), but are embodied in another JCS directive. Governing directives should clearly require the JCS to review and approve each of these operations. Since such operations are to be included in the monthly forecast submitted by the JCS, they will be reviewed and evaluated in the same manner as any other sensitive reconnaissance operation.
Fourth, specific provision should also be made to report to higher authority those military operations which, while not primarily reconnaissance in purpose or objective, probably would provoke the same type of foreign reaction as would reconnaissance operations undertaken in the same geographic areas. Such military operations will be submitted to higher authority for approval in the same manner as proposed sensitive reconnaissance operations since a mechanism exists for obtaining approval expeditiously.

Finally, the new management directives should include a provision which states that any subsequent amendments or changes will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval before they are promulgated.

Copies to:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
MEMORANDUM FOR Director, National Reconnaissance Office

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Replacement of the U-2 with the SR-71 for Cuban Overflight

1. On 18 April 1969, the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), recommended that consideration be given to replacing the U-2 with the SR-71 for the reconnaissance effort over Cuba. The basis for his concern was the recent shoot-down of the EC-121 in the Sea of Japan.

2. A JCS paper is being prepared that will provide a response to CINCSAC. It is expected that the paper will be approved by 2 May 1969. Pending the results of this investigation, GLASS LAMP U-2 missions are not being flown over Cuba.

Ralph D. Steakley
Brig General, USAF
Deputy Director for Reconnaissance Operations Directorate

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MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS