MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCHAR

SUBJECT: State Department Proposal for Handling the Subject of Satellite Reconnaissance in Future Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Problem:

To show an alternative to a State Department proposal, "Strategic Missile Talks: Related Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Disclosure Policy."

Background:

We have briefed you on a State Department proposal of September 9, 1968 (see Tab A) to reveal to the Soviets our willingness to (1) forego on-site inspection and (2) depend upon satellite reconnaissance as an arms control observation and monitoring system. The essentials of the State proposal were these:

1. Reclassification of the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance from Top Secret BYEMAN (or TALENT-KEYHOLE) to SECRET.

2. Continuation of the present TKH and BYE systems with regard to acquired intelligence, capabilities, and operations of reconnaissance satellites.

3. Revelation to the Soviets that "national means of verification" includes the use of reconnaissance satellites.

/TALENT-KEYHOLE
4. Establishment of a negotiating position based on the assumption that "one side will not impede the operation of the other's reconnaissance satellites."

5. Providing NATO general information on the U.S. negotiating position on verification.

6. Briefing Congress on the U.S. position on verification and capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement through national means.

7. Maintaining a discreet position in response to press inquiries and in official public statements, with preparation to eventually acknowledge "maximum reliance on national means of verification" and the inclusion of the use of satellite photography in such means.

The NRO reacted quickly to this proposal, meeting with representatives of the CIA, JCS, and NASA to develop opposition to the basic proposal and to suggest an alternative. The NRO position, abstracted in our briefing to you, is expressed in detail in Tab B.

On September 13, 1968, the USIB considered the security aspects of the State proposal and decided that "there should be no change in the classification of reconnaissance satellite operations or the information derived from them at this time" (see Tab C, and particularly paragraph 14 for Mr. Helms' further comments).

On September 16, 1968 the NSAM 156 Committee met, discussed the matter at some length, and arrived at no specific conclusion, as far as the minutes are concerned (see Tab D). Those in attendance reported that all parties were to prepare recommended guidelines and furnish them to State.

On September 26, 1968, ACDA issued a proposed guidelines paper for comment by NSAM 156 Committee members (see Tab E). This paper was a decided improvement over the earlier (September 9) proposal. It did not ask for a downgrading of the security surrounding "the fact of" satellite reconnaissance. It restricted the delegation's discussions to "information-gathering" satellites, with no further definition
authorized. Consultation "with Congress" was changed to "selected members of Congress" and was to be done on a classified basis. Constraints were placed on what might eventually be said to the press, with the statement for release limited to "the U.S. is prepared to place maximum reliance on national means of verification." While the NRO objected to some of the woolly thinking in the paper -- and said so -- we agreed that there had been general improvement in concept.

About this time, President Johnson released the pressure he had placed on the SALT negotiators, and, with the November election at hand, SALT entered a waiting phase.

Present Situation:

We have received a copy of a memorandum from State, dated May 1, 1969, which asks the NSSM 28 Committee to consider guidelines for negotiations at future SALT meetings (see Tab F). The NSSM 28 Committee membership is shown on the address list. It is a new committee, organized by Dr. Kissinger, to develop policy for SALT talks.

The new paper is practically a word-for-word copy of the guidelines paper issued on September 26, 1968 (shown above at Tab E).

Possible Courses of Action:

We could spend a good deal of time in editing and improving the proposed paper. We do not believe, however, that an "acceptable" version of this document will do very much for SALT talks or for arms control in general. As you will recall from our briefing, we believe there is a "Fourth Alternative," calling for the bilateral development and operation of an Arms Control Satellite which should become the basis for a strong United States initiative. (By the way, Dr. Paine supports this thought enthusiastically.)

Recommended Course of Action:

We would like to show you a new, short briefing, revised in the light of the new State paper, in which we suggest consideration of an Arms Control Satellite, as an alternative. We will further propose to
show this briefing to Dr. Homer Newell (NASA), General Allison (JCS), Dr. Clarke (CIA), and Mr. Spurgeon Keeney (WH), to provide a "Fourth Alternative" for consideration in NSSM 28 discussions. We should move rapidly (within the next few days) to make this concept available to the SALT planners.

PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

\[\text{W.H.} \]

We briefed McLucas on our concept on Saturday, 1 May 1969. He spoke to Mr. Packard about it the same morning. Mr. Packard was "enchanted" with the idea. On Sunday, we briefed General Allison (JCS), Spurgeon Keeney (WH), Mr. Gerald Smith (DOD), and Mr. John Shaw (State). On Tuesday, 3 May, we briefed Bruce Clarke (CIA) and Dr. Seaborg. The NSSM 28 Group set to meet on 8 May.
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