21 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR SAFSP

SUBJECT: Additional Special Security Officers

Dr. Flax has conditionally approved our request for your additional special security officers for the SAFSP/ ENRO industrial security program. That is now required is a memorandum from your office to the ENRO requesting the specific positions you want (grade, AFSC), when you require the personnel, and your plan for their utilization.

A copy of our memorandum to Dr. Flax is enclosed for your information.

RAYMOND D. ROSE
Captain, USAF
Dep Asst for Security
NRO Staff

Enclosures

Bye-12655/69
February 19, 1969

FOR DR. FLAX

Captain Rose speaks from experience and conviction. I've discussed his proposal with Colonel Ford and General Martin's security officer. They concur heartily in this proposal. So do I.

PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

Of course, this is a much needed effort in view of our expanding contract base.
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: Special Security Officers

PROBLEM:

Due to insufficient number of qualified, experienced NRO Special Security Officers, the security programs of both NRO Program A and SAFSL are in jeopardy. This is due to two factors:

1. Insufficient number of special security officers.

2. Extensive non-productive period of on-the-job training required for replacement personnel assigned to these positions since there is no outside source of trained qualified personnel.

This memorandum is intended to inform you of those prudent actions recommended to resolve this problem.

BACKGROUND:

An NRO Program Director operating within a covert environment must assume complete responsibility for the integrity of his security system. This includes not only the decision making process as to what procedures and methodology will be used, but the inspection and guidance necessary to enforce its management on a day-to-day basis.

When the original special security program was established for SAFSP, it was under the control of three officers who managed the GAMBIT, EARPOP, and the Air Force portion of CORONA security. They were responsible for ten covert industrial facilities and some five thousand industrial personnel. While inexperienced in covert methodology

GAMBIT, EARPOP, CORONA, DORIAN
they were able to formulate an effective comprehensive covert program through imagination, skill, and learning experience. One of the fundamental strengths of the program was the close liaison between the government special security officer and his industrial counterpart.

CURRENT SITUATION:

Today the five officers assigned to the Special Security Office at SAFSP and the two assigned to SAFSL are responsible for managing security within sixty BYEMAN industrial facilities, and have responsibility for 46,000 personnel, representing some 135 different contractors. The rapid growth of the BYEMAN industrial base is expanding beyond the capability of the current security staffs to provide adequate management. As the result of this disproportionate allocation of work load, there has been a reduced surveillance of covert activities and increased reliance on contractors' ability to manage their security program. This is particularly dangerous since many of the contractors are new in the covert environment and are not qualified to accept complete responsibility for managing a covert program. If this situation continues, only deterioration of the program and eventual compromise can result. This problem has been compounded by an unusually severe turnover of personnel within the SAFSP and SAFSL security offices, resulting in the loss of our most experienced personnel.

The problem of replacing personnel is extremely difficult because of the unique knowledge and qualifications they must possess in order to effectively fulfill their covert security role, (see TAB-A).

RECOMMENDATION:

With your concurrence, we will seek authorization for four additional special security officer spaces for the SAFSP/SL security program. Rather than be assigned in residence to the program office, they will be located at key industrial facilities. They will be responsible for the day-to-day security at the facility assigned, its sub-contractors and other facilities within the geographic area. By assigning these officers the responsibility for handling the more limited aspects of security, they should be able to be productive after an initial training period.
in their assigned tasks while gathering experience for overall future program responsibilities. When a position within the program office is vacated there will be a continuing resource pool of qualified personnel from which a selection may be made.

The concept of this proposed action has been discussed with and concurred in by both Maj Gen Martin and Maj Gen Stewart. Your concurrence is requested.

Raymond D. Rose
RAYMOND D. ROSE
Captain, USAF
Dep Asst for Security
NRO Staff
PROGRAM OFFICE SECURITY OFFICERS

CONCEPT:

The Special Security Officer must insure the security of the NRO without hindering the development or production of the program. There is no "real" set of rules that may be used. Only his knowledge of covert methodology, and the particular elements involved can permit him to make a rational, fairly reliable decision in the world of WHITE/BLACK and shades of gray. Each case must be determined on its own factors, since the modus operandi at Douglas would spell disaster at Eastman Kodak.

QUALIFICATIONS:

The covert program security officer must have a:

Comprehensive Knowledge of:

BYEMAN security concepts
- Why a BYEMAN system
- How it works
- Why it works
- Its limitations

Covert Methodology
- What a covert operation is
- How it works
- Its strengths and weaknesses
- Legal limitations
- Covert techniques
- Clandestine vs covert
Industrial Roles and Responsibilities
Types of contracts
Security clauses
Government/company roles and relationships
Sub-contractor and associate relationships
Interagency Roles and Responsibilities
Security aspects of associations
Basic responsibilities
Communications Capabilities

Working Knowledge of:
DOD Industrial Security Program
Clearance procedures
Strengths and weaknesses
Conflicts with covert operations
Compatibilities with covert operations
Interfaces with covert operations
Air Force Security Programs
Strengths and weaknesses
Cover benefits and techniques
Covert interfaces
Other Compartmented Programs
Techniques used
Resources (personnel, technical information, and facilities available)
Current cover arrangements
Obligations not to reveal other programs
Other Compartmented Systems

Jurisdictions and responsibilities
Clearability standards
Interface capabilities
Responsible agencies

System Specification and Goals
Types of systems
How used
Capabilities
Applications
Threats and vulnerabilities

Management Techniques
Utilization of Resources
Impact of access authorization delays
Control of access and alternate access means
Concept of realistic operations

Contracts
Types in use
Impact on security and security impact on costs
How to use
Importance to security of contracting officer
Contracting Structure
Sensitivity of funding levels
Security Threats

Foreign association and travel
Hostage cases
Personality disorders
General attitude toward security
Marketing operations
Physical security concepts
Sino/Soviet domestic operations
Communication security
Public statements

Be Familiar with:

Technical language
Industrial techniques
Union operations
DCASR/AFRRO functions
Union operations and attitudes

For a single individual to have the capabilities as stated may be a totally unrealistic goal. But it is not only realistic to expect this knowledge in degrees from all our security officers, but it must be available within the program security office. To maintain this capability it is desirable that incoming personnel be from engineering, research, and security career fields.