MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BERG

SUBJECT: NRO Responsibilities for NRP Air Vehicle Reconnaissance Projects

Problem.

This memorandum is responsive to your memorandum to Colonel Sweeney of 28 August 1968 and is addressed to two problem areas:

a. The de facto division of management and operational control of aircraft and drone overflight reconnaissance activities which now exists between the DNRO and the JCS/JRC, and

b. The question of how best to exercise the DNRO's overall supervisory responsibilities for these activities through the NRO Staff mechanism.

Background.

The DNRO's basic authority and responsibility for management and control of all overflight activities are clearly stated in DOD Directive 5103.23, March 1964, and in the DOD/CIA Agreement of August 1965.

DOD Directive 5105.23 (Tab A) assigns the DNRO responsibility for the "consolidation of all DOD satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography and electronic signal collection into a single program, defined as the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defense," (Underscoring supplied,) He is further told to "establish appropriate interfaces between the (S) National Reconnaissance Office and the USIB, the JCS, the DIA, and the NSA." Further, he is specifically delegated authority to assist the Secretary of Defense in the
Tab C describes a proposal advanced by the DNRO (Dr. McMillan) in 1963, which, in essence, would have placed in the JRC the responsibility for supervising NRO aircraft operations and the NRO Satellite Operations Center. This met opposition from CIA and, after several attempts during June, July, and August 1963 to obtain DOD/CIA agreement on setting up an NRO/JRC aircraft operational center, the action was abandoned.

The JRC Director's responsibilities for military aerial reconnaissance were discussed in February and March 1968 in two memoranda signed by Mr. Nitze and addressed to the Chairman, JCS; Director, NRO; Director, DIA; and Director, NSA. The key provisions of these memoranda (Tabs D and E) were Mr. Nitze's (and Mr. McNamara's):

a. Decision that the JCS will maintain cognizance and control over all military aerial, surface (land and sea), and submarine reconnaissance operations.

b. Request that the forecast of reconnaissance operations conducted under the overall direction of the DNRO be transmitted to the 303 Committee in the JCS forecast binder. (However, it was made clear by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Office that this was intended to be a courier service only and not intended to alter the DNRO's authority for NRP overflights and their approval by the 303 Committee.

c. Request that the JCS prepare appropriate management directives to govern the conduct of all military aerial, surface, and submarine reconnaissance operations, including JCS responsibilities for advising and seeking the approval of higher authority in all military reconnaissance operations of a sensitive or potentially sensitive nature.

Discussion.

The two memoranda referred to above (Tabs D and E) clearly are intended to strengthen JCS control over military reconnaissance operations of all types. It is probably no coincidence that they followed closely on the seizing of the 'Pueblo'. I do not read into them an interpretation that the DNRO is not ultimately responsible for managing and conducting the
supervision of aircraft, drone and satellite reconnaissance, mapping and geodetic matters, including both photographic and electronic signal projects, and be his direct representative on those matters both within and outside the Department of Defense." (Underscoring supplied.)

The DOD/CIA Agreement (Tab B) reinforces the DNRO's charter, making him responsible "for the development, management, control, and operation of all projects, both current and long range, for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations)." EXCOM is told to "assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DOD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee." Drones are not specially mentioned, whether by accident or choice. However, the DOD Directive refers to "all...air vehicle overflight projects" (which would unquestionably include drone projects) as being within the NRP. (Underscoring supplied.)

While DNRO thus very clearly has been assigned the responsibility for all overflights, including air vehicles, his control over air vehicle overflights of denied territory is now ambiguous, particularly where JRC aircraft and drone operations are concerned.

The erosion of the DNRO control over JRC aircraft and 147 and 154 drone overflights has come about gradually over the last six years during periods of international crisis when aircraft reconnaissance was conducted. The U-2 and low-level Cuban overflights and were the first examples of "delegation" of DNRO operational authority to the JRC. These transfers of operational authority were tacit, and were done informally. No documentation can be found to confirm these transfers of authority. However, a new management agreement on the TAGBOARD drone assigns JRC operational control of this NRP asset, while leaving management control invested in the DNRO.

Approval for JRC overflight missions is solicited from the 303 Committee in the NRO Monthly Forecast and also separately by the JRC in its monthly forecast of military aerial, surface, and submarine reconnaissance operations. As the latter forecast goes from the JRC direct to the 303 Committee and 303 Committee approvals, in turn, go direct to the JRC, the NRO Staff finds itself at a disadvantage in 303 Committee staff actions related to JRC-operated overflight activities.
NRP, however, regardless of whether DOD or CIA air vehicle assets are employed, the fact that DOD air vehicle assets collect against both military and national (COMIREX/USIB) targets, and the fact that these targets are often identical, obviously blurs the issue somewhat. The SR-71 covert overflights of North Vietnam, like the OXCART A-12 overflights, are responsive to theater requirements for military intelligence. Nevertheless, the implementation of this overflight program was directed by the highest national authority for clearly national objectives. These objectives are stated in COMIREX documents—COMOR D-25/220 of 23 May 1967, revised by COMIREX D-25, 3/2, dated 20 November 1967; and COMOR D-25/207, dated 4 March 1966. They include a search for evidence of the possible introduction of offensive missiles and other new weapon systems into North Vietnam and provide for the coverage of North Vietnamese military installations and lines of communications.

Another pertinent example is provided by GLASS LAMP U-2 missions over Cuba which are responsive to national targeting priorities established by USIB. They fly over a denied area* and are the responsibility of the DNRO.

Further, the "forecast of reconnaissance operations conducted under the overall direction of the Director, NRO", referred to in Mr. Nitze's memorandum of 3 February 1968 (Tab D), includes the air vehicle programs of the JRC which are involved in overflight missions. A copy of the March 1969 NRO Monthly Forecast and a copy of the JRC input to this forecast are included as Tabs F and G. As they specifically include GIANT SCALE (SR-71), GLASS LAMP (U-2), GIANT DRAGON (U-2), and BUMPY ACTION (Drone) missions carried out under the operational control of the JCS/JRC, it would seem clear that Mr. Nitze's memorandum affirms, at least implicitly, the DNRO's overall management responsibility for these programs. Our Staff problem is that the Director, JRC, does not appear to similarly interpret the DNRO's overall supervisory authority in this area.

The remainder of this paper discusses in some detail the current status of our relationships with the JRC, CIA/OSA, and COMIREX regarding aircraft and drone operations. Further, it offers for your consideration recommendations for a course of action we should attempt to carry out in

*DCID No. 1/13 defines denied area as: "all territory and territorial waters claimed by Communist nations, as well as such other areas of priority intelligence interest as may be determined by USIB."
order to more effectively backstop the DNRO in executing his responsibilities for aircraft and drone overflights of denied areas. It could be executed with little or no disruption to current JRC and OSA operational procedures for conducting air vehicle projects, but would, nevertheless, provide us the sufficient data to do a more effective Staff job in this area.

NRO and the JRC. By virtue of the acceptance on the part of the NRO over the past few years of the increasing control by the JCS/JRC of SAC U-2, SR-71, and USAF drone operations, the DNRO has been gradually moved into a disadvantageous position. While he still retains the responsibility for all overflight programs aimed at achievement of NRP objectives, he clearly has lost a very significant amount of management and operational control over the conduct of these operations. The only element of direct control is that the Director, JRC, albeit grudgingly, submits to the DNRO his monthly forecast of military aircraft and drone operations which require approval of the 303 Committee. At the present time, these include U-2 operations over Cuba, Laos, and Cambodia; SR-71 operations over North Vietnam, and drone operations against North Vietnam and China. Presumably, the DNRO has authority to change these forecasts before submitting them to the 303 Committee, but, in fact, this has not occurred. In fact, the Director, JRC, has on at least one occasion challenged the requirement that he must submit his overflight forecasts to the NRO. That he does so now is the result of a treaty worked out about two years ago. However, he also submits his aircraft and drone forecasts to the 303 Committee, independently, in the JCS forecast book. As he also receives 303 Committee approval direct (and not through the DNRO mechanism), he almost certainly regards the NRO Monthly Forecast mechanism as a redundant and unnecessary step.

Another problem area, of probably more importance than that described above, is that the NRO has no formal mechanism for keeping apprised in a real-time way of what JRC-controlled flights are planned, underway, or completed, successfully or otherwise. This data is now chiefly obtained by personal visits to the JRC by members of the NRO Staff and/or by telephone from the JRC, and is mostly obtained after the fact. Likewise, the degree to which JRC overflights satisfy USIB/COMIREX.
requirements and the interface with COMIREX on feedback and reporting
is handled by the DIA member of COMIREX, not the NRO consultant.
The DNRO, in essence, while ultimately responsible by DOD Directive
for the supervision of JRC-controlled overflights of denied territory, is,
for all practical purposes, on the "outside looking in" with regard to the
exercise of management authority and control of such overflights, as well
as the interface with USIB/COMIREX on requirements for the flights or
other operational matters.

NRO and OSA. The NRO position with regard to OSA-conducted
overflights is somewhat better. OSA, as an operating arm of the DNRO
(through the Director, CIA Reconnaissance Programs), is responsive to
DNRO direction with regard to overflights. A monthly forecast of such
overflights is submitted for DNRO and 303 Committee approval, and 303
Committee approval is, in turn, provided to the DNRO. Before over-
flights having monthly blanket authority are actually conducted, OSA
normally submits to the DNRO a formal "black book" proposal which
lays out the proposed flight route, the targets to be covered, and so on.
If DNRO concurs, the flight is conducted; if 303 Committee approval is
required in individual cases, this, too, is obtained before a flight is
initiated.

Only the DCI or his deputy can approve U-2 peripheral missions
which also are scheduled against USIB requirements. The procedures
for selecting USIB requirements are ill-defined.

The CIA member of COMIREX, not the NRO consultant, reports
on the accomplishment of OSA overflights. Thus, the NRO position with
respect to COMIREX is the same for OSA operations as it is for JRC
operations.

NRO and COMIREX. While the NRO consultant to COMIREX is
looked to as the authoritative voice in satellite operational matters, he is
not, as discussed above, similarly regarded for NRP aircraft and drone
operational matters. These topics are reported, in the case of JRC-
controlled overflights, by the DIA member, and in the case of OSA mis-
sions, by the CIA member. This arrangement conflicts with the authorities
vested in the DNRO by both DOD Directive 5105.23 of March 1964 and the
DOD/CIA Agreement of August 1965. These clearly make the DNRO responsible for conducting the interfaces with USIB in NRP matters and, further, specifically give him "authority to require that he be fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP." (Emphasis added.) The charter is clear. The real question is whether the NRO can reassert management authority in the community in aircraft and drone activities in the face of the erosion of this authority that has occurred, particularly with respect to JRC-run operations.

As the interface with OSA is reasonably good in operational matters, it could be relatively easy for the NRO representatives to COMIREX and SORS to take over the spokesman function on OSA operational matters, assisted as needed by OSA personnel. This would need to be worked out with the Chairmen of COMIREX and SORS and the CIA members of these Committees. It should be done and it may not be too difficult politically. The same should be done for JRC aircraft and drone operations that are conducted as a part of the NRP. This, too, would need to be worked out with the Chairmen of COMIREX and SORS and the DIA members. Such a proposal would strike a more sensitive nerve, for it would inject the NRO into the middle of the JRC/DIA link, and well known JRC sensitivities would quickly, and, no doubt, forcefully be made apparent. However, if a reasonable handle is to be achieved on NRP aircraft and drone operations by the NRO Staff, this action is important and should not be sidestepped.

The NRO should carry out its charter to be the representative on all NRP matters in the community. This will carry with it the necessity to be "fully and completely" informed on OSA and JRC activities. I believe this can be achieved reasonably easily with OSA. The JRC problem, experience shows, would be tougher, as JRC has been operating quite independently of the NRO for a long time. However, if the NRO is to acquire even a limited management control of JRC operations conducted for the NRP, it must set up formal information and reporting procedures, adhered to by the JRC, which would provide sufficient information to allow the NRO Staff to be the focal point to provide an effective interface with the community on NRP aircraft and drone operational matters. As an illustration of the disparity between the NRO relationship with COMIREX
on air vehicles, as opposed to satellites, it is standard practice for COMIREX (and probably SORDS, too) to provide requirements lists to JRC and OSA for their mission planning, completely independent of any NRO involvement or awareness of the action. Results of missions flown against COMIREX targets are fed back to COMIREX from the film processing centers. The NRO thus is out of the asking loop for NRP air vehicle operations, except for the OSA "black book" proposals submitted to DNRO via the NRO Staff (SS-5). The NRO Staff is apprised of mission accomplishments only through COMIREX documents.

Current NRO Staff Functions on Aircraft and Drones.

There are essentially three NRO Staff functions regarding aircraft and drones:

a. R&D. This can involve anything from improvements to the U-2, development of new drones, new design concepts (e.g., ISINGLASS), and advanced research on new concepts. This is an SS-7 function, formerly handled by a full-time staff officer, and now handled on a more or less ad hoc basis by several SS-7 staff people as problems arise in the R&D area. These problems are coordinated, as required, with the Program D Office, and sometimes originate there.

b. Requirements and Procurement of New Vehicles. This problem, when it comes up, if not accomplished entirely by [seems to fall principally to SS-7 from a staffing standpoint. The problem may originate at the program office, Air Staff, or DOD. On the other hand, SS-5 (Colonel Worthman) has been involved during the past year with an Intra-DOD group (JRC, DIA, and others) to sort out requirements for numbers of U-2's for DOD-assigned operations.

c. Operations. For the reasons described above, the NRO Staff involvement with aircraft and drone operations is minimal. Primarily, it consists of:

(1) Preparation of the NRO Monthly Forecast of Over-flight Activities. This is done in SS-5 from inputs provided by the SOC, OSA, and the JRC, the latter as the result of a treaty with General
Steakley. In accordance with Mr. Nitze's instructions, copies of the Forecasts are delivered to JRC for transmittal to the 303 Committee members. The purpose of this procedure is to ensure that all forecasted reconnaissance activities, i.e., NRO, JRC aircraft, ships, and submarines, get to the 303 Committee simultaneously for review and approval. JRC has no authority to review or tinker with the NRO Forecast; they provide a messenger service only. 303 Committee action on the NRO Forecast is transmitted back to the NRO Staff (SS-5) and a copy provided the DDNRO. However, 303 Committee actions on the JRC forecast go direct to the JRC, not via the NRO.

(2) Operational Studies. SS-5, for example, did a study in May 1968 of "The Employment of NRP Assets Against South China." Another special study, done about a year ago for the Survey Applications Coordination Committee and for Dr. Steininger, PSAC, compared the costs per square mile of obtaining essentially cloud-free photography with the KH-4 system and the U-2R. This, too, was done in SS-5, with a great deal of assistance from the SOC for data and methodology to cost out the KH-4 coverage. U-2 data used in the study was obtained mainly from Program D and OSA.

(3) Assembling Data on OSA and JRC NRP Operations. This is essentially unsatisfactory, in that most data concerning aircraft and drone operations conducted as part of the NRP is obtained "after the fact."

Information on OSA operations is fair, as they routinely send messages to Program D and the SOC advising of scheduled flights, the general area of intended operations, and mission cancellations or slippages. These messages do not provide information on intended targets, however, and post-flight data on results accomplished are obtained informally by telephone from NPIC, and on occasion from post-mission summaries in COMREX documents.

The situation with respect to JRC operations is significantly worse. There are no messages received from JRC concerning their operations. Such information as is obtained is solicited by personal visits to the JRC by the Director, SOC, and it is an understatement to say
that the JRC response to this arrangement has been less than enthusiastic. JRC unquestionably regards NRO requests for data as an encroachment and their cooperation is, at best, grudgingly given.

**Possible Courses of Action.**

The possible courses of action are listed below:

a. **Establish an NRO Aircraft and Drone Operational Center.** This would be the ideal solution from the NRO standpoint. It would provide a focal point for NRO aircraft and drone operations similar to that now existing for satellite operations. Further, it would enable the NRO to carry out its charter as the responsible agent for all NRP aircraft and drone operations. It would insert the NRO squarely into community tasking and control of actual overflight operations; provide the means to establish a data bank of coverage results, and, probably of no little importance, permit better correlation of satellite and air vehicle operations to satisfy USIB requirements.

While an "ideal" solution, an NRO operations center for aircraft and drones is not a practical solution. JRC and OSA already provide this type of facility for their operations, and any attempt to establish an NRO center would be attacked strongly by the JRC and probably by the CIA. Further, with the gradual reduction in the importance of aircraft and drone operations to satisfy USIB reconnaissance requirements, it would seem unnecessary to attempt such an ambitious undertaking, particularly in view of the working space, personnel staffing, and budgetary requirements it would spawn, and, especially, for an around-the-clock operation.

b. **Use the JRC Operations Center as a Joint JRC/NRO Center.** This solution, which was proposed in 1963 and strongly opposed by the CIA at that time, would seem on the face of it to be a reasonable way to solve the NRO problem, as most of the NRP aircraft and drone activity is now operated from the Joint Reconnaissance Center. The history of JRC/NRO relations over the past several years, however, offers little hope that such an arrangement would be more satisfactory than the current situation. It would, in effect, promise to complete the erosion of DNRO control over NRP aircraft and drone activities that has already occurred. It would solidify the center of gravity over these activities in the JCS, whatever name would be given to such an operations center.
Further, it is dubious, at best, that CIA would receive such a proposal with any more equanimity than they received the 1963 proposal, particularly in view of their recent loss of the OXCART Program. Moreover, it would introduce new security problems by mixing CIA BYEMAN controlled operations with JCS non-BYEMAN operations, and would, in fact, cover the CIA civilian overflight capability with a military umbrella.

c. Improve the SOC Capability to Staff the Aircraft and Drone Operational Problem. This solution would have more limited and probably more realistic objectives designed to:

(1) Gradually reassert DNRO management authority to at least a limited extent, in all NRP aircraft and drone operational matters,

(2) Make the SOC the NRO Staff information focal point on NRP aircraft and drone capabilities and operations to keep the Director, NRO Staff and the DNRO informed and to maintain a requirements and coverage data base to enable comparison and correlation with satellite requirements and operations and for special studies and reports. More importantly, perhaps, this information data base would permit the NRO Staff to study alternative approaches to special collection requirements of COMIREX and SORS involving aircraft and drones and make appropriate recommendations to the DNRO as to how best to satisfy them.

(3) Make Director, SOC, and his designated representatives the official spokesmen for NRP aircraft and drone operational matters in COMIREX and SORS. This would further insure NRO Staff knowledgeability of NRP aircraft and drone activities and capabilities, and enable better utilization of NRP aircraft and drone assets.

I believe approach (c) is both feasible and necessary, and that it would provide the NRO Staff with an adequate knowledge of NRP aircraft and drone capabilities and operations to enable it to carry out the spirit of the DNRO's charter in these matters, if not the precise letter. The JRC Director's grip on certain NRP aircraft and drone operations is too strong to wrest it back without a major--and probably unnecessary--confrontation.
Recommendation.

Establish in the SOC a staff informational and operational focal point for all aircraft and drone activities conducted within the NRP. Implement this recommendation through the following steps:

a. Immediately obtain an additional person, preferably at the Lt Colonel/Colonel or GS-14/15 level to be the Special Assistant for Air Vehicle Operations to the Director, SOC. (See proposed job description at Tab H.) An attempt should be made to get a qualified person from the Air Staff, JRC, or OSA. Air Staff, is singularly capable for administering this function.

b. Negotiate with the Director, JRC, to establish a genuine working interface and formal reporting mechanism so that JRC provides to the SOC their day-to-day schedule of intended missions, targets to be obtained and postflight reports of results. They should also provide vehicle inventory reports on a regular basis and reports and briefings as requested by the SOC on aircraft and drone technical characteristics and capabilities.

c. Negotiate with the Director, OSA/CIA, to increase their formal reporting to the SOC to provide similar information on their activities, inventories, and vehicle technical characteristics and capabilities.

d. Make SOC the responsible Staff element for preparing such special studies and reports, as may be required, which are principally concerned with aircraft and drone operational and coverage matters, including the study of alternative operational approaches to meet COMIREX and SORS requirements, and to make recommendations on these matters to the DNRO.

e. Establish and maintain an intelligence data base in the SOC on aircraft and drone coverage of COMIREX and SORS requirements, similar to that done for satellite operations.

f. Negotiate with the Chairmen, COMIREX and SORS, and the DIA and CIA members of those Committees, to establish the NRO representatives on those Committees as the community spokesmen for NRP aircraft and drone activities.
g. Place the responsibility for preparing the NRO Monthly Forecast in the SOC, and have SOC be the Staff focal point for 303 Committee feedback and follow-up actions on aircraft and drone matters.

h. Place the responsibility on SOC to be the recipient of OSA "black book" overflight proposals and to do any required staff work before they go to DNRO and the 303 Committee for approval.

i. Refer to the SOC as the Special Operations Center in lieu of the Satellite Operations Center.

j. Implement all recommendations with the exception of a. above to achieve gradual and politically acceptable results within the next 12 months. We can start by having the DNRO send the attached memorandums (Tabs I and J) to the Director, JRC and the Director, CIA Reconnaissance Programs to initiate the dialogue.
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Office

Reference (a): DoD Directive TS 5105.23, subject as above, dated June 14, 1962 (hereby cancelled)

I. GENERAL

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, including the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a National Reconnaissance Office is hereby established as an operating agency of the Department of Defense, under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Defense.

II. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

The National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the Department of Defense under a Director, National Reconnaissance Office, appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director will be responsible for consolidation of all Department of Defense satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence, geospy and mapping photography and electronic signal collection into a single program, defined as the National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defense.

III. RELATIONSHIPS

A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program, the Director, National Reconnaissance Office shall:

Department of Defense Directive

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

Dept. of Def. P. O. 3800

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1. Keep the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) personally informed on a regular basis on the status of projects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

2. Similarly inform other Department of Defense personnel as he may determine necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters.

3. Establish appropriate interfaces between the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

4. Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies of the Department of Defense as full time members of the National Reconnaissance Office.

B. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and other DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions. Streamlined management procedures will be utilized whereby individual project directors will report directly to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be given support as required from normal staff elements of the military departments and agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he specifically requests, and these projects will not be subject to normal Department of Defense staff review.

IV. AUTHORITIES

A. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned responsibilities for the
(a) National Reconnaissance Office and the (26) National Reconnaissance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

1. Organize, staff, and supervise the (26) National Reconnaissance Office.

2. Establish, manage and conduct the (26) National Reconnaissance Program.

3. Assist the Secretary of Defense in the supervision of aircraft, drone and satellite reconnaissance, mapping and geodesy matters, including both photographic and electronic signal projects, and be his direct representative on these matters both within and outside the Department of Defense.

4. Review all Department of Defense budget requests and expenditures for any items falling within the definition of the (26) National Reconnaissance Program, including studies and preliminary research and development of components and techniques to support such existing or future projects.

B. Other authorities specifically delegated to the (26) Director, National Reconnaissance Office by the Secretary of Defense will be referenced in numbered enclosures to this directive.

V. PROJECT ASSIGNMENTS

All projects falling within the definition of the (26) National Reconnaissance Program are assigned to that program and will be managed as outlined herein unless specific exception is made by the (26) Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Announcements of any such exceptions will be made by numbered enclosures to this directive.
VI. SECURITY

A. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security procedures to be followed for all matters of the National Reconnaissance Program, including suitable unclassified names and functions to protect all elements of the National Reconnaissance Office.

B. All communications pertaining to matters under the National Reconnaissance Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the cognizance of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, except in those instances specifically exempted by either the Director, National Reconnaissance Office or the Secretary of Defense.

C. With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the following titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not controlled under the special security control system(s) referred to in B. above: National Reconnaissance Program; National Reconnaissance Office. Where absolutely necessary to refer to the National Reconnaissance Program in communications not controlled under the prescribed special security systems, such reference will be made by use of the terminology: "Matters under the purview of DoD TS-5105.23."

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective upon publication.

VIII. CANCELLATION

Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.

Deputy Secretary of Defense
AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

A. The National Reconnaissance Program

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U.S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.

B. The Secretary of Defense will:

1. Establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD and will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP;

2. Choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions.

Excluded from automatic regrading; DoD Dir. 5200.10 does not apply.

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3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;

4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget;

5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement could not be reached.

C. The Director of Central Intelligence will:

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage;

2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results;

3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;

4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;

5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby established to guide and participate in the formulation of the NRP through the DNRO. (The DNRO will sit with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member.) If the Executive Committee cannot agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee will:
a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIS and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.

c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD.

d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force component, recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. To optimize the primary objective of systems development, design requirement of the sensors will be given priority in their integration within the spacecraft and reentry vehicles.

e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee.
f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNI and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence consider desirable.

E. National Reconnaissance Office

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DOD. It shall include the SGC which shall be jointly manned.

2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director NRO will:

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP.

b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations, to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements.

c. Have authority to require that he be kept fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.
d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee records of the status of all projects, programs, and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNARO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

3. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in a line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect the best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNARO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department.

F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities
1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto.

(signed)  
Cyrus Vance  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

(signed)  
W. F. Reborn  
Director of Central Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BERG

SUBJECT: NRO-JCS Relationships on Aircraft Reconnaissance of Denied Areas

PROBLEM: At the present time there is a lack of understanding, or, at best, an ill-defined understanding between the NRO and JCS-JRC with regard to responsibility for aircraft reconnaissance of denied areas. There is no clear statement of (1) responsibilities during peacetime/crisis/active hostilities, (2) definitions of peripheral area (limitations)/denied territory, (3) responsibility for operational planning and analysis, (4) ownership of resources, (5) utilization of resources, and (6) responsibility for reporting status and results.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM: The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office is responsible for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range, for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights. At the present, however, for a variety of reasons which will be discussed, the DNRO does not exercise his authority for all such overflights. Yet, he remains responsible for all overflights, whether or not he elects to control them, and is uniquely responsible for any difficulties or crises which may result from them.

How did this situation come to be?

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBLEM: There are a number of factors which have combined to produce the present problem. Chief among them are the following:

1. During international crises calling for the use of aircraft overflight resources, the NRO has yielded its operational authority
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U-2 and low-level Cuban overflights and were the first examples of this "delegation." Responsibility, in these cases, was transferred to the JCS-JRC. At first, to be sure, operations were carried out under close DNRO supervision; however, before long this direct contact softened and the operations moved completely outside his domain. Once this pattern was set, it became a powerful precedent for all crisis situations.

2. In each case of tacit transfer of authority, the arrangement appears to have been made informally and never confirmed by documentation.

3. The Director of the JRC has moved enthusiastically and aggressively toward broadening his scope of activity from the reconnaissance of carefully-defined peripheries to full-fledged overflight of denied areas. He now asserts a responsibility for missions "required to support assessments of CHICOM threats to the GRC" or those "required to maintain current air, ground, electronic, naval and AAA orders of battle" (see Reference A). He expresses the conviction that any aircraft carrying a military insignia or tail number is the property of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do with as they see fit. He has assumed jurisdiction over the 147 drone operations and has recommended them to the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a JCS asset for the overflight of China, vice WILD RICE.

4. There is already a tacit acceptance of JCS-JRC ownership and control of SR-71 covert overflights, following the phase-out of OXCART aircraft.

5. The 303 Committee has come to recognize JCS-JRC as the national aircraft reconnaissance agency. This development is illustrated by the fact that although the DNRO submits all aircraft overflight schedules to the 303 Committee (including those "delegated" to the JCS-JRC), the 303 Committee sends the approval of JCS-JRC flights directly to the JRC and not to the DNRO.

6. The NRO is developing a primary association, in the intelligence community, with satellite reconnaissance, not aircraft reconnaissance. There is a growing custom of referring to the NRO as the National Satellite Reconnaissance Office.
7. Because of this general situation, the NRO Staff has never attempted to assume control of aircraft overflight operations.

   a. The Staff has never been in a position to do more than after-the-fact tracking of aircraft operations.

   b. It has provided little more than a processing service in the "staffing" of aircraft matters.

   c. It has not established an Aircraft Operations Center (paralleling the SOC) from which appropriate control could be exercised.

HOW THE PROBLEM WAS ALMOST SOLVED: The problem of stepping up to his aircraft overflight obligation was recognized by Dr. McMillan (then the DNRO) in mid-April 1963, when he advised the Deputy Secretary of Defense that a clarification of the policy with regard to the operational aspects of the NRO was in order. Specifically, he expressed concern about:

1. The definition of denied area overflights

2. NRO responsibilities during active military hostilities

3. NRO capability for operations planning and analysis

On Item 1, the DNRO was proceeding on the basis that denied area overflights were any overflights of sovereign territory for which specific permission had to be obtained from the 3412 Special Group (later the 303 Committee) or higher authority.

As to Item 2, the DNRO was recommending a policy which would state that aircraft overflight responsibility would be transferred from the Director, NRO, to the appropriate military commander upon decision of the Secretary of Defense (or higher authority) that the area in question had become an active theater of military hostilities.

In regard to Item 3, Dr. McMillan proposed the establishment of an NRO Aircraft Operations Center so that he might carry out his assigned responsibilities for aircraft reconnaissance of denied areas. His two proposed possibilities:
1. The establishment, within the NRO, of a new office having an aircraft operations capability, which would transmit all instructions to the U&S commands through the JCS-JRC.

Or, as a preferred solution,

2. The establishment of an organizational arrangement under the existing JCS-JRC to serve the needs of both the NRO and JCS. Under this arrangement, the JRC would serve as the NRO Aircraft Operations Center (AOC) and the Chief, JRC, would be the NRO Staff Deputy for Operations, responsible for supervising both the NRO SOC and the new NRO AOC.

In addition to insuring formal coordination between the peripheral activities of the JCS and the overflight activities of the NRO, Dr. McMillan felt that Solution No. 2 would formalize the coordination by the JCS of the resources of the U&S commands which would certainly be required in support of NRO overflight activities.

The CIA, and particularly Dr. Scoville, objected to the McMillan proposal on the basis that it was cumbersome and involved certain fundamental management weaknesses (could the JRC serve two masters: The JCS and the DNRO?). CIA recommended the establishment of an NRO Program E to achieve the desired objective and to provide the NRO with some means of exercising its authority over all overflight activities. The Chief, JRC, could be the Director, NRO Program E, and could be charged with presenting plans to the DNRO for all overflights assigned to his responsibility.

The JCS (General LeMay, Acting Chairman) concurred in Dr. McMillan's proposal and recommended its approval to the Secretary of Defense. While the JCS had some quibbles about the lack of a precise definition of "denied area overflight" and a distinction between those flights which would remain the sole responsibility of the NRO and those for which the responsibility had been, or would be, delegated to the JCS, it concluded that Dr. McMillan's recommended arrangement might well eliminate the requirement for absolutely precise terms. The JCS was ready to prepare, in collaboration with the NRO, a letter of agreement between the Chairman, JCS, and the DNRO which would outline in detail the means by which the Chief, JRC,
would carry out his dual responsibilities.

Following a personal editing by Mr. McNamara of the proposed "Terms of Reference" for an NRO/JCS Aircraft Operations Center, the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced his agreement in principle with McMillan's recommended organizational arrangement and agreed for final JCS/DNRO concurrence in this matter. Of further importance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed with the specific recommendation that the NRO responsibility for aircraft overflights would shift to the JCS in periods of tension -- such shifts of responsibility to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

The JCS concurred in the Terms of Reference and, in response to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated that the Terms of Reference would form the basis for a revised JCS-JRC charter.

The DNRO advised the Deputy Secretary of Defense of his concurrence with the views of the JCS.

The CIA held to its previous view that the proposed organization was unwieldy and badly conceived, adding that the DCI would discuss the subject personally with Mr. McNamara. Mr. McCone questioned the necessity for "complicating the NRO agreement by injecting into the NRO the complicating factor of the JCS-JRC." Although he did acknowledge that some form of arrangement might be in order to formalize the NRO and JCS-JRC relationship, specifically on Cuban overflight and BOW-Thomson aircraft operations, he opined that this could be arranged by the simplest form of agreement. The last paragraph of his letter reads as follows:

Hence, until we learn from experience that the presently conceived NRO cannot operate satisfactorily, I feel it would be a mistake to make as broad a change as the introduction of the JRC involves. This is not to say, however, that if the D/NRO and his Deputy wish to call on the JRC to execute those missions assigned to the Department of Defense their doing so would be perfectly agreeable to me. However, it must be recognized that this does not involve a change in the basic philosophy of handling reconnaissance over foreign territory in the traditional manner through CIA's facilities which are existent and capable, except, of course, in the case of war or the imminent threat.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense responded to the DCI that it was not his intention to suggest any change in the basic policy of handling reconnaissance over foreign territory which, with two exceptions -- overflights of Cuba and -- were being carried out by the CIA. He still considered it important to have a clear-cut and well-understood interrelationship between the DOD elements concerned, specifically the NRO and the JCS-JRC. The Deputy Secretary of Defense believed these interrelationships to be functioning effectively in the absence of formal agreements, but considered it necessary to spell out in written form the procedures needed to insure the continuation of that state of affairs. He agreed that it should be possible to achieve this objective with simpler documentation and accordingly asked Drs. McMillan and Fubini to join the JCS in preparing a less elaborate paper.

After several unsuccessful attempts at such a paper during June, July, and August 1963, the action was abandoned.

The CIA's reaction to the OSD's proposal in 1963 very likely stemmed in part from an uneasiness it was experiencing over the actions of the newly-established NRO. In January 1963, the DNRO had directed the transfer of the CIA's Satellite Operations Center to the NRO Staff, creating a new operations facility in the basement of the Pentagon. CIA middle-management, still smarting from this "loss," undoubtedly looked on the OSD aircraft proposal as another step in the pattern: first the SOC, now the AOC. There is certain to be some CIA recollection of both of these occasions and the NRO would do well to make it emphatically clear, in any new negotiations, that it has no desire or intention to impact the CIA's AOC in any manner.

**ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO US TODAY:**

1. **We can allow the present course of events to continue.**

   **Advantages:**
   
   a. We conserve NRO resources.
   
   b. We accommodate to the present quasi-waritime situation.
c. We avoid a confrontation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. We capitalize on demonstrated JCS-JRC experience and capability.

Disadvantages:

a. Continued disinterest and "delegation" will result in all NRO aircraft/drone resources passing to the JCS.

b. The DNRO will continue to be responsible for aircraft overflights but will not be able to control their conduct.

c. Two "national" reconnaissance authorities on aircraft overflight will be dealing with the 303 Committee.

2. We can set up a strong NRO Aircraft Operations Center.

Advantages:

a. We will be centralizing aircraft overflight operations in a single authority.

b. We will be responsive to the mission assigned to us in the 11 August 1965 DOD/CIA Agreement.

c. The DNRO will have aircraft overflight authority commensurate with his responsibility.

Disadvantages:

a. We will not be able to avoid what promises to be a stormy confrontation with the JCS.

b. We will lose the JCS-JRC's proven capability to operate reconnaissance aircraft.

c. We will immediately face the requirement for increased manpower and more floor space for an NRO Aircraft Operations Center (shades of SOC I).
d. We will still have no provision for a smooth transition to JCS control of all aircraft reconnaissance in wartime.

3. We can set up a joint NRO-JCS Aircraft Operations Center under the DNRO.

Advantages:

a. This will give us a single, strong, national aircraft overflight reconnaissance authority.

b. The DNRO will re-capture aircraft overflight authority commensurate with his assigned responsibility.

c. The nation will have a single agency responsible for alloting developmental and operational resources for aircraft overflight activities.

d. We will be capitalizing on the JCS-JRC's proven capability to conduct reconnaissance activities.

e. We will have one clean line of control to the U&S commands.

f. We will conserve manpower and floor space resources.

g. We will have a simple, clearly-defined mechanism for transferring aircraft overflight resources and operations during periods of tension and war.

h. We will avoid a confrontation with the JCS.

Disadvantages:

None that one can envision at this time.

CONCLUSION: This seems to be a good time to reopen discussions on the concept of an NRO-JCS Aircraft Operations Center. There are impressive advantages and no obvious disadvantages in following this course of action. The CIA objections of four years ago should be substantially softened and possibly altered by now.
RECOMMENDATION: That you request Dr. Flax's approval of an NRO Staff Initiative along these lines and, having that approval, that you open personal discussions with General Steakley, holding closely to the terms of the original 1983 plan (see Reference B).

WILLIAM R. YOST
Lt Colonel, USAF

Attachments
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR AIR VEHICLE OPERATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR, SOC

1. Responsible for handling all correspondence received by the DNRO concerning air vehicle operational matters and for preparing replies or directives concerning air vehicle operations for the DNRO's signature.

2. Represents the DNRO, as appropriate from an operational standpoint, on air vehicle study groups and panels in accordance with DNRO interest and responsibilities.

3. Maintains current knowledge of NRP air vehicles for overflight operations, to include inventory, technical status, and location.

4. Maintains current and cumulative data on all NRP air vehicle overflight operations, to include scheduled operations, flights conducted or cancelled, hours flown, areas covered, and a data base of COMIREX target coverage.

5. Maintains close and continuing liaison with those organizations which carry out and support air vehicle operations for the DNRO, particularly the JRC/JCS, OSA/CIA, and the Program D Office.

6. Prepares the Monthly Forecasts of NRO Overflight Activities for approval by the DNRO and review by the 303 Committee. He is the responsible Staff officer for 303 Committee review actions which require Staff support.

7. Establishes and maintains a complete file of documentation, correspondence and working papers necessary for the accomplishment of the responsibilities herein described.

8. Maintains a close working relationship with SS-7 (R&D) so that he is knowledgeable of air vehicle R&D efforts and coordinates his functions with SS-7 (R&D) Staff officers as appropriate.

Air vehicle means all aerodynamic vehicles employed in the NRP, whether manned or unmanned.
MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Director, National Security Agency (NSA)

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Operations (U)

I wish to reaffirm Secretary McNamara's and my desire that the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain cognizance and control over all military aerial, surface and submarine reconnaissance operations. We look to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit recommendations for all such operations and for reporting on the status of approved missions.

The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all reconnaissance operations should include assessments of (1) the intelligence objectives to be achieved, (2) the technical and operational feasibility of proposed missions, and (3) the risks involved. The Directors of DIA and NSA will provide whatever assistance the Joint Chiefs of Staff require in the development of their recommendations.

Commencing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff submission of the March 1968 monthly forecast for peripheral reconnaissance activities, the following two supplemental sections will be included in the same binder:

(1) A forecast of all submarine reconnaissance missions, and

(2) A forecast of reconnaissance operations conducted under the overall direction of the Director, NRO. (This supplement will be prepared by the Director, NRO.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to submit for my review and approval the appropriate management directives they develop for governing the conduct of all military aerial, surface, and submarine reconnaissance operations. In these directives, provision should specifically be made for the special functions the Deputy Director for Reconnaissance, J-3, discharges on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copies to:
Under Secretary of State
Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Operations (U)

References: (a) Memo for DepSecDef from Dir, Jt Staff, Subj: "Peacetime Reconnaissance Operations in Sensitive Areas (U)," dtd 29 Feb 68

(b) SM 24-68, Subj: "Sensitive Peacetime Reconnaissance Operations," dtd 11 Jan 68 (forwarded by Reference (a) above)

(c) DepSecDef multi-addressee memo, Subj: "Reconnaissance Operations (U)," dtd 3 Feb 68

Having carefully reviewed References (a) and (b) which set forth the general manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan to implement the requirements of Reference (c), I wish to reiterate my decision that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will maintain cognizance and control over all military aerial, surface (land and sea) and submarine reconnaissance operations. This is not to say that in developing a system for discharging this responsibility the Joint Chiefs of Staff are constrained from delegating to the Unified and Specified (U&S) commanders specific functions and responsibilities in the reconnaissance field (e.g., routine aerial, surface, and submarine reconnaissance associated with task force operations on the high seas; ground reconnaissance patrols in the Korean DMZ), nor are the U&S commanders constrained from subdelegating reconnaissance functions delegated to them. I should like, however, to be kept apprised of those operations for which approval authority is delegated by the JCS to the U&S commanders or retained by the JCS. In determining those reconnaissance operations which the JCS are obliged to submit to higher authority for approval, those for which the JCS decide to retain approval authority, and those for which the JCS delegate approval authority to U&S commanders, in final analysis I must rely on the good judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since all situations which could become politically or militarily important to higher authority cannot be arbitrarily defined in advance. In this regard, I found the Appendices to Reference (b) in the main useful documents but believe they may require more substantive revision than Reference (a) suggests. I assume that in addition you will develop management guidance memoranda for OJCS use.
As a general rule, in the development of your new management directives, please keep in mind my desire that all submarine, surface vessel, and aircraft reconnaissance operations which are specifically tasked to collect intelligence against foreign countries and the military forces, equipment, and operations thereof, are to be reported.

Also please include in your new reconnaissance management directives, as requested by Reference (c), the following points.

First, in consonance with the discussion of sensitive peacetime reconnaissance operations as contained in the Appendices to Reference (b), explicit provision should be made to establish the responsibility of the JCS for advising, and obtaining approval from, higher authority of all sensitive peacetime reconnaissance operations.

Second, provision should be made for promptly advising higher authority of any geographic area, reconnaissance function, or reconnaissance platform, which is designated or considered "sensitive," and the reasons therefor, by the JCS or U&$ commanders. Similarly, provision should be made to report any changes in such designations to higher authority. In this context, I believe that your new management directives should include specific provision for quickly designating areas, operations, or functions as sensitive in which political or military events suddenly emerge (e.g., the recent developments in Korea) which generate concern or interest by higher authority.

Third, I believe that the new management directives should also contain the principal instructions and policies for the conduct of all sensitive military reconnaissance operations. I noted that in Reference (b) citations are included to some six other JCS management directives. For example, DoD policies governing the conduct of sensitive submarine and surface vessel reconnaissance operations are not set forth in Reference (b), but are embodied in another JCS directive. Governing directives should clearly require the JCS to review and approve each of these operations. Since such operations are to be included in the monthly forecast submitted by the JCS, they will be reviewed and evaluated in the same manner as any other sensitive reconnaissance operation.
Fourth, specific provision should also be made to report
to higher authority those military operations which, while not
primarily reconnaissance in purpose or objective, probably
would provoke the same type of foreign reaction as would
reconnaissance operations undertaken in the same geographic
areas. Such military operations will be submitted to higher
authority for approval in the same manner as proposed sensi-
tive reconnaissance operations since a mechanism exists for
obtaining approval expeditiously.

Finally, the new management directives should include
a provision which states that any subsequent amendments or
changes will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for
approval before they are promulgated.

Copies to:
  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
  Director, National Reconnaissance Office
  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
  Director, National Security Agency
MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Secretary of Defense
                  Director of Central Intelligence
                  Assistant to the President for National
                  Security Affairs
                  Deputy Under Secretary of State (Political Affairs)
                  Executive Secretary, 303 Committee

SUBJECT: Forecast of NRP Aircraft and Satellite Activities for March 1969

Attached is the forecast of National Reconnaissance Program
overflight activities for the month of March 1969.

Alexander H. Flax

Approval
303 Committee Principal
# FORECAST OF NRP AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES FOR MARCH 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>REQUIREMENT APPROVED BY</th>
<th>DATE APPROVED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDEALIST/TACKLE</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>1-31 March</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>USIB</td>
<td>20 Sep 65</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Missions*</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>1-31 March</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>USIB</td>
<td>28 Jan 66</td>
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<td>As required*</td>
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<td>Photo</td>
<td>1-31 March</td>
<td>S. China</td>
<td>USIB</td>
<td>17 Mar 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIANT SCALE</td>
<td>SR-71</td>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>1-31 March</td>
<td>NVN</td>
<td>(Special)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 Missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLASS LAMP</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>1-31 March</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>JCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 Missions</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GIANT DRAGON</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>1-31 March</td>
<td>NVN/Laos</td>
<td>JCS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15-20 Missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUMPY ACTION**</td>
<td>Drone</td>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>1-31 March</td>
<td>NVN</td>
<td>JCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-45 Missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*A recurring bank against total requirements. Subject to specific mission approval under present 303 Committee restrictions. If overflights of China continue to be stood down, the following schedule is proposed: 4 Photo/ELINT missions to remain 20 miles off the China Mainland. This conforms to the present 303 Committee restrictions of approaching no closer than 20 miles to the China Mainland.

**BUMPY ACTION missions over China are subject to specific mission approval under present 303 Committee restrictions.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORONA</td>
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<td>PHOTO</td>
<td>Eurasian Communist Countries (Primary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World-wide Mapping and Charting (Secondary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORONA RESERVE*</td>
<td>THOR (SLV-2A)</td>
<td>PHOTO</td>
<td>Eurasian Communist Countries (Primary)</td>
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<td>World-wide Mapping and Charting (Secondary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMBIT</td>
<td>Titan IIIB (SLV-5B)</td>
<td>PHOTO</td>
<td>Eurasian Communist Countries (Primary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EARPOP RESERVE*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Note: Sub-satellites are not listed.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Back-up used only if required.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE STAFF

Attention: SAFSS-6

Subject: JCS Controlled Overflights, Forecast for March 1969

Reference: NRO Memorandum B/00284, 3 Jan 64

1. (C) In accordance with the request in reference, a forecast of JCS controlled overflights for March 1969 is submitted.

2. (C/C) Actual date of flights indicated below will depend upon weather. All of the following have a primary mission of photography.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number Sorties</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>GLASS LAMP</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>GIANT DRAGON</td>
<td>NVN/Laos/Camodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-45</td>
<td>Drore</td>
<td>BUMPY ACTION</td>
<td>NVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>SR-71</td>
<td>GIANT SCALE</td>
<td>NVN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ralph D. Steakley
Brig General, USAF
Deputy Director
for Reconnaissance
Operations Directorate.

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FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR AIR VEHICLE OPERATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR, SOC

1. Responsible for handling all correspondence received by the DNRO concerning air vehicle operational matters and for preparing replies or directives concerning air vehicle operations for the DNRO's signature.

2. Represents the DNRO, as appropriate from an operational standpoint, on air vehicle study groups and panels in accordance with DNRO interest and responsibilities.

3. Maintains current knowledge of NRP air vehicles for overflight operations, to include inventory, technical status, location, and operational capabilities.

4. Studies alternative operational approaches to meet COMIREX and SORS requirements, when appropriate, in order to make recommendations to the DNRO on the most suitable platform to use in particular situations.

5. Maintains current and cumulative data on all NRP air vehicle overflight operations, to include scheduled operations, flights conducted or cancelled, hours flown, areas covered, and a data base of COMIREX target coverage.

6. Maintains close and continuing liaison with those organizations which carry out and support air vehicle operations for the DNRO, particularly the JRC/JCS, OSA/CIA, and the Program D Office.

7. Prepares the Monthly Forecasts of NRO Overflight Activities for approval by the DNRO and review by the 303 Committee. He is the responsible Staff officer for 303 Committee review actions which require Staff support.

8. Establishes and maintains a complete file of documentation, correspondence and working papers necessary for the accomplishment of the responsibilities herein described.

9. Maintains a close working relationship with SS-7 (R&D) and Program D so that he is knowledgeable of air vehicle R&D efforts and coordinates his functions with SS-7 (R&D) and Program D Staff officers as appropriate.

Air vehicle means all aerodynamic vehicles employed in the NRP, whether manned or unmanned.
As you know, a Staff representative stops by the JRC each morning now to pick up an operations summary of the subject programs, generally covering activities of the previous day. I will request General Berg to work out with you and the Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs the most suitable procedures for transmitting the additional data required and to provide more details on the specific supplementary data the NRO Staff will need to carry out this new function.

Alexander H. Flax
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CIA RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS

SUBJECT: Supplemental Data on the IDEALIST/TACKLE Program

As we move continually in the direction of tighter budget scrutiny
of all our NRP assets and operations by the Bureau of the Budget and
others, I find it would be very useful to me to have a better informational
focal point in the NRO Staff to provide me somewhat greater visibility in
relating all our programs (satellites, aircraft, and drones) in their
respective capabilities to satisfy USIB requirements. Accordingly, I have
instructed General Berg to establish an additional function in the Satellite
Operations Center with the principle task of maintaining a current data base
on aircraft and drone assets, to include inventories, locations, technical
status, operational capabilities and operational activities within the NRP
in satisfaction of USIB requirements. I would look especially to the NRO
Staff to study and make recommendations to me, based on this cumulative
knowledge, of alternative methods to meet particular COMIREX and SORS
requirements most appropriate for collection by air vehicle assets, as
opposed to collection by satellites.

I will ask General Berg to work out with the Director, OSA and the
Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center, JCS, the details of the supplemental

W O R K I N G D R A F T

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data he will need to carry out this new function. As OSA already provides a good deal of data on their operations, I do not believe this new requirement will significantly increase their reporting workload.

Alexander H. Flax