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DOD RESPONSE TO NASA ACTIVITIES IN SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

FEBRUARY 1, 1966

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WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

28 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: DOD Response to NASA Activities in Satellite
Reconnaissance

Problem: To develop and sponsor the best DOD response to NASA's satellite reconnaissance activities.

Background: You are well aware of the background leading up to our present untenable situation regarding NASA's entry into the satellite reconnaissance area and the impact of that activity on the National Reconnaissance Program. During December I advised you that the NRO Staff would prepare, for your consideration, a proposed DOD position and response to NASA's activities. In preparing this study, we found the alternatives available to the DOD to be substantially more limited than one would expect. For example, your discussions with us made it clear that very little or no progress could be expected from a simple continuation of the ad hoc, piecemeal negotiations conducted in the past, and that definitive resolution is essential and could only be achieved by explicit direction from the highest executive level. Secondly, Mr. McNamara's personal initiative of May 6, 1965 set a definite policy framework against which our own considerations had to be measured.

Present Status: The attached document, "DOD Response to NASA Activities in Satellite Reconnaissance" has been prepared in the light of the guidance implicit in (1) your comments and (2) Mr. McNamara's initiative. The audience we had in mind, during the preparation of this report, was the Secretary of Defense, and it was arranged accordingly in the format you see. The tabular reference section is more voluminous than I would like; however, it represents solid documentation for everything we say. January 1966 was the first month

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in which we could work from 100% documented facts, with no speculative interpretation on what has occurred or is actually occurring in NASA.

Recommendation: I recommend that you determine the appropriateness of this study for presentation to the Secretary of Defense.

Paul E. Worthman
PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

Dr. Flay :

These two pages, of course, detach from the study

Mr. Rehn and General Stewart have read this study and would like to discuss it with you at your convenience.

Paul Worthman

2 Feb 66

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DOD Response to NASA Activities in Satellite Reconnaissance

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DOD RESPONSE TO NASA ACTIVITIES
IN SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

I. PROBLEM:

To achieve suitable arrangements between the Department of Defense and NASA on satellite reconnaissance activities.

II. INTRODUCTION:

NASA has recently outlined its plans for "remote sensing of the earth" by satellite reconnaissance overflight (Tab 1). This activity -- called the APOLLO Applications Program -- will justify and use those APOLLO spacecraft and SATURN launch capabilities which are excess to the needs of NASA's approved lunar program. NASA has encouraged the military services, civil governmental agencies, and the scientific community generally to propose active participation in this activity and has solicited their proposals and endorsements for this extension to the original APOLLO program. These solicitations have led inevitably to a series of proposed experimental activities involving the study, development, test, and operation of satellite-borne image forming earth sensors in a reconnaissance mode.

These NASA activities are more than mere formal departures from national policy and approved procedures. They publicly commit

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the United States to announce its engagement in reconnaissance activities from orbit. They develop and disseminate a body of knowledge and experience covering the capability of U. S. sensors to accomplish earth observation, eventually revealing technology and operations derived from the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). These earth orbital activities, conducted ostensibly as a prelude to lunar exploration, will involve open launchings, announced overflight reconnaissance of denied areas, and unclassified dissemination internationally of reconnaissance products. The damage to the NRP will be irreparable and the resulting impact in the international political arena will be irreversible.

Ironically, most of the "requirements" solicited by NASA can be satisfied easily and promptly by presently-available data acquired by the NRP. (Tab 2) This fact, although advanced to NASA in a proposal by the DOD, has been ignored by top NASA officials. Additionally, these officials have declined to respond to an initiative by the Secretary of Defense on this subject.

III. BACKGROUND:

NASA has a valid need for image forming sensors -- optical and radar -- to map and explore the surfaces of the moon and planets. The development and testing of these required sensors must, of necessity,

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draw from the same industrial group which supports the National Reconnaissance Program. In connection with the NASA lunar program, these needs were recognized in an agreement of August 28, 1963, signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA.

(Tabs 3 and 4) This agreement (still in effect today) has established a suitable working relationship under which NRP-derived technology, experience, and other support are now being provided to the NASA lunar program.

As early as 1963, a number of contractors to NASA who were working on Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) studies examined, at NASA direction, optical reconnaissance systems. One such study by Boeing addressed explicitly the earth reconnaissance mission and possible military applications. In spite of the DNRO's expressions of concern the follow-on MORL work statement to Douglas Aircraft Company for FY 65 listed such objectives as research and development in surveillance and reconnaissance (as well as in other purely military domains such as command and control, anti-ballistic missile technology, and anti-satellite work). In January 1965, Douglas reported that "two categories of experiments have been tentatively selected for inclusion on board the MORL which support the reconnaissance and surveillance required for the national defense effort." In addition to industry, NASA was also engaged

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actively in advertising its potential satellite reconnaissance capability to the scientific community and was soliciting testimonial support and requirements from the military services and from federal agencies such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States Coast & Geodetic Survey, the United States Department of Commerce, the United States Geological Survey, and the United States Department of Agriculture. (Tab 5) By 1964, NASA's satellite reconnaissance planning -- expanded far beyond lunar exploration -- openly included specific applications for "earth sensing" -- a NASA pseudonym for photographic and electromagnetic reconnaissance. By 1965, NASA's "earth sensing" objectives included "visual, photographic, and electronic surveillance of ocean areas and detection, observation, tracking and various other uses of large telescopes and antennas." Today, NASA is considering 20 to 30 SATURN launchings for the initial four-year period beyond the initial APOLLO flights. (Tab 1) The majority of these are to be earth-orbital missions devoted primarily to "earth sensing" using optical, infra-red, and radar sensors.

During this entire period, meetings were convened, committees formed, and correspondence exchanged between the DOD/NRC/CIA and NASA in attempts to agree on suitable arrangements for NASA-sponsored

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satellite reconnaissance activity. These DOD/NRO/CIA efforts were entirely constructive with their major theme being that of protecting the integrity and security of the NRP.

On May 6, 1965, the Secretary of Defense proposed to Mr. Webb an arrangement by which the Associate Administrator of NASA and the DNRO would jointly review the NASA requirements for study, development, test or use in earth orbit, of devices or methods for forming or recording high resolution images to determine whether or not the requirements could be construed to be of reconnaissance quality. Mr. McNamara proposed further that, in the event the requirements were considered to be of reconnaissance quality, the DOD would serve as agent to the NASA in carrying out specific studies, development, test in earth orbit, and procurement for NASA lunar and planetary exploration purposes. (Tab 6)

On June 23, 1965, Mr. Webb replied stating that he considered non-military terrestrial surveys utilizing satellite technology to be a proper function of NASA, citing the policy expressed in NSC Action 2454.¹ Mr. Webb indicated that the arrangement proposed by Mr. McNamara "would not meet NASA's responsibilities" and suggested that in lieu

¹ Mr. Webb's reference to NSAM 2454 was an out-of-context cite of Point 5 which states: "The NASA should study possibilities of accelerating bilateral international cooperation concerning non-military space activities involving space observation, 'perhaps including photography.'"

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of executing a further (to the August 1963) agreement² "at our level," the Associate Administrator, NASA and the DNRO be delegated the responsibility for executing a memorandum of understanding "in any future case in which NASA desires to proceed beyond the exploratory study phase." (Tab 7)

On July 31, 1965, the Secretary of Defense stated his personal concern to the Administrator of NASA saying "in view of the grave possibility of endangering the national security, I believe that study contracts you have underway in this regard should not be carried any further with the industrial and academic community. These study groups should be disbanded until determination by the management procedures we have agreed to can be brought to bear." (Tab 8) Mr. Webb never responded to this proposal.³

² The August 1963 Agreement is confined explicitly to the NASA lunar program and cannot, in any sense be construed as encompassing NASA earth orbital activity.

³ A detailed chronology covering DOD/NASA relationships during this period is attached as Tab 9.

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IV. THE NASA SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

A. NASA Plans

NASA has purchased 24 APOLLO spacecraft, 12 SATURN IB's, and 15 SATURN V's. Both the SATURN IB and SATURN V vehicles are capable of injecting sizeable APOLLO spacecraft payloads into low inclination, polar, or synchronous orbits.

For months, NASA has been engaged in a meticulous study of potential earth orbital space reconnaissance missions which would use the APOLLO spacecraft and the SATURN IB and SATURN V launch capabilities in activities extending far beyond requirements for the initial APOLLO effort. Some 20 to 30 SATURN launchings are being considered for the four-year period beyond the initial APOLLO flights. The NASA reconnaissance program (referred to as the APOLLO Applications Program) will use any of these vehicles which are excess to APOLLO lunar program requirements. NASA has, in fact, tentatively scheduled APOLLO spacecraft 507, 513, 517 and 521 for a first series of earth orbital flights. (Tab 1) Assuming a degree of success similar to that of its current programs, NASA plans to begin its earth orbital reconnaissance flights by July 1968.

NASA has conducted a number of studies and instrument developments for its planned use of these vehicles in earth sensing reconnaissance

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and mapping roles. Specifically, NASA has already defined a program for the development of:

- a. A metric mapping camera system which will provide ground resolutions of less than 12 meters (roughly four times better than the ARGON mapping camera used in the NRP today).
- b. A panoramic, high resolution search camera system which will provide ground resolutions of less than four meters (a resolution identical to the CORONA search system being flown in the NRP today).
- c. An ultra-high resolution camera system which will provide ground resolutions of less than two meters (quality approaching that of the GAMBIT system currently being flown in the NRP). (Tab 10)

NASA is now engaged in detailed experiment definition and hardware specification for these reconnaissance sensors.

B. NASA Information Policy and Practice

NASA information release policy is very simply stated as "if we fly it -- we release it." NASA intends to continue this policy and is determined that security classifications will not be imposed on the reconnaissance sensors it plans to use or on the operations it intends to conduct.

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NASA has stated that: (1) all reconnaissance sensors flown on NASA spacecraft missions will be unclassified; (2) all data acquired on NASA space reconnaissance missions over foreign areas will be unclassified; (3) all data acquired by NASA reconnaissance missions will be generally available to the international scientific community. In summary, the total NASA effort in this area will be unclassified.

(Tab 11)

NASA has never closed any of its launchings to the public. NASA policy enjoins extensive pre-launch, in-flight and post-flight public exposure. NASA encourages its scientists and engineers to write and speak freely in all matters concerning the technical content and operational aspects of NASA programs.

NASA conducts itself as if uninhibited by stated national policy on satellite reconnaissance, by the PFIAB, the 303 Committee, the USIB, or by any definition of mission or requirement for security.

C. The Time Scale

To meet a first reconnaissance satellite launching in July 1968, NASA must accomplish a series of actions by approximately the dates indicated:⁴

⁴ These actions are drawn from typical planning factors used by NASA and the DOD in the accomplishment of any program of this nature. The time phasing of these events is based upon past NASA and DOD experience in related programs and developmental activities.

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Specify functional requirements	January 1966
Define mission payload specifications	February 1966
Issue an RFP to the optical industry for the development of	March 1966
- a mapping reconnaissance camera	
- a search reconnaissance camera	
- a spotting reconnaissance camera	
Evaluate proposals from industry	May 1966
Award hardware development contracts and publicly announce the award	June 1966
Obtain Manned Space Flight Evaluation Board approval	August 1966
Conduct validation tests for reconnaissance camera performance	November 1966
Make spatial mockup available to news media	April 1967
Commence final mission planning and choose orbital inclinations	June 1967
Complete plans for data collection, reduction and processing	July 1967
Publicly announce flight objectives	August 1967
Release mission profile to news media	September 1967
Distribute public information (press) plan	December 1967
Commence astronaut training	January 1968

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- Deliver hardware to spacecraft contractor for integration March 1968
- Integrate payload March-June 1968
- Checkout spacecraft (payload) systems June 1968
- Conduct simulated flight test June 1968
- Furnish complete detailed system performance characteristics (animated) and sequence of mission events (for national TV network coverage) June 1968
- Conduct open launching for 14-day manned earth orbital reconnaissance mission July 1968
- Release (to wire services and national TV networks) the in-flight mission control/astronaut dialogue (on experiment activity, sightings, targets photographed, estimated degree of success, etc.) July 1968
- Recover, process and make available to the news media and the international scientific community: July-August 1968
 - 4000 feet of mapping photography
 - 15,000 feet of survey photography
 - 3000 feet of selective high resolution photography

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D. The Probable Results

Assuming normal global weather conditions and nominal sub-system performance, examples of the photography which would be included in that obtained from the NASA reconnaissance missions are the following:

- an array of Soviet ICBM deployments
- Chepelevka airfield (and an identifiable count of some 100 aircraft of various configurations)
- the Soviet nuclear submarine bases at Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok
- Soviet tactical missile deployments at North Brest
- Leningrad and Moscow with associated ring of AICBM installations
- the Israeli nuclear production plant
- the Aswan High Dam
- the Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nor
- the French atomic test site on Tuamotu Atoll
- the 19,000 foot runway of the NRO's covert reconnaissance base -- Area 51
- various key strategic bases and ICBM deployments within the Continental United States
- key deployments of U-2 reconnaissance vehicles at Peshawar and Ban Takhli

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E. The Impact

The impact of the major events in this time scale is overwhelming.

Action: NASA's RFP to the optical industry will represent the first publicly announced active solicitation of effort for the development of satellite-borne photographic image-forming earth sensors since the adoption of a no-public-notice Presidential policy in 1961.

Impact: Dangerous, irreversible relaxation of carefully structured national security standards

Substantive and explicit deterioration of NRP security

Increasingly strained DOD/NASA relations as two organizations work on the same general task using different rule books

Public confirmation of United States intention to engage in satellite reconnaissance activities

NASA "peaceful" image irretrievably tarnished or destroyed

Loss of national control over public statements and backgrounding concerning satellite reconnaissance

Action: NASA's award of reconnaissance sensor hardware development contracts will represent the first serious breach of NRP contractor discipline.

Impact: Dilution of the Nation's already scarce optical contractor resources

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Disturbance of contractor morale as DOD contractors work in the "black" and NASA's work in the "white"

Unreconcilable demands on the optical industry from two competing Federal agencies

Inevitable duplication of technical effort. Most of what NASA will insist on developing already exists

Open invitation to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress to adjudicate the DOD/NASA reconnaissance budgets

International proliferation of sensitive NRP-derived technology

Security compromise over the full spectrum of the NRP

Action: NASA's public announcement of flight objectives and its release of complete mission profile data to the news media will represent the first disclosure of the United States' wide-ranging activity in satellite reconnaissance overflight of denied areas:

Impact: Unilateral abrogation of national security policy

Unilateral redefinition of 303 Committee authorities

Action: NASA's launching of a satellite for earth reconnaissance purposes will represent the first publicly disclosed, open launching of a vehicle with such a mission since the 1961 Presidential decision that such releases were contrary to the national interest.

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Impact: Explicit public confirmation of U. S. engagement in satellite reconnaissance activity (contrary to existing national policy).

Action: NASA's public dissemination of satellite photography will represent the first uncontrolled release of unsanitized satellite reconnaissance products.

Impact: Explicit disclosure of United States interest and technical capability

Unilateral dissolution of the Presidentially-directed TKH security control system

Unilateral abrogation of DCI statutory authority regarding intelligence collection activities

Afforded the uninhibited pursuit of its objectives, NASA can accomplish these actions on its planned time scale. NASA is convinced that such a program can be conducted without straining international relations unduly. Indeed, NASA is confident that such activity will elicit kudos from all nations of the world.

Previous experience -- the U-2 for example -- has demonstrated that national and international reaction to such a series of events and the "fait accompli" could range from the unlikely -- but possible -- situation

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of no unfavorable comment to one of threats or actual efforts to destroy or interfere with the offending satellite. Assuming that NASA's convictions are valid -- that this series of events elicits no unfavorable comment -- then the following actions are incumbent upon the U. S. :

- redefine national security policy
- reassign all U. S. reconnaissance activity to a no-longer "peaceful" NASA
- arrange with NASA a suitable priority for the collection of intelligence information
- devise an orderly plan for dissolving the NRP
- cancel the DOD Manned Orbiting Laboratory program
- arrange the transfer of programmed DOD reconnaissance funds (roughly \$1.5 billion annually) to NASA
- arrange the orderly declassification of all presently-available TALENT-KEYHOLE controlled intelligence products
- redefine (statutorily) the authority of the DCI in this area
- dissolve the 303 Committee
- develop new contingencies to cover U. S. military response to crises on a fast reaction basis, in the absence of a DOD satellite reconnaissance program

If, on the other hand, NASA's judgments are not valid and previously demonstrated adverse reactions to reconnaissance overflight activity occur, the following events are imminent:

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- breaching of the current "detente" between the U. S. and the USSR
- destruction of the NASA "peaceful" image
- forced disclosure of satellite reconnaissance operations
- forced disclosure of satellite reconnaissance products
- loss of a virtual sole source of photographic intelligence information (or at best acceptance of a totally clandestine modus operandi)
- charges of duplicity or aggressiveness in the U. N. forum
- exposure to a confrontation by the USSR or a third party
- extreme international pressure -- particularly from our allies and from friendly neutrals -- to "cease and desist" all photographic overflight (or acceptance to fly in a known hostile environment with constant risk of interception and resulting high level international crisis)

V. ALTERNATIVE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS REGARDING THE NASA SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

As indicated in Section IV, NASA's reconnaissance program will have a wide-ranging impact on federal policies and activities. The Department of Defense has needed a clear policy to guide all of its elements in dealing with the impact as it affects them. Such a proposal is contained in the Secretary of Defense's letter of May 6, 1965 to Mr. Webb. (Tab 6)

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The Department of Defense has also taken a first step toward setting up intra-agency practices to carry out this proposal. In a memorandum dated August 30, 1965 for the Service Secretaries, Mr. Vance designated the NRO and the DOD point of contact with NASA, as well as with other governmental agencies regarding activities involving study, development, test, or use of satellite-borne image forming earth sensors. Mr. Vance further directed all DOD agencies to deal exclusively with the NRO on all intra-DOD needs of this nature.

(Tab 12)

While these actions have had a positive influence in coordinating and disciplining DOD activities, they have had little or no parallel effect on NASA. Indeed, the only response from NASA has been a studied reluctance to accept anything less than total NASA autonomy in satellite reconnaissance. Since the DOD and NASA are the only U. S. agencies conducting space operations, it is unreasonable to expect a governmental "third party" to referee or arbitrate the reconnaissance issue. With matters now at a stand-off, it is essential that the DOD take the initiative to resolve this issue.

The Secretary of Defense's memorandum of May 6, 1965, referenced above, has already established the general outline of a desirable solution. In the light of that proposal, several alternative follow-on actions are available.

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ALTERNATIVE ONE:

1. Continue to negotiate ad hoc partial solutions to the problem.⁵

With this approach, the DOD could attempt to strengthen the existing (or create a new) DOD-NASA coordinating group to examine NASA satellite reconnaissance proposals on a one-at-a-time basis, evaluating the necessity and propriety of the proposals in the light of federal needs and federal policy.

The following points outline the elements of such an approach:

a. Authority: All NASA activities, current or proposed, will be reviewed by a joint DOD(NRO)/NASA committee at regular intervals. Proposed new NASA activity will be reviewed prior to, during (if approved), and after the study phase, whether in-house or contractual. (The success of this review will depend entirely on the ability of the committee to achieve agreement.)

b. Requirements: The DOD will request NASA to make its "requirements" available to the DIA. In any case, the DIA will collect the "requirements" of the DOD, which, in this context, are essentially those of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (for mapping photography)

⁵ In carrying out negotiations on Alternative One, the DOD would actually be working toward a timely adoption of a stronger Alternative -- which is discussed in Alternative Two below, and which calls for "permitting NASA to conduct carefully defined satellite observation activities."

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and the U. S. Navy Oceanographic Office (for oceanographic photography). Additionally, the DIA will approach NASA's other federal customers -- which are now mainly the Department of Agriculture (crop photography), the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (mapping photography), and the U. S. Geological Survey (geological photography and large scale mapping photography) -- to assemble their requirements and determine to what extent they may be fulfilled from the already-available data bank. (The DIA is already working along these lines with civil agencies in connection with a mapping and charting study requested by the BOB.) (Tab 13)

c. Operations: A survey of NASA customer "requirements," as outlined in b. , above, indicates that 50% of the need could be met (without additional expense) from presently-available DOD material. The remainder could be met within the capabilities of already-programmed DOD flights without detracting appreciably from primary missions.

d. Exploitation: The DOD will attempt to acquire NASA concurrence to permit NPIC to conduct all processing, production, and necessary interpretation of photographic reconnaissance of the earth. Similarly, NASA would be requested to permit NSA to process electronic observation products.

e. Security: The DCI will be asked to issue an intelligence directive stating that earth reconnaissance products will be automatically

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controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system, pending a DCI review for releasability. (Arrangements are now in existence for making controlled releases to the civil agencies referenced in b. and c., above.) (Tab 2)

Strength of Alternative One:

1. Avoids a direct interagency confrontation.

Weaknesses:

1. Assumes an over-optimistic view of the situation. To date, NASA's actions indicate a total disinterest in negotiating the subject.
2. Assumes that all negotiations can be concluded in a short time. Actually, it is likely that NASA will release a comprehensive, earth-reconnaissance sensor RFP in March 1966.
3. Contains no provision for automatic higher-level enforcement of committee decisions.
4. In practice, invites the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget to adjudicate DOD/NASA reconnaissance budgets.
5. Deals with symptoms only; never settles the basic issues of adherence to well-established federal satellite reconnaissance policy.

If Alternative Two is the goal of Alternative One, why not move directly to:

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ALTERNATIVE TWO:

Arrange for a Presidential directive which explicitly defines the permissible range of NASA satellite reconnaissance activities.

Under this Alternative, a Presidential directive will be issued permitting NASA to conduct satellite reconnaissance activities within a range of sensor resolutions which would not endanger the security of the NRP, nor embarrass the United States publicly or politically. In August 1965, such a range was defined by the DNRO and agreed to by the Associate Administrator, NASA. (Tabs 14 and 15) In this agreement, a reconnaissance-like sensor was defined as

"an image-forming sensor having a resolution of 0.1 milliradian or finer, or an optical or infra-red image-forming system with a physical aperture greater than 30 cm and an optical figure controlled to better than 1/4 wave length."

This definition will serve as a basis for the Presidential directive. NASA activity will be permitted at resolutions more gross than those defined for reconnaissance-like sensors; moreover, NASA is not exclusively franchised in this range of resolutions, since the DOD will necessarily continue to conduct satellite reconnaissance at any resolutions required -- gross or fine -- to obtain national intelligence.

The following points outline the essential elements of such a directive -- essential in the sense that they must be non-negotiable if Alternative Two is to be employed effectively.

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a. Authority: Under the Presidential directive, all NASA activities current or proposed, will be reviewed by a joint DOD(NRO)/NASA committee at regular intervals. Proposed new NASA activity will be reviewed prior to, during (if approved), and after the study phase, whether in-house or contractual. Committee disagreements will be taken directly to the President for adjudication.⁶

b. Requirements: Will be collected by the joint DOD(NRO)/NASA committee and processed through the USIB.

c. Operations: After review and validation, the joint DOD(NRO)/NASA committee will assign reconnaissance operations in strict compliance with the definition contained in the Presidential directive. The DOD will continue to conduct, through its NRO, reconnaissance operations across the resolution spectrum in fulfillment of national requirements.

d. Exploitation: Processing, production, and necessary interpretation of all photographic earth reconnaissance products will be accomplished by the NPIC. Similarly, all electronic observation products will be exploited by the National Security Agency.

⁶ One might consider that the Vice President as Chairman of the NASC would adjudicate committee disagreements; however, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, places the NASC in an "advise and assist" role and calls for decision by the President on matters of this nature in which the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA are unable to reach an agreement.

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e. Security: All products of earth reconnaissance will be automatically controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system, pending review for releasability by the DCI in accordance with existing directives. (Tab 16)

Strength of Alternative Two:

1. Forces a timely agreement on satellite reconnaissance activities.

Weaknesses:

1. Places the total National Reconnaissance Program under two dissimilar managements.

2. Requires substantial redefinition of national satellite reconnaissance policy to license NASA's "no-secrets" public information practices.

3. Invites Congressional and BOB adjudication of DOD/NASA reconnaissance budgets.

4. Requires Presidential adjudication of committee disagreement.

To overcome the weaknesses of either Alternative One or Two, consideration should be given to:

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ALTERNATIVE THREE:

Arrange for a Presidential directive assigning all satellite reconnaissance of the earth to the Department of Defense.

This Presidential directive will appoint the Secretary of Defense as the single federal manager for satellite reconnaissance of the earth, whether civil or military in application. The Secretary of Defense will have the authority to task NASA for validated civil agency needs, as required or appropriate. All funding will be controlled by the Secretary of Defense, with reimbursement from those civil agencies whose needs are served.

The following points are the essential elements of such a directive, and, as in Alternative Two, are considered non-negotiable:

a. Requirements: All federal requirements will be collected by the DOD and processed through the USIB.

b. Operations: After validation of the requirements by the USIB, the Secretary of Defense will assign all federal earth reconnaissance operations, as appropriate, directing that these operations be conducted in strict accordance with existing national satellite reconnaissance policy.

c. Exploitation: Processing, production, and necessary interpretation of all photographic earth reconnaissance products will

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be accomplished by the NPIC. Similarly, electronic observation products will be exploited by the NSA.

d. Security: All products of earth reconnaissance will be automatically controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system, pending review for releasability by the DCI in accordance with existing directives. (Tab 16)

Strengths of Alternative Three:

1. Requires no adjudication of budgets by the Congress or BOB.
2. Requires no Presidential review and adjudication.
3. Settles basic issues of adherence to established national satellite reconnaissance policy.
4. Preserves existing authorities of the 303 Committee, the PFIAB, the USIB, and the DCI.
5. Provides single, responsible, national program management.
6. Assures effective utilization of national resources.

Weaknesses:

None

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

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