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POL-A-5

1. Dr. Flax
2. SS-1
3. SS-3
4. RF



November 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX
THRU MR. REBER

SUBJECT: Proposed Changes in the Scope of the BYEMAN and
TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Systems

PROBLEM:

Evaluate a proposed COMOR Directive (prepared by DIA, CIA, and NRO representatives) on the identification of NRP information that may be handled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE control channel (Tab A). In an earlier discussion on this paper, you expressed some concern about the type of technical and operational information proposed for release under a T-K label.

BACKGROUND:

The TALENT-KEYHOLE Security System: On August 26, 1960 (a few days after the successful recovery of the first satellite reconnaissance capsule) President Eisenhower directed the establishment of the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system. The scope of the system was described in these words, "I hereby direct that the products of satellite reconnaissance, and information of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the product, shall be given strict security handling under the provisions of a special security control system approved by me. I hereby approve the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System for this purpose...."

The BYEMAN Security System: On December 20, 1961, the BYEMAN security system was introduced by the DCI, who published a manual on the subject. The stated purpose of the BYEMAN system was "to protect information pertaining to the development and/or operational aspects of NRP projects." The DCI is responsible for protecting and controlling BYEMAN materials; the DNRO is responsible for determining individual "must-know" for access to NRP information; and, by agreement between the DNRO and the

~~TOP SECRET~~

Director, DIA, the latter "manages" the BYEMAN system within the DOD (for example, processes all DOD requests for project clearances).

The First Bending of the Rules. Early in 1962, because of NPIC's complaint that it was not being kept current on camera modifications and new cameras, the NRO Staff prepared the first in what was to become a series of technical booklets designed to assist the exploitation technicians. It is clear, from the definitions stated above, that these booklets should have been in the BYEMAN system, since they described, in detail, camera systems, optical configurations, operational modes, etc. Both NPIC and DIA--the main customers for the booklets--urged the NRP Staff to consider the use of the TALENT-KEYHOLE system, in lieu of BYEMAN, arguing that (1) this would preclude a flood of requests for BYEMAN codeword project clearances and (2) the distribution of the booklets could and would be handled on a strict "must-know" basis. This argument was considered compelling and the suggestion was followed with the issuance of manuals for the KH-4 and KH-7, and pertinent aircraft cameras, in the T-K system. Attached at Tab B for your information is the latest such manual for the G-Cubed (KH-8) camera, which was prepared by the Staff and published by NPIC. The following examples illustrate BYEMAN or BYEMAN-type information in the KH-8 manual:

Page 1: Main camera optics (line drawing)

Page 2: The altitude range
The availability of 601 film speeds
The expected accuracy of film speed synchronization
The use of SO 3404 thin base film
The camera's looper mechanisms

Page 3: Focus adjustment components

Page 4+5: Exposure and processing information
Camera control: pointing and crab angles
Discussion of modes of operation

Page 10: Target acquisition methodology

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 14: Altitude ranges
 Mission durations
 Lens types
 Film drive capabilities.
 Mirror crab capabilities

Page 15: Film handling assembly

Page 16: APT camera design

Page 19: Camera f number

Page 21: APT camera operational modes

However, the distribution of these manuals has been carefully controlled, as promised at the outset by DIA and NPIC. The distribution volume is 27 copies. Reproduction is prohibited. In short, aside from the question of their legitimacy in the T-K system, these manuals have not constituted a problem per se; however, their existence may have encouraged the recent introduction of a DIA proposal to bend the rules a little further. Other encouragement may have come from what appears to me to be liberal use of T-K in lieu of BYEMAN at times by COMOR and USIB.

PRESENT STATUS:

During the past year, the DIA (which, at NRO request, handles all DOD requests for BYEMAN codeword clearances) has been pressed severely for additional BYEMAN clearances, particularly by DIA planners, DIA science and technology people, and Army mappers and chargers. These clearance requests--numbering perhaps 150--are advanced on the basis of the following justification:

1. DIA planners. These people are responsible for estimating resource needs for DIA's exploitation (NPIC-equivalent) activity. They must have schedule information on each operational or planned system in order to budget manpower, dollar, and facility resources. Unfortunately, NRP schedules are in the BYEMAN system. I would recommend that detailed schedules go to already-cleared top management personnel and then be paraphrased, if necessary, for T-K cleared people).

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~~TOP SECRET~~

2. DIA science and technology people. The mission of this activity has never been clear to us; however, there is pressure from its members for BYEMAN clearances so that each may have a "broad overview" of reconnaissance. (I would recommend that DIA clarify the mission of this office, prior to requesting BYEMAN clearances for the people involved).

3. Army mappers and charters. With the cancellation of the ARGON codeword, Army mappers and charters have been pressing for additional CORONA clearances. (We should have no qualms about approving such clearances on a "must-know" basis).

The DIA Special Activities Office (DIAXX), headed by Colonel William Hall, has done an excellent job of handling BYEMAN security processing for the NRO. Colonel Hall's staff has a reasonably conservative viewpoint and has turned down about 30-40% of the requests on initial screening. The idea of adding a block of 150 new people (the sum of 1, 2, 3 above) to the BYEMAN access list was not attractive to DIAXX and alternatives were sought. Last summer, DIAXX developed a new idea: since most of the people desiring codeword clearances already had T-K clearances, why not expand the scope of T-K, on a must-know basis, to cover the information required? This expansion of T-K data, plus the information already available in the NRO's T-K camera system manuals, was believed to be sufficient to eliminate the need for BYEMAN clearances in the majority of cases. This was proposed officially to CIA by DIA.

The idea was developed further by a CIA/DOD committee which finally produced the paper (see Tab A) which Messrs. Sheldon and Osborne have sent to you for coordination. Under this proposal the following items would be released--albeit a controlled basis--to holders of T-K clearances:

1. Operational target dates for new systems
2. Mission frequency of all systems
3. On-orbit lifetimes
4. Operational altitude

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5. Film type, format, and volume
6. Sensor focal length, swath width, resolution, and operating modes
7. Satellite Operations Center Control Manuals
8. Technical limitations of KH-7/KH-8
9. Technical camera description manuals
10. Special features of current or future systems
11. Mission costs
12. Data on non-photographic image-forming sensors

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION:

1. Agree to the proposal: This does not solve an implicit basic longer-term problem: do we plan to keep the BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE security systems? Both systems are clearly defined in their original charters. Unfortunately, the NRO has contributed to blurring that clarity by issuing T-K manuals on the cameras, despite the best of intentions. Do we solve the B/T-K issue by introducing a third system--an enlarged T-K? Or expanding T-K to where it may include almost everything which is now BYEMAN? And leaving these distinctions to the "Senior Intelligence Officers" (see Tab B, page 1 of BYE 56927-66 attachment, line 13)?

2. Modify the proposal. This might have the advantage of being more palatable to the originators; unfortunately, where does one begin? Which items--in such an integrated package--can be eliminated individually on principle?

3. Propose a new course of action: This may be the time to call a halt to the blurring of the BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE security systems. Present policies, directives, and guidance call for both systems to be preserved and experience to this point indicates that the distinction may need to be reinforced rather than blurred. The NRO could assume the leadership in this matter by:

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a. Correcting past practice: Camera manuals, from this point forward would go into the BYEMAN/TALENT-KGYNHOLE (jointly) security system. We can afford to allow the KII-4 and KII-7 manuals to "wither away," as those systems move toward termination. The KII-8 manual (already distributed) would be re-classified to include BYEMAN and the KII-9 manual (still to be written), as well as any subsequent to it, could be protected similarly.

b. Correcting an impression: DIA apparently has the notion that the NRO strongly opposes giving BYEMAN access to the exploitation community. This is a feeling we could correct rather easily. The BYEMAN access clearances which would be required today by selected exploitation personnel would be two: "C" and "G". The number of cleared persons required is estimated at several hundred--all of whom presently have T-K clearances. Since these individuals are bona fide participants in the general satellite reconnaissance activity, it would be perfectly credible to grant them clearances, as required.

DISCUSSION:

The third option has the disadvantage of "rejecting" the proposed DIA-CIA solution to a problem. Various arguments will be raised against it, for example:

1. "Do you really want several hundred additional people getting into your BYEMAN business, visiting your contractors, demanding briefings?" As a matter of record, we have had very little intrusion into "BYEMAN business" from BYEMAN-cleared people and none that we can recall from BYEMAN-cleared exploitation people. Further, these people would only be briefed on the portions of the projects applicable to their business.

2. "We have a turnover of one-third to one-fourth of our T-K billet structure each year right here in the Washington area. Do you want to double or triple our work by having us take these people in and out of multiple BYEMAN clearances rather than a single T-K clearance?" True, some additional work might be required on the part of the DIA, but I would expect only a portion of the T-K billet structure to require BYEMAN clearances for exploitation purposes.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. "The Army will be very unhappy if the T-K system isn't softened to include more Army people." The Army is, indeed, "unhappy;" it has been advocating the change of T-K to "SECRET" for some time. But the Army's unhappiness is directed at an alleged scarcity of cleared people, rather than at a given security system. Perhaps, more Army exploitation people do need BYEMAN or T-K clearances. This needs another look.

4. "Several hundred BYEMAN clearances? Before you're through, the requests will number thousands!" By the careful use of departmental billet structures, the number of clearances for actual exploitation personnel can be controlled. And the demand is not as enormous as it is often imagined; for example, ACIC has 1600 "exploiters" and only 80 needed access to the KH-7 manual.

However, I do believe the third option has the advantage of getting to the heart of the problem. It preserves the TALENT-NEEDLE and BYEMAN systems in accordance with their legal function and original intent; it avoids the introduction of what amounts to a third security system; it brings the NRO camera manuals back under proper classification; and it should satisfy the needs of the exploitation community.

RECOMMENDATION:

This problem, involving all of our customers (the DIA and CIA), is too complex to solve by mail. I recommend a conference between Mr. Sheldon, Mr. Osborne, Colonel Hall (DIA), myself, and Mr. Mazza to discuss this problem. Option 3 will be a new thought to these people and is worth exploring. In that vein, I recommend that you sign the opposite page memo to Mr. Sheldon.

James T. Stewart
Major General, USAF
Director