MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: Project TAGBOARD Security

PURPOSE:

To prescribe security controls, authorities, and responsibilities applicable to the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Project TAGBOARD.

BACKGROUND:

On 4 March 1969, Dr. Flax requested Mr. Helms' approval of a directive which would add the project indicator TAGBOARD as a formal security compartment within the BYEMAN Security Control System, (TAB-A).

On 19 March 1969, Mr. Helms confirmed his agreement that Project TAGBOARD should be enrolled as a formal compartmented program, (TAB-B).

PRESENT SITUATION:

Consequently, in accordance with Dr. Flax's original direction, a complete implementation package is hereby presented for review and approval by the DNRO.

RECOMMENDATION:

A. Recommend that you sign the implementing directive as approved by Mr. Helms, (TAB-C).

B. Recommend that you indicate your approval of the Project TAGBOARD Security Guide, (TAB-D), and the Security Indoctrination material, (TAB-E).

Assistant for Security
NRO Staff
INDEX

TAB-A BYE 12636-69, letter from Dr. Flax to Mr. Helms in reference to Project TAGBOARD, 4 March 1969.

TAB-B BYE 8822-69, response from Mr. Helms regarding Project TAGBOARD, 19 March 1969, with attached BYE 12637-69.

TAB-C Memorandum for Director, NRO Program D; Director JCS; Director DIA; Director of Reconnaissance, CIA; and Director of Special Projects, OSAF.

TAB-D Project TAGBOARD Security Guide

TAB-E Project TAGBOARD Security Indoctrination Material.
12 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: Project TAGBOARD Security

At the instigation of Director Program D, a directive has been prepared for your signature related to security of the D-21 drone activity.

Because Section V, E of the BYEMAN Control System Manual requires the approval of the DCI for the additions of codewords to the BYEMAN Security Control System, appropriate correspondence has been prepared for your signature. This action which has been coordinated with OSA/CIA, Director of Security, CIA, AFIGOS, SAFSP, and JRC, would in no way prejudice subsequent decision on your part to transfer the activity out from under the NRO.

The Project TAGBOARD Security Responsibilities Memorandum does not require your signature at this time. After Mr. Helms' approval, a complete implementation package including the Directive will be presented for your review.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached correspondence to Mr. Helms.

Assistant for Security
NRO Staff

Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05114811
March 4, 1969

Dear Dick:

In compliance with Section V, E of the BYEMAN Control System Manual (BYE-57000-66) I am requesting your approval of the attached directive, which would add the project indicator TAGBOARD as a formal security compartment within the BYEMAN Security Control System.

A number of factors including: (1) the substitution of the B-52 for the A-12 as the launch vehicle, (2) the move of the activity from Area 51 to Beale AFB, and (3) the close-out of project OXCART make the present arrangement, wherein the D-21 drone effort is protected under the OXCART Security Access Approval, administratively impractical.

The attached directive has been coordinated at the working levels of OSA/DDS&T/CIA, Office of Security, CIA as well as appropriate elements of the Department of Defense.

Al

Alexander H. Flax

Atch
BYE 12637-69

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
Dr. John L. McLucas  
Director  
National Reconnaissance Office  
Washington, D.C.  

Dear Dr. McLucas:

With reference to Al Flax's letter of 4 March 1969 attaching BYE 12637-69, this will confirm my agreement that Project TAGBOARD should be enrolled as a formal compartmented program within the BYEMAN Security Control System.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Attachment
BYE 12637-69
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO) PROGRAM D
DIRECTOR, JOINT RECONNAISSANCE CENTER, JCS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF RECONNAISSANCE, CIA
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL PROJECTS, OSAF

SUBJECT: Project TAGBOARD -- Security Responsibilities

I. PURPOSE:

The purpose of this directive is to prescribe security controls, authorities, and responsibilities applicable to the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Project TAGBOARD.

II. GENERAL:

That activity, previously identified as the OXCART/TAGBOARD program, involving the covertly developed D-21 reconnaissance drone, will henceforth and until further notice, be identified as Project TAGBOARD and maintained as a separate Security Access Approval within the BYEMAN Security Control System.

Director, NRO Program D as the program director responsible for the management of Project TAGBOARD will provide overall direction and supervision to the Security of this activity, subject to specific delegations of authority defined herein and consistent with DCI security policy guidance as set forth in BYEMAN and NRP security policy pronouncements.

Director, NRO Program D will prepare a Project TAGBOARD Security Guide for my approval and publication to elements of the
U.S. Government having responsibilities to the activity. In addition, Director, NRO Program D will prepare security indoctrination materials and instructions for the benefit of all organizations involved under the project.

Except as modified, herein, established BYEMAN and NRP security authorities, responsibilities and channels of communication will be applicable to Project TAGBOARD.

III. SPECIFIC DELEGATIONS OF SECURITY AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY:

A. The Director, Office of Special Activities (OSA) CIA will:

1. Continue to provide an industrial security program in support of Project TAGBOARD contractual activity under his cognizance.

2. Continue to direct security protection of Project TAGBOARD activities involving Area 51 at a level of effort to be mutually agreed upon by Director OSA/CIA and Director, NRO Program D.

3. Exercise "must-know" authority for all individuals requiring Project TAGBOARD access pursuant to his assigned responsibilities in addition to other individuals access pursuant to the normal business of the CIA.

B. The Director of Special Projects, Office Secretary of the Air Force (SAFSP) will:

1. Provide direction to all security matters involved in the USAF Satellite Control Facility (SCF) support to Project TAGBOARD in order to insure against compromise of other sensitive programs in which that facility is involved.

2. Exercise "must-know" authority for all individuals requiring Project TAGBOARD access pursuant to this assigned responsibility.
C. Commencing with the operational phase, the Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) of JCS will, through SAC and other supporting military commands, insure compliance with Project TAGBOARD security policies and procedures.

Alexander H. Flax
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO) PROGRAM D
DIRECTOR, JOINT RECONNAISSANCE CENTER, JCS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF RECONNAISSANCE, CIA
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL PROJECTS, OSAF

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C. Commencing with the Project TAGBOARD operational phase, the Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) of JCS will, through SAC and other supporting military commands, insure compliance with established BYEMAN Control System security policies and procedures.

[Signature]
John L. McLucas
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL GUIDE

PROJECT TAGBOARD

The relocation of Project TAGBOARD from a secure area to Beale AFB will have a significant impact on project security by unveiling for the first time, an advanced state-of-the-art weapons system. However, Byeman security requirements remain in effect and the principle of limited access based on a strict interpretation of "need-to-know" is unchanged. The following security guidelines cover both the Project's general security aspects and a detailed classification of components. All major components of the TAGBOARD (D-21B) vehicle are included and listed by standard nomenclature terminology as described in technical manuals SP-790 Volume I, System Description and Volume III, Maintenance Instruction. In addition, those major components peculiar to the B-52H as it relates to the D-21B weapon system are also included. Components have been classified in consideration of special controlling, shipping, and storing procedures as approved by Project Headquarters.

(Note: Access to or knowledge of any subsystem, component, structure, or total system as it relates to a project function or operation is limited to personnel who have previously been cleared, briefed, and have a strict 'Need to Know'.)

I. SYSTEMS/SUBSYSTEMS
   A. Total System
      1. General
2. Sensor Systems

a. Sensor capabilities and applications in association with unmanned experimental vehicle or D-21B Program
b. Sensor capabilities and applications completely disassociated from D-21B Program or unmanned experimental vehicle

3. Hardware Development/Engineering Program

a. Identity of Contractors

(1) Lockheed Aircraft Corp with unmanned experimental vehicle

(2) Lockheed Aircraft Corp with D-21B

(3) Other contractors with unmanned experimental vehicle or D-21B (includes Lockheed subs)

b. Contracting and Auditing

c. Access to contractor facilities

d. Engineering system requirements, request for proposal, contractor progress reports, and hardware specifications and drawings

e. Performance specifications

f. Total system/performance specifications

4. Flight Operations

a. External view of unmanned experimental vehicle with or without booster
b. Association of term "Unmanned experimental vehicle" with "D-21B" or "Project TAGBOARD"

c. Access to external vehicle

d. Internal view of vehicle

e. Access to internal vehicle or external access when vehicle's interior is exposed

f. Flight operations/parameters of D-21B (to include launch point)

g. Flight operations/parameters of parent B-52H

h. Confirmation of success or failure of D-21B launch

i. Access to recovery procedures

j. Access to recovered products prior to system or intelligence evaluation

k. System evaluation reports

l. Resulting intelligence products after removal from recovered hardware and mission evaluation
reports containing intelligence product information

B. Sub Systems

1. Hatch

When viewed as enclosed package ready for installation or in varying stages of assembly/maintenance:

2. Hatch Components

a. Recovery and stabilization parachute system

(1) Parachute system when related to D-21B or unmanned experimental vehicle

(2) Parachute system in a packed configuration alone and removed from any reference to its intended use

(3) Any component of parachute system when disassociated from any reference to its intended use

b. Automatic flight control system

(.914 components)

As a "state of the art" flight control system developed specifically for a high-speed vehicle

BYE-12361-68

Cy 7 of 12 cys
Pg 5 of 12 pgs
the total subsystem as well as individual components are classified:

(1) Electronic components assembly (ECA) containing 3 line replaceable units (LRU's)
   (a) Auto pilot
   (b) Power supply
   (c) In flight check out (IFCO circuitry)

(2) Air data computer (ADC)

(3) Rate gyro package (RGP)

(4) Elevon and rudder servo package

c. Inertial navigation system (INS) type 390-D components - D-21B vehicle

All components separately or as a total system are classified:

(1) Inertial platform

(2) Inertial electronics unit (IEU) containing 3 subunits:
   (a) Pulse rebalance electronics (PRE)
   (b) Gyro torquing electronics (GTE)
   (c) Precision timing generator (PTG)

(3) Gimbal control electronics (GCE)

(4) Digital computer

BYE-12361-68
Cy 7 of 2 cys
Pg 6 of 12 pgs
(5) Power supply

d. Command and telemetry (TLM) module

UNCLASSIFIED

DE 337

e. X-Band transponder

UNCLASSIFIED

f. X-Band battery DE 335

UNCLASSIFIED

g. X-Band antennas (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

h. Sarah beacon transmitter

UNCLASSIFIED

i. Sarah beacon antenna

UNCLASSIFIED

j. Generator control panel

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE: Articles e. thru j. are classified when associated with D-21B or unmanned experimental vehicle

k. Payload electronics package

UNCLASSIFIED

l. Payload (aerial reconnaissance camera - HR 335)

UNCLASSIFIED

3. Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and conditioned air system

a. Individual components unrelated to intended use on the D-21B or unmanned experimental vehicle

UNCLASSIFIED

b. All assembled APU and conditioned air components integral with the D-21B vehicle or unmanned experimental vehicle

UNCLASSIFIED
4. D-21B Electrical Components
   a. Battery "D" 28 VDC
   b. Generator AC/DC 4kva
   c. Inverter 600 AMP solid state
5. Liquid Nitrogen System
   All components
6. Hydraulic System
   All components
7. Pitot System
   All components
8. Fuel System
   All components

NOTE: Components 4 thru 8 are classified SECRET/BYERMAN Project TAGBOARD when associated with D-21B or unmanned experimental vehicle.

10. Propulsion System
    a. Total propulsion system when associated with D-21B or unmanned experimental vehicle
    b. Individual components when dis-associated, unassembled, and unrelated to D-21B or unmanned experimental vehicle

   Air induction system
   (1) Air inlet assembly
   (2) Duct buzz sensor

Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05114811
(3) Inlet duct assembly
(4) Ramjet engine (MA20S-4)
   (a) Nose cone assembly
   (b) Fuel control unit
   (c) Foreward innerbody assembly
   (d) Main structure assembly
   (e) Aerodynamic grid
   (f) Fuel manifold assembly
   (g) Burner assembly
   (h) Engine combustion chamber assembly
   (i) TEB ignition system
   (j) Engine electrical system

11. B-52H Components

   a. Stellar inertial navigation system 330M (total system and/
or individual components)

   (1) Digital computer
   (2) Inertial electronics unit (IEU)
   (3) Gimbal control electronics (GCE)
   (4) Star tracker platform
   (5) Star tracker electronics package
   (6) Air data computer (ADC)
   (7) Data link repeater (DLR)
(8) Inverter 30 400 cycle AC

(9) Power supply

b. Display Panels

(1) Navigator
   (a) Nav control and display panel (No. 1)
   (b) Distance to go/ground speed indicator

(2) Launch control officers (LCO's left and right)

All LCO panels collectively or individually are classified:
   (a) DC circuit breaker panel L/R
   (b) AC circuit breaker panel Phase A
   (c) Error display panel, L/R
   (d) Navigation control and display panel L/R
   (e) Temp indicator and T/C monitor selector control panel
   (f) LCO temp and magnetic indicator panel, L/R
   (g) Temp monitor select control panel, L/R
(h) TM indicator panel, L/R
(i) TM readout panel, L/R
(j) Time code generator panel
(k) INS azimuth torque free panel
(l) AC circuit breaker panel, phase B
(m) Electric and hydraulic instrument panel
(n) LCO main control panel
(o) Ground test and service control panel L/R
(p) LCO center panel
(q) Transformer rectifier (T/R)
   No. 1 and No. 2 loadmeter panel
(r) Tape recorder control panel

c. Command System
   Command transmitters
      SECRET/BYEMAN
      Project TAGBOARD

d. AFCS
   Flight control system demodulator
      SECRET/BYEMAN
      Project TAGBOARD
   power supply

e. Telemetry
   SECRET/BYEMAN
   Project TAGBOARD

   (1) TM code rate converter
   (2) TM unidap assembly
   (3) LCO (L & R) TM display electronics

BYE-12361-68
Cy 7 of 2C cys
Pg 11 of 12 pgs
(4) Time code generator
(5) TM sub carrier oscillator
(6) Telecom receivers
(7) SPS flexowriter
(8) Flexowriter driver unit

f. Magnetic tape recorder

12. Booster and all sub assemblies

The above appendix is forwarded to provide security guidelines for handling project hardware. The intent of this appendix is not to itemize a parts list, but to provide a security working document that is informative and practical.

In conclusion, the user of this document is reminded that in handling, shipping, and storing project hardware, the person, contractor and/or military organization with whom disposition of hardware is being made must have been previously cleared, briefed, and have a strict "need to know" before project hardware can be discussed with reference to its intended use, regardless of its listed security classification.

Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05114811
Because of your contractual or official status with the United States Government, you have been selected for briefing on an extremely sensitive covert project. Your access authorization is based on an established "need-to-know" and favorable clearability as determined by an extensive background investigation.

The purpose of this briefing is to acquaint you with the sensitivity and stringent security requirements surrounding the project and to advise you of your personal responsibilities regarding the project.

After the briefing you will be required to sign an official oath certifying that you have been briefed and that you understand the security requirements of the project.

The sensitive nature of the briefing demands that certain restrictions be placed on your travel, both personal and in the performance of your duties. Generally, you are prohibited from travel or duty in "non-secure areas" or Communist-bloc countries. If you agree to these restrictions, they will be explained in greater detail later in the briefing.
The program for which you have been granted access is Project TAGBOARD. Project TAGBOARD is a TOP SECRET BYEMAN, Department of Defense activity concerned with the covert development, testing, and eventual operational employment of a supersonic, pilotless, high altitude reconnaissance drone.

This drone will be directed and utilized by the highest United States Government authorities to acquire essential photo intelligence information through overflight of denied areas. The drone will be launched from a B-52 aircraft operated by specially selected, trained and cleared USAF personnel.

Project TAGBOARD is directed covertly by a Program Director, whose office is overtly identified as the Special Projects Office, The Inspector General (AFIGOS), Hq USAF. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provides Project TAGBOARD with covert contracting as required to support project research and development conducted by industrial organizations.

The extremely sensitive covert nature of the information you are receiving causes it to be placed under a security control system that is completely separate and distinct from the Department of Defense, military industrial security systems which you may have worked with in the past. This system which is identified as the BYEMAN Security System is controlled by the DCI and is handled in a completely covert manner. Even the fact that such a BYEMAN Security System exists must not be revealed to persons who have not been properly granted access and briefed in accordance with BYEMAN TAGBOARD security procedures.

The BYEMAN system is unique in that access is severely limited based on need-to-know." Rigorous investigative standards are met on all persons...
nominated for access and physical and administrative security policies are strictly adhered to.

Despite these rigid rules, a large portion of the success of the BYEMAN system is due to the cleared individual accepting the responsibilities imposed on him. Project TAGBOARD information should be discussed with no one until the individual's TAGBOARD access has been verified and then only if there is a "need-to-know." Access approval can be verified by contacting the Project Security Officer or local BYEMAN Control Officer (BCO) whichever is applicable. In addition, Project TAGBOARD material will be stored only in areas previously designated as BYEMAN secure areas. Individuals approved for access are also required to report to their security officer or BCO any change in personal status such as: marriage or divorce, change of assignment or job, anticipated foreign travel, association with foreign nationals of Communist-bloc countries or with individuals who are suspected of attempting to acquire classified information to which they are not entitled.