December 23, 1966

Mr. Vance

Attached (Tab A) for joint signature by you and Mr. Schultze is the memo to the President on the TAGBOARD issue. The joint-signature is a DOB recommendation as an indication that the memo reasonably presents both sides of the issue.

Mr. Schultze requested some minor changes in the basic memorandum (consisted of substituting another point in the basic summary memo from the attachment which elaborates on the DOB/DOD arguments). For comparison, attached at Tab B is the draft basic memo you saw Wednesday night; the attachment is unchanged from the version you saw.

Atchs

James T. Stewart
Major General, USAF
Director, NRO Staff

1. Mr. Vance
2. Dr. Flax
3. SS-1
4. Gen Steakley (JRC) (memo only)
5. SS-8
6. 

Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05114891
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: High Performance Reconnaissance Drone (TAGBOARD)

ISSUE:

Whether to continue the development of the reoriented TAGBOARD reconnaissance drone program or to defer further development until FY 1969 with a combined FY 67/68 savings of approximately $50 million in NOA and $30 million in actual expenditures.

PROGRAM:

TAGBOARD is a Mach 3.3, ramjet-powered, photographic reconnaissance drone which will cruise above 90,000 feet with a 3,000 nautical mile range. TAGBOARD originally was designed for launch by a modified A-11 at Mach 3-plus and 75,000 feet (this speed and altitude are necessary for ramjet ignition). However, as a result of a fatal R&D launch accident last July, it was decided to reorient the program to use a B-52H launch platform and boost the TAGBOARD to ramjet-operating speed and altitude with a solid rocket motor.

BUREAU OF BUDGET RECOMMENDATION:

The BOB proposes deferring further development of the TAGBOARD system until FY 1969 because:

1. The system proposed for development has a relatively high cost (about $2 million per mission) but a low probability of use for targets not accessible to satellites, subsonic long-range drones and Mach 3 aircraft. Over China, subsonic drones...
will have up to 5 to 1 cost effectiveness advantage through the early 1970's. Over the Soviet Union, the probability of using manned or unmanned Nesh 3 aircraft is slight because of the danger of violating Soviet airspace.

2. We should take advantage during the next year of the opportunity to re-examine the direction of our overall reconnaissance drone program in light of other adequate and available reconnaissance systems.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

The DOD proposes to continue development of the TAGBOARD drone because:

1. The unmanned TAGBOARD reconnaissance drone capability is needed as soon as possible to insure coverage of targets not easily accessible to satellite systems, or which involve the political risk of manned overflight, or where prohibitive loss rates would be incurred by other drone systems.

2. The Soviets have shown both a willingness and capability to deploy advanced weapon systems and to create dense and effective defense environments in areas of their own choosing in 12 months or less (e.g., Cuba and North Vietnam). Where such defensive systems are deployed and used, TAGBOARD will provide the only effective unmanned drone reconnaissance capability.

3. The proposed deferral by the BOB would delay the operational availability of the TAGBOARD system from January 1968 to January 1970.

(The attached paper includes more detailed arguments in support of the BOB and DOD recommendations.)
ACTION:

Approve BOB Recommendation: ____________________________

Approve DOD Recommendation: ____________________________

See me: ____________________________

Charles L. Schultze
Director
Bureau of the Budget

Cyrus R. Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

23 DEC 1966
ECD ARGUMENTS FOR DEFERRAL:

1. The TAGBOARD system proposed for development has a relatively high cost (about $2 million per mission) but a low probability of use.

   a. The TAGBOARD would be limited to use for targets not accessible to satellites, subsonic long-range drones and Mach 3 aircraft.

   b. The TAGBOARD would be limited to use in areas which have air defense forces of the type and intensity now deployed in the Soviet Union.

   d. Over the Soviet Union, the probability of using manned or unmanned Mach 3 aircraft is slight. The TAGBOARD drone has only a narrow advantage over the SR-71 type aircraft in terms of a lower provocation effect—the offensive act being the violation of Soviet airspace.

2. We should take advantage during the next year of the opportunity to re-examine our overall reconnaissance drone program in light of other adequate and available reconnaissance systems. The reassessment should include: probable mission used, anticipated defensive environments, and relative cost-effectiveness.

3. It is recognized that the implications of deferring further development and funding until FY 1969 is a delay of operational availability from approximately January 1968 to January 1970.
DOD ARGUMENTS FOR CONTINUING:

1. The flexibility of an aircraft reconnaissance system (manned or unmanned) is required to supplement satellite photography when timeliness is of utmost urgency (changing tactical situations and/or taking advantage of fleeting good weather over strategic objectives). In view of political constraints against manned overflight of denied territory, an unmanned vehicle is required which is capable of successfully penetrating sophisticated air defense environments.

3. The Soviets have shown both the willingness and the capability to deploy advanced air defense systems in desired areas in 12 months or less (for example, Cuba and Vietnam). In Cuba, the Soviets introduced both SA-2's and the FISHBED D aircraft (MIG-21 with missiles)--the latter within a year after it had become operational in the Soviet Union.
a. The probability of a single Vietnamese S-Band SA-2 site (5-6 missiles) shooting down a non-ECM equipped TAGBOARD is one percent.

b. The maximum probability of the present overall Cuban air defense environment shooting down a TAGBOARD is approximately 5 percent.

c. The kill probability of a C-Band SA-2 site (type now used in the Soviet Union) against a non-ECM equipped TAGBOARD approaches 15 percent under certain conditions; with ECM in the TAGBOARD, the kill probability is only 1 percent.

d. Against advanced Soviet interceptors now in development (Soboy and MiG E-266), capable of Mach 2.8 to 3.0 speeds at 75 to 80,000 feet, and which the latest NIE estimates could be operational in the 1968/69 period, the TAGBOARD will have relatively low vulnerability because of its over-90,000 foot cruising altitude.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: High Performance Reconnaissance Drone (TAGBOARD)

ISSUE:

Whether to continue the development of the reoriented TAGBOARD reconnaissance drone program or to defer further development until FY 69 with a combined FY 67/68 savings of approximately $50 million in NOA and $30 million in actual expenditures.

PROGRAM:

TAGBOARD is a Mach 3.3, ramjet-powered, photographic reconnaissance drone which will cruise above 90,000 feet with a 3,000 nautical mile range. TAGBOARD originally was designed for launch by a modified A-11 at Mach 3-plus and 75,000 feet (this speed and altitude are necessary for ramjet ignition). However, as a result of a fatal R&D launch accident last July, it was decided to reorient the program to use a B-52H launch platform and boost the TAGBOARD to ramjet-operating speed and altitude with a solid rocket motor.
BUREAU OF BUDGET RECOMMENDATION:

The DOD proposes deferring further development of the TAGBOARD system until FY 1969 because:

1. The system proposed for development has a relatively high cost (about $2 million per mission) but a low probability of use. The TAGBOARD would be limited to use for targets not accessible to satellites, subsonic long-range drones and Mach 3 aircraft, and for areas which have air defense forces of the type and intensity now deployed in the Soviet Union.

2. We should take advantage during the next year of the opportunity to re-examine the overall direction of our overall reconnaissance drone program in light of other adequate and available reconnaissance systems. The reassessment should include: probable mission uses, anticipated defensive environments, and relative cost-effectiveness.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

The DOD proposes to continue development of the TAGBOARD drone because:

1. The unmanned TAGBOARD reconnaissance drone capability is needed as soon as possible to insure coverage of targets not
easily accessible to satellite systems, or which involve the political risk of manned overflight, or where prohibitive loss rates would be incurred by other drone systems.

2. The Soviets have shown both a willingness and capability to deploy advanced weapon systems and to create dense and effective defense environments in areas of their own choosing in 12 months or less (e.g., Cuba and North Vietnam). Where such defensive systems are deployed and used, TAGBOARD will provide the only effective unmanned drone reconnaissance capability.

3. The proposed deferral by the BOB would delay the operational availability of the TAGBOARD system from January 1968 to January 1970.

(The attached paper includes more detailed arguments in support of the BOB and DOD recommendations.)

ACTION:

Approve BOB Recommendation: _______________________

Approve DOD Recommendation: _______________________

See me: _______________________

Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05114891

OXCART/TAGBOARD