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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

November 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: Plan for Further Debris Retrieval [redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Based upon our recommendations (TAB A), you decided that it would be useful to wait for further information before making a decision as to whether or not to search further for debris. Since the memorandum was developed, we have discussed the situation in further detail with [redacted] (TAB B) and have received an input from General Allen (TAB C). [redacted] will be supportive of our desires and recognize our fear of publicity. General Allen feels that there is risk even in doing nothing further except to wait and see if further debris turns up. He feels that some action is in order as opposed to a "do nothing" posture, mainly because the primary mirror film supply, re-entry vehicle and the remainder of the stereo mirror are still "at large," and should be sought after.

Assuming that risk is associated with all options, it may be prudent to initiate some sort of low-level inquiry based on a hope of maximizing additional recovery while minimizing the risks involved. A low-key attempt to locate additional debris appears to be desirable from the technical and also from the latent risk of exposure standpoints, should there be debris around which could be recovered.

We have developed the following plan, which we believe attempts to minimize potential risks involved and maintains a low-key approach not employing diplomatic channels.

First, no ground or air search will be conducted, save for a possible low-level helicopter pass over non-farm, non-urban areas which are identified to be remote areas not normally traversed by the populace.

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GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATE-  
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Second [redacted] will be asked through military channels to report on whether there has been third country interest in visiting the impact area [redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Next, and concurrently with the above, the local chiefs of police in the towns along the ground track from the impact point to 50 nautical miles north of that point will be requested to identify if any debris from a valuable experiment has been discovered during the past few months in their jurisdictions. This request would be transmitted on a "confidential" basis, probably personally, and the chiefs would be requested to hold their inquiry close so as to generate no speculation or untoward interest. There may have been other debris uncovered but not turned in. The finders may have either discarded the items or have otherwise felt them not to be of value or of interest. Debris uncovered by this inquiry would be turned over to appropriate military authorities.

Finally, if the 50-mile inquiry has been unproductive, and if there has been no attendant publicity, consideration will be given to expanding the inquiry along the ground track and also widening the swath of the inquiry.

If the above plan is agreed upon, we will initiate the necessary requests with [redacted] contact. It would also be appropriate to apprise the CIA (DDS&T) of our activities.

*Harold S. Coyle, Jr.*  
HAROLD S. COYLE, JR.  
Major, USAF

*Hyman*

*I think the search has more down-side risk than up-side. I agree with Bob Singsel. Suggest we do nothing more.*

*I agree with the above, but would strongly oppose doing anything more than described here.*

*I see no virtue in any further action.*

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