

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

# **NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (NRO Launch IPG)**

**20 July 1999  
(Includes Change 1, 7 April 2000)**



**National Reconnaissance Office  
Office of Space Launch**

See Section I, paragraph 4, for supersession, applicability, and classification authority.

**LOCAL REPRODUCTION AUTHORIZED**

*This document contains information EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(5) apply.*

Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors for administrative and operational use. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the NRO Office of Space Launch.

1

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

2

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

### Change Record

<u>Change Number</u>	<u>Date of Change</u>	<u>Initials (Incorporated by)</u>	<u>Date Incorporated</u>
1	7 April 2000	<input type="text"/>	7 April 2000
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			

(b)(3)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

.NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

4

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**Foreword**

1. **Description:** National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Satellite Vehicle (SV) programs must be given security protection to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information on mission objectives, capabilities, operational configurations, and vulnerabilities; schedules and manifests revealing replenishments, needs or strategies; program and SV plans or requirements; and constellation health and system needs. All program documents, whether classified or unclassified, including this Information Protection Guide (IPG), will be given minimum distribution consistent with operational requirements, need-to-know, and sound security practices.
2. **Derived Classification:** Classification guidance provided is either from Original Classification Authority (OCA) of the Director, NRO/Office of Space Launch, or derived from guidance provided/documented in the National Space Policy, dated 14 September 1996, the NRO SCG, dated 14 October 1995, and other applicable documents.
3. **Supersession:** This IPG supersedes and rescinds integration and launch classification guidance contained in the *Security Classification Guide for the Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems*, dated 8 April 97, the *Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Programs A-F on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System*, dated 8 April 97, the *Space Technology Experiment Security Classification Guide*, dated 8 April 97, the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Launch-1*, dated 26 February 1998, and the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Request for Proposal*, dated 21 October 1998.
4. **Purpose:** The NRO Launch IPG provides a single source of protection requirements for the integration and launch process of NRO SVs on various families of launch vehicles. Contact the OSL or applicable Contracting Officer prior to implementing this IPG if increased costs are anticipated.
5. **Authority:** This guide is issued under authority of the Director, NRO; NRO Directive 82-1, *NRO Space Launch Management Directive*; and DoD 5200.1-R/AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Regulation*.

APPROVED BY:

/s/

STEPHEN A. WOJCICKI  
Colonel, USAF  
Director, Office of Space Launch  
National Reconnaissance Office

5

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

6

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

**Table of Contents**

Section	Page
(U) Foreword.....	5
1.%(U) Description.....	5
2.%(U) Derived Classification .....	5
3.%(U) Supersession .....	5
4.%(U) Purpose .....	5
5.%(U) Authority.....	5
(U) Table of Contents.....	7
I%(U) General Instructions.....	10
1.%(U) Purpose .....	10
2.%(U) Scope .....	10
3.%(U) Office of Primary Responsibility .....	10
4.%(U) Supersession, Classification Authority, and Applicability .....	10
5.%(U) Approach .....	11
6.%(U) NROL Categories .....	11
7.%(U) NRO Launch Designators .....	12
8.%(U) Launch Vehicle Designators .....	12+3
9.%(U) Need-To-Know Information.....	12+3
10.%(U) Substitute Identifiers .....	13
11.%(U) NRO Satellite Vehicle (SV) Information.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b> 13
12.%(U) For Official Use Only Information.....	13+4
13.%(U) Internet/Intranet Use.....	13+4
14.%(U) Public Release Of Information.....	13+4
15.%(U) Disclosures to Foreign Interests.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b> 16
16.%(U) Memorabilia .....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b> 16
15.%(U) Risk Management.....	14+6
16.%(U) Operations Security (OPSEC).....	14+7
17.%(U) Classification Marking.....	15+8
18.%(U) Classification/Declassification Instructions .....	15+8
19.%(U) Contractor Proprietary Information.....	16+9
20.%(U) Previously Generated Information .....	16+9
21.%(U) Compilation of Information.....	16+9
22.%(U) Classification Recommendations .....	16+9
23.%(U) Reporting Program Vulnerabilities and/or Weaknesses .....	17+0
24.%(U) Reporting Elicitations.....	17+0
25.%(U) Classification Conflict Resolution .....	17+0
26.%(U) Reproduction and Dissemination .....	17+0
27.%(U) Classification Currency.....	17+0
II%(U) Category Assignment Table .....	18+21
III%(U) Classification Tables .....	20+23
IV%(U) For Official Use Only Handling Instructions .....	35+51
V%(U) Definitions.....	38+59
VI%(U) Change Letters .....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b> 65
VII%(U) Index .....	44+66
VIII%(U) Distribution.....	45+68

Foreword.....	5
1. Description .....	5

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

2. Derived Classification .....5

3. Supersession .....5

4. Purpose .....5

5. Authority.....5

Table of Contents .....7

I General Instructions.....9

1. Purpose.....9

2. Scope.....9

3. Office of Primary Responsibility .....9

4.

Superses

sion, Classification A

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

## SECTION I

**General Instructions**

1. **Purpose:** This NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (IPG) provides protection strategies and guidelines for the protection of NRO information and assets that require protection in the interest of national security. Security requirements and classification guidance provided in this document are intended to serve as a baseline for all NRO launches.
2. **Scope:** NRO SV programs must be given security protection to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information on mission objectives, capabilities, operational configurations, and vulnerabilities; schedules and manifests revealing replenishments needs or strategies; program and SV plans or requirements; and constellation health and system needs. Information protection requirements specified in this guide are consistent with the security objectives set forth in Executive Order (EO 12958, *Classified National Security Information*, dated 17 April 1995; *National Space Policy*, dated 14 September 1996; *DoD Space Policy*, dated 4 February 1987, as amended; and applicable DCI Directives and NRO Policies. This section contains general instructions including implementation approaches. Specific classification requirements are provided in Section III.
3. **Office of Primary Responsibility:** This guide is issued by the NRO Office of Space Launch (OSL). The NRO/OSL is the cognizant office for the integration and launch of NRO satellites. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV System Program Offices (SPOs) for resolution. Address inquiries to:

Office of Space Launch Security  
14675 Lee Road  
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

4. **Supersession, Classification Authority, and Applicability:**
  - a. This IPG supersedes and rescinds classification guidance contained in the *Security Classification Guide for the Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems*, dated 8 April 97; the *Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Programs A-F on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System*, dated 8 April 97; the *Space Technology Experiment Security Classification Guide*, dated 8 April 97; the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Launch-1*, dated 26 February 1998; and the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Request for Proposal*, dated 21 October 1998.
  - b. This guide will be cited as the classification authority for material generated in connection with the integration and launch of AFPs, Programs A..G, experimental and developmental programs, and NROs listed in Section II, Category Assignment Table. Information and material requiring protection based on other efforts which support NRO launches will be classified in accordance with (IAW) the appropriate classification guide. The provisions of this IPG do not cover launches occurring prior to Dec 1996 and the classification guidance for those launches remains in effect. Questions on applicability of this IPG to any other past and/or present NRO launches should be referred to the OSL.
  - c. This guide applies to all participants, contractor and government employees, involved in the integration and launch of NRO SVs. NRO participants include, but are not limited to, SV SPOs, Satellite Vehicle Contractors (SVCs), and OSL operations at Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS), Los Angeles Air Force Base (LAAFB), Onizuka Air Station (OAS), Schriever Air

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**

Force Base (SAFB), and Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB). Other organizations and agencies supporting NRO launches include, but are not limited to, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), AFSPC's Space Wings, Space Launch Squadrons, and Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), Air Force Material Command's Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Launch Vehicle Contractors (LVCs), Launch Vehicle Integration Contractors (LVICs), and Launch System Integration Contractors (LSICs). Prime or associate contractors are responsible for ensuring that their subcontractors are aware of and contractually obligated to comply with the requirements of this guide.

5. **Approach:** The Launch IPG is developed for use by organizations or agencies supporting NRO launches and provides guidelines for the protection of NRO information and assets during I&L processing. The integration and launch process begins when initial launch requirements are provided to launch service providers and ends with post-launch turnover of the SV to the applicable control node. The following definitions apply to NRO information in the I&L environment:
  - a. **SV Operations Data** - Information that is not required by LV mission planners and will not be released. This includes information that describes the SV operational mission in terms of:
    - (1) SV mission, objectives, capabilities, operational limitations, and vulnerabilities;
    - (2) Priorities and plans for space-based intelligence activities;
    - (3) Critical, unique to program, advanced state-of-the-art hardware technology;
    - (4) Satellite constellation health, system needs, and replenishment strategies; and
    - (5) NRO operational infrastructure, elements, and control nodes.
  - b. **SV Descriptive Data** - Information that describes the SV's shape, mechanical characteristics, and structural dynamics. Information required by the LV mission planners to successfully integrate and launch a satellite will only be released at the NRO's discretion.
  - c. **Planning and Scheduling Data** - Information that provides insight into the operational planning and requirements of a launch flow.
  - d. **Launch Mission Profile Data** - Information that describes the LV mission requirements, e.g., target orbit, predicted injection accuracy, LV orbital mechanics, attitude, roll rates, coast maneuvers, SV separation point, state vector, orbit options, etc. In other words, information that describes LV operations.
6. **NROL Categories:** Three launch classification policy baselines have been established as launch categories based on existing national security requirements to identify the levels of protection for each NRO launch. The launch category is defined by the SV SPO at program introduction and explicitly identified in the Program Requirements Document (PRD), Operational Directives, etc. SVs may be re-categorized if the NRO determines that an SV's requirements have changed and that a category change is appropriate. SVs are listed by category in Section II. The three launch categories are:
  - a. **Category A** - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and Planning and Scheduling Data, to include information that reveals reflight. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection. This category is most restrictive in protection requirements. Specifics are identified in Section III.

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**

- b. Category B - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and information that reveals reflight. This category is less restrictive in the protection of Planning and Scheduling Data. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection. Specifics are identified in Section III.
- c. Category C - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, but do not require protection of most SV Descriptive Data, Planning and Scheduling Data, or Launch Mission Profile Data. Information that reveals reflight is to be protected. This category is the least restrictive in the protection of these types of information. Specifics are identified in Section III.

**7. NRO Launch Designators:**

- a. NROL designators are now used to identify NRO launches and are the official NRO launch identifier. An NROL designator will be used only once. To assist those integrating and launching multiple programs at one given time, NROL designators may include the category identifier; e.g., NROL-#(A).
- b. New programs will be assigned an NROL designator and a category as they are manifested. NRO SV programs currently in a launch flow that were introduced as AFP or Program A...G may continue with their current identifier or may change to the NROL designator at an event or time as determined by the SV SPO-LSIC launch team. This IPG includes AFP and Program A...G classification determinations to assist users in the transition from AFP/Program A...G usage to the NROL system.
- c. In the past the NRO used several mechanisms, including AFP numbers and Programs A...G (formerly Programs A-F), to protect information related to multiple NRO launch activities, reflight, constellation size, and NRO SV identifiers. AFP numbers and Programs A...G are no longer official launch designators. Information classified under Programs A...G or those AFPs will be remarked in accordance with guidance contained in paragraph 20 of this section.

Since the AFP numbers and Programs A...G were used for more than one launch integration flow, associating them with information in the I&L community may have revealed a launch date, number of launches, launch rate, or planned constellation size, requiring protection of the association with the designator. Associating an NROL designator with information in the I&L community is an acceptable risk; therefore, information content and not the association drives the classification.

- 8. **Launch Vehicle Designators:** Launch vehicle activities are unclassified unless they reveal information specifically classified under this IPG or other applicable classification guidance. References or designators for specific launch vehicles, e.g. Titan K-18, mission B-26, AC-109, do not inherently identify an SV program or payload. Likewise, references or designators for LV configuration, e.g., Titan 401, Atlas AC-109, and Delta IV do not reveal an SV program or payload. However, SV characteristics and mission planning information may drive LV planning or mission analyses to become classified. The classification tables identify these circumstances. Re-use or reflight of an LV configuration or hardware set becomes classified if it positively confirms that it is relaunch of an SV or SV payload. Inferences or speculation related to indicators of reflight is not classified, but is handled as For Official use Only (FOUO) information (see Section I, paragraph 12).
- 9. **(U) Need-To-Know Information:** All classified or FOUO information must be controlled on a strict "need-to-know" basis. Dissemination must be made on the basis of a positive determination, by the

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**

holder of the information, that the intended recipient has a demonstrated requirement for the requested information. See Definitions.

10. (U) **Substitute Identifiers:** Substitute identifiers are used to avoid association and classification issues related to identifying a particular activity or operation. A substitute identifier may be any combination of numbers, letters, or an unclassified name. With the implementation of the NROL system, the unclassified NROL designator will be used to identify the NRO launch activity, making the use of substitute identifiers unnecessary. Information relative to SV mission, capability, vulnerability, and operations may NOT be declassified through disassociation or by use of a substitute identifier.
11. (U) **Special Access Information:** Items in this guide addressing information that is Special Access are identified with a remark. The NRO, as the originator of the information, controls dissemination of the information. All information covered in these items, either requested or discovered by integration and launch personnel, will be handled IAW the following:
  - a. (U) Information that is Special Access and is NOT needed for integration and launch purposes will NOT be decompartmented and provided to the integration and launch community and requests will be denied. This includes, but is not limited to, SV operations data. Anyone discovering this information, either directly, deduced, or implied, will protect it as SECRET, X1, 4, and immediately notify the NRO through secure channels. The NRO will determine the requirement for limited distribution, or any system, facility or personnel access needs.
  - b. (U) Information needed for integration and launch purposes will be decompartmented at the NRO's discretion and provided only when absolutely necessary. This includes, but is not limited to, SV descriptive data, planning/scheduling data, and launch mission profile data. Information will normally be released in OSL/SV SPO endorsed documentation. Other requests for this information should be forwarded to the OSL.
  - c. (U) Information that MAY be required for integration and launch will be determined by the SV SPO when a need for this information has been established. Since some, or all, of this information may be decompartmented and released into the collateral security system or declassified, the protection levels could range from minimal through Special Access.
12. (U) **For Official Use Only Information:** Information that is not classified but can provide insight into NRO SV requirements, characteristics, and operations is designated as "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" or "U//FOUO". FOUO information will be afforded protection in accordance with the FOUO handling instructions in Section IV.
13. (U) **Internet/Intranet Use:** All information maintained on a computer system connected to the Internet has become unclassified public access information. Under no circumstances will any NRO information be posted to the Internet without specific prior approval of the NRO. Unclassified NRO information may be posted on an organization's Intranet, the computer network internal to an organization if the Intranet is behind a protective firewall. Posting of NRO FOUO information to an organization's Intranet will be handled IAW the instructions in Section IV.
14. **Public Release of Information:** Public release of any information, irrespective of classification, regarding the NRO will be at the determination of the DNRO, DD/NRO, or Office of Corporate Communications (OCC). Unilateral public release of information pertaining to the NRO and its SV programs, operations, and launches is expressly prohibited. All NRO related public releases, whether Government or Contractor originated, must be coordinated with the NRO's OCC.

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)****15. Risk Management:**

- a. The Director, NRO, and the Director, NRO/OSL, as OCAs, have established a risk management-based classification system and program protection process. The ultimate goal is effective and, where deemed appropriate, selective application of security countermeasures to protect essential program information, technologies and systems while avoiding extreme costs and operational impacts associated with traditional regulatory requirements.
- b. Numerous factors affect the degree of damage to national security that the compromise of classified information may cause. Also, different elements of information within the same classification level can result in different impacts. Even the time in which classified information is either declassified, downgraded, or compromised during the integration and launch flow can be a significant factor.
- c. Users are not only encouraged, but are expected, to identify system and operational conditions that may be reducing the effectiveness of security protection measures. Early recognition of such conditions may indicate where the risk management process would enhance NRO security programs. These system and operational conditions should be identified to the OSL. (See paragraph 23 of this section.)
- d. From time-to-time it may be necessary for the I&L community to submit a request for waiver and deviation from the classification requirements of this IPG. Rationale for a waiver request will be closely scrutinized and will only be approved (1) if the security infrastructure is not in place to protect information as required, (2) if the program would incur undo cost or schedule impacts to enhance the security infrastructure, and (3) if the NRO determines that assets are not exposed to unacceptable levels of security risk by granting the request for waiver.
  - (1) All requests for waiver shall be directed via secure means to the OSL Director of Security and shall include (a) a reference to the classification call in question, (b) rationale for the requested waiver, (c) an explanation of proposed security methods to be implemented in lieu of the waived security requirement, and (d) a security risk analysis that includes a description of the security measures that will be implemented to ensure an acceptable level of security risk.
  - (2) Requests for waiver must be submitted with sufficient time prior to an operational or implementation requirement, a minimum of 90 days, to allow for coordination with the appropriate NRO SV SPO. Users must comply with all provisions of this IPG until a request for waiver has been granted, in writing, by the OSL or other appropriate authority.

**Operations Security (OPSEC):** An important part of the NRO's risk management philosophy is the application of OPSEC principles to reduce system vulnerabilities to an acceptable level. OPSEC is the methodology for protecting unclassified operational, administrative, and logistical activities that may reveal classified I&L information. A key element of OPSEC in the I&L environment is the identification and control of unclassified indicators and observables which could provide an adversary with insight into classified NRO SV activities, plans, or operations.

- a. The NRO I&L risk management philosophy includes an OPSEC approach to:
  - (1) Identify NRO I&L activities that compromise classified information or that expose high value hardware to an unacceptable level of risk and that can be observed by knowledgeable adversaries.

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**

- (2) Determine the indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive classified information in time to be useful to adversaries.
  - (3) Select and implement measures that mask or obscure selected NRO I&L activities and therefore reduce the likelihood of adversary observation.
- b. The OSL requires all participants in NRO launch related activities to establish a sound security program that incorporates an OPSEC approach consistent with government regulations, the NRO Contract Security Specification (NF4.4702), or other contract security specification (e.g., DD Form 254) as applicable to their organization. Questions related to I&L OPSEC requirements or implementation measures should be directed to the OSL.
17. **Classification Marking:** Classification designations, time limits, derivative marking procedures, and other requirements of EO 12958, are to be applied to information classified pursuant to this guide IAW DoD 5200.1-R/AFI 31-401 and DoD 5220.22-M, *National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual*.
18. **Classification/Declassification Instructions:** Classification designations specified in this guide are identified with "S" for SECRET, and "U" for UNCLASSIFIED. Information handling instructions, such as "SCP" for Sensitive Compartmented Information (see paragraph 11) and "U//FOUO" for UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (see paragraph 12) are also used. Classification tables in Section III assign classification level, identify the appropriate classification reason appropriate, and provide declassification instructions.
- a. (U) The classification reason is identified as "1.4" (for the amended EO 12958 Section 1.5) plus the letter(s) corresponding to the appropriate classification category in the EO 12958, e.g., 1.5(b). Acceptable categories or reasons for classifying information are:
    - 1.5(a) Military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
    - 1.5(b) Foreign government information;
    - 1.5(c) Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
    - 1.5(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
    - 1.5(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
    - 1.5(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; and
    - 1.5(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security.
  - b. Declassification instructions are either identified as a specific event or activity or an exemption category if the information has been exempted from automatic declassification. When a specific date or event within 10 years cannot be established, the classifier will apply the date that is 10 years from the date of the original decision. Upon determination that the information must remain classified beyond 10 years, the classifier will apply the letter "X" plus a brief recitation of the exemption category(ies) or the letter "X" plus the number that corresponds to that exemption category(ies) from Section 1.6(d) of EO 12958. Manual Review declassification code should be used when any variety of manual review needs to take place before declassification. Allowable exemptions are information that would:
    - X1 Reveal an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptologic system or activity;

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**

- X2 Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
  - X3 Reveal information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system;
  - X4 Reveal United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans;
  - X5 Reveal foreign government information;
  - X6 Damage relations between the United States and a foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or seriously undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for a period greater than 10 years;
  - X7 Impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and other individuals for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized; or
  - X8 Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.
- c. Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information. Unauthorized disclosures will be reviewed by the OSL to determine appropriate and/or necessary course(s) of action.
19. **Contractor Proprietary Information:** When a contractor releases proprietary information to the Government, the contractor will mark the information appropriately and, if necessary, inform the recipients of required protection measures. The Government has the responsibility to protect the information in accordance with the contractor's guidance.
20. **Previously Generated Information:** This IPG changes the classification requirements for some information items. Archived documents that were created and classified under previous guidance, prior to the effective date of this IPG, need not be remarked. Any newly created documents, including extractions, changes, revisions, and/or updates of documents classified under previous guidance, must have current classification markings, to include use of this IPG as the classification authority.
21. **Compilation of Information:** A compilation or aggregation of items of information which are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association, relationship, or piece of information that meets the standards for classification under the tables contained in this guide and is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. For example, certain information referenced in this IPG when standing alone is unclassified; however, this information may be classified or FOUO when associated with intelligence community overhead reconnaissance or the NRO. It is the individual's responsibility to make compilation classification determinations. When necessary, OSL will assist with any compilation classification decisions.
22. **Classification Recommendations:**
- a. IAW EO 12958, users of NRO information who, in good faith, believe that its classification is improper are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification of the information. If progress in any phase of system development indicates that classification changes are appropriate and advisable, documented recommendations, to include informal recommendations, should be submitted to the OSL, which will coordinate with the applicable NRO SV SPO. Assistance in maintaining current, effective and adequate classification criteria is solicited of all participating government and industrial organizations. See paragraph 15d in this section for guidance on one-time waivers.

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**

- b. The OSL shall be notified when the accuracy of an assigned classification is questioned. Information shall be protected IAW this guide pending reply to the inquiry. The information shall not be regraded or declassified unless so directed by the OSL, which will coordinate with the applicable NRO SV SPO.
23. **Reporting Program Vulnerabilities and/or Weaknesses:** Individuals who believe they have identified a potential vulnerability or weakness to an NRO SV program will assign a tentative classification of SECRET to the information and immediately contact, via secure communications, the OSL for further guidance. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV SPOs for resolution. The NRO will evaluate the validity of the concern, assign a classification, reason for classification, and downgrading instructions to the information and take other actions as necessary.
24. **Reporting Elicitations:** Participants in the integration and launch of NRO SVs shall report all direct, purposeful, or probing elicitation attempts by any individual, regardless of nationality, to gain insight into classified, FOUO, business proprietary, or non-releasable technical information regarding NRO programs, activities, or operations beyond the scope of their need-to-know. Elicitation attempts may be made by visitors to any of the organizations under the auspices of this guide or when I&L participants are visiting other organizations, either foreign or domestic, or attending symposia, seminar, exhibitions, conferences, etc. The report to NRO/OSL must include the name(s), position, area(s) of interest, date, and place of occurrence, as well as the name and telephone number of the reporting individual.
25. **Classification Conflict Resolution:** This IPG is applicable to the integration and launch of those activities identified in Section II, Category Assignment Table. Conflicts between this and any other guides will be addressed to the OSL. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV SPOs for resolution. Pending resolution of the conflict, information will be protected at the highest classification given.
26. **Reproduction and Dissemination:** Local reproduction of this guide is authorized. All program documents, whether classified or unclassified, including this IPG, will be given minimum distribution consistent with operational requirements, need-to-know, and sound security practices.
27. **Classification Currency:** The OSL will make revisions to this guide by distributing corrected pages for insertion in place of superseded pages, issuing pen and ink changes or, when considered appropriate, issuing a completely revised guide.
- 

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION II

**Category Assignment Table**



(b)(3)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

19

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**Page Denied**

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION IV

**For Official Use Only Handling Instructions**

1. (U) **General.**

- a. (U) "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) is official government information that does not meet requirements for classification but still requires protection. As such, FOUO is an administrative marking that is used to limit dissemination of certain categories of unclassified information from public disclosure.
- b. (U) Official government information needed by selected recipients outside the NRO in furtherance of the NRO's mission, may be released at the discretion of the individual holding such information. Such release does not constitute authority for its publication and a disclaimer to that effect should be attached, such as: "The information contained herein is for the exclusive use of (name of recipient) and is not for further distribution." Ultimate responsibility for the protection of FOUO information from public release lies with the user, who will be held accountable.
- c. (U) FOUO information may be withheld from the public under exemptions 2-9 of the Freedom of Information Act (U.S.C. 552). Most FOUO information generated or handled in support of the NRO will be exempt from mandatory disclosure under exemptions 3 and/or 5.
- d. (U) FOUO information may be released to the public; however, the Government must review it prior to its release. FOUO information must be reviewed by the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) and the Contracting Officer's Security Representative (COSR) prior to release.

Field Code Changed

2. (U) **Identification Markings.**

- a. (U) An unclassified document containing FOUO information will be marked "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO" on the outside of the front cover (if any), on the first page, on each page containing FOUO information, on the back page and on the outside of the back cover (if any). For convenience, all pages, even those that do not contain FOUO information, may be marked in documents generated by an automated system.
- b. (U) Individual portions/paragraphs in unclassified documents that contain FOUO information may be marked with "U//FOUO" to alert users and assist in review. Documents prepared for dissemination outside the NRO must have individual paragraphs and portions marked. In this context, the NRO includes the Government and its contractors.
- c. (U) Individual pages within a classified document that contain both FOUO and classified information will be marked at the top and bottom with the highest security classification of information appearing on the page. Individual portions/paragraphs containing FOUO information but no classified information will be marked "U//FOUO".
- d. (U) The cover or the first page of unclassified documents containing FOUO information will be marked with the following statement:

Field Code Changed
--------------------

*This document contains information  
EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE  
under the FOIA. Exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(5) apply*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

30 March 1999

**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

e. (U) Certain classified material will be downgraded by the Original Classification Authority to UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO. When classified material approved for declassification to U//FOUO is used, extracted, reissued, transmitted and/or updated, it must be reviewed and appropriately marked.

3. (U) **Transmission/Dissemination/Storage:** Authorized contractors, consultants and grantees may transmit/disseminate FOUO information internally, to each other and U.S. Government components and officials of U.S. Government components who have a legitimate need for the information. The following guidelines apply:

Field Code Changed

a. (U) FOUO information may be discussed over non-secure telephones and other electronic instruments. Cordless, cellular and mobile telephones should be avoided.

b. (U) Secure facsimile is the preferred method of fax transmission; however, FOUO information may be transmitted over non-secure facsimile equipment.

c. (U) Documents or facsimile transmissions containing FOUO material or with FOUO material attached must be marked to identify any FOUO contents or attachments.

d. (U) FOUO information may be sent via US Postal Service or commercial carrier as long as the shipping package is not marked as containing FOUO material.

e. (U) If authorized by the COSR, FOUO information may be transmitted, processed and stored on corporate or private Automated Information Systems, electronic mail, and other similar systems or networks. Requests for authorization should be submitted to the PSO along with justification and a written plan describing how FOUO data will be protected. Holders will not use user-all, general, broadcast or universal mail addresses to distribute FOUO information. FOUO information will not be posted on the Internet on home pages, bulletin boards, or any other public forums. FOUO information may NOT be used with personally owned Internet accounts. See Item 6 below for approval requirements.

f. (U) FOUO information may be reproduced on unclassified copiers or within designated government or contractor reproduction areas.

g. (U) During working hours, FOUO information shall be used in a manner that limits access by persons who do not have an official need for the information. During non-working hours and when internal building security is provided, FOUO material may be filed with other unclassified records in unlocked files or desks. When there is no internal building security, locked buildings or rooms will provide adequate after-hours protection or the material can be stored in locked receptacles such as file cabinets, desks, or bookcases

64. (U) **Disposition.**

Field Code Changed

a. (U) When no longer needed, FOUO information should be disposed of in a manner to hinder reconstruction, e.g. by shredding or tearing each sheet into pieces and placing in a recycle or trash container or by initializing, degaussing or shredding magnetic media.

b. (U) FOUO material may be recycled. Safeguard the FOUO documents or information until recycling. Recycling contracts must include agreements on how to protect and destroy FOUO material.

c. (U) Removal of the FOUO status can only be accomplished by the government originator. The COTR and the COSR will review and remove, or authorize the removal of, FOUO status for information.

**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

5. (U) **Unauthorized Disclosure.** Government and Contractor personnel must act to protect FOUO information under their control from unauthorized disclosure. Government and Contractor organizations must inform the COTR and the COSR of any unauthorized disclosures of FOUO information. Unauthorized disclosure, intentional disregard or gross negligence in the handling of FOUO information does not constitute a reportable security violation. However, the responsible organization should investigate and, when substantiated, take appropriate disciplinary action. Unauthorized disclosure of FOUO information containing Privacy Act information may also result in civil or criminal sanctions.

Field Code Changed

6. (U) **Implementing Instructions for FOUO on Unclassified Systems:** In the event NRO FOUO information is to be placed on unclassified system or network, the requestor will submit written justification and supporting protection plan to the COSR for approval. The plan will detail how FOUO information will be protected from unauthorized access and / or release while resident on the unclassified system. The Protection Plan will include:

- Description. General size and description of the network / unclassified system.
- Location of Network.
- Controlling Authority. Description of Entity controlling network elements.
- Access Controls Employed. Description of administrative procedures, as well as technical mechanisms, used to restrict access to FOUO files / information to authorized users. Note: The network must provide Identification & Authentication mechanisms to uniquely identify and authenticate the users. The network structure must define and control access between named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs).
- Internet Connectivity. Description of any connections and controls employed. Note: Data transmission over the Internet will employ commercially available encryption or other similar methodology which can be reasonably expected to prohibit the data from being obtained ("hijacked") by unauthorized users.
- Description of Audit features. Auditing is not a requirement, but describe features if used.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

NRO Launch IPG


~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION V

**Definitions**

- AFI Air Force Instruction.
- AFP Air Force Program.
- AFSCN Air Force Satellite Control Network. The AFSCN controls over 80 communication, navigation, missile warning, and meteorological satellites and other missions for DoD, NASA, and the United Kingdom. It consists of (1) two operational control nodes located at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, and Onizuka Air Station, CA; (2) 17 TT&C antennas at nine geographical locations worldwide; (3) a communications calibration site at Camp Parks, CA; (4) space vehicle checkout facilities at CCAS, FL, and VAFB, CA; and (5) communications connectivity among these locations.
- AGE Aerospace Ground Equipment. Any electrical (EAGE) or mechanical (MAGE) ancillary equipment to support the flight hardware. This may include test sets, battery conditioners, or adapters. All equipment, excluding Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE), necessary to support a spacelift system throughout production processing and launch operations.
- Applicable Control Node The spacecraft command and control element that assumes responsibility for the command and control of the spacecraft after launch.
- ASE Aerospace Support Equipment. The ASE consists of the hardware and software that provides the physical and functional interface of the SV and the LV.



(b)(3)

- CCAM Contamination/Collision Avoidance Maneuver.
- COMSEC Communications Security - the protective measures taken to deny unauthorized persons' access to information derived from telecommunications of the United States Government related to national security.
- DoD Department of Defense.
- EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle - the Air Force, as the DoD lead agency

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

	for expendable launch vehicles, has initiated an EELV program that will eventually replace the current medium and heavy lift vehicles. The EELV Program concept is envisioned to be a single family of launch vehicles with significantly improved reliability, operability, and cost over current US expendable launch vehicles.
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility.
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference. Any EM disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics or electrical equipment. It can be induced intentionally, as in some forms of electronic warfare, or unintentionally, as a result of spurious emissions and responses, intermodulation products.
EO	Executive Order.
External View	See SV Launch Configuration.
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act. The FOIA requires that Executive Branch agencies respond to requests for information from the public. Requests submitted to the NRO are processed through MS&O/IARC.
FOUO	For Official Use Only.
FTS	Flight Termination System.
GSE	Ground Support Equipment. Ground equipment required to perform spacelift mission operations and maintenance. Consists of AGE and RPIE. GSE can be either common use (e.g., range GSE) or dedicated (e.g., Titan).
I&L	Integration and Launch.
ILC	Initial Launch Capability.
Internet	A set of computers that are networked together throughout the world.
Intranet	A set of computers that are networked together behind an organization's firewall.
IPG	Information Protection Guide.
IRON	Inter-Range Operations Number - a four-digit number used to schedule and identify AFSCN support for booster, launch, and/or on-orbit operations.
Launch Date	Date when a space launch is/was scheduled to occur; year, quarter, month, week or day.
Launch Mission Profile Data	Information that describes the LV mission requirements, e.g., target orbit predicted injection accuracy, LV orbital mechanics, attitude, roll rates, coast maneuvers, SV separation point, state vector, orbit options, etc. In other words, information that describes LV operations
Launch Time	The planned launch time is usually the opening of the launch window
Launch Period	A time span (that envelopes the launch window) during which an LV launch is intended to occur. Used to define the beginning and end of area clear and

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

	advance warning notices when ships, aircraft, trains, and personnel are prohibited from the restricted hazardous area or zone.
Launch Window	A specified period, including duration and/or time, during which a space launch must occur to satisfy technical constraints and requirements. The launch window is based on LV capabilities and/or SV requirements.
LCO	Launch Communications Office.
LON	Launch On Need.
LSIC	Launch Systems Integration Contractor.
LV	Launch Vehicle - consists of the entire space delivery system including, as appropriate, the booster, core vehicle, upper stage, and the payload fairing
MCC	Mission Control Center.
Mission Director	Director, OSL, as the Mission Director, is the final authority for all NRO space launch systems Commit to Launch. The Mission Director is accountable for SV launch processing & operations during the launch countdown and successful SV deployment
Need-To-Know	A determination made by an authorized holder of classified or FOUO information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized function.
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>
NROL	National Reconnaissance Office Launch. As used in this document, the term includes both NRO launch activities and the NROL designator. NROL designators are used to identify an NRO launch, NOT an NRO satellite vehicle.
NRO/OCC	National Reconnaissance Office/Office of Corporate Communications. The only office within the NRO with the authority to publicly release unclassified information related to NRO activities.
NRO/OSL	National Reconnaissance Office/Office of Space Launch; the OCA.
OCA	Original Classification Authority. An individual, authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.
OD-4	Operating Division 4, a user of the AFSCN and operator of several AFSCN MCCs.
OPSEC	Operations Security.
OSL	See NRO/OSL.
Pathfinder	A test to verify the compatibility of the LV elements with each other, ground facilities, and AGE

(b)(3)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

Payload	The hardware item(s) carried into space by the SV to perform an operational, research, or test mission.
Planning and Scheduling Data	Information that provides insight into the operational planning and requirements of a launch flow.
PLF	Payload Fairing - an aerodynamic shell used for environmental protection of the SV during ascent.
POCC	Payload Operations Control Center.
Program	The facilities, equipment, hardware, software, funds, personnel, and activities involved in a concerted effort to achieve a predetermined mission/objective.
Public Access Information	Open source information is publicly available information (i.e., any member of the public could lawfully obtain the information by request or observation), as well as other unclassified information that may have limited public distribution or access. Open source information also includes any information that may be used in an unclassified context without compromising national security or intelligence sources and methods. If the information is not publicly available, certain legal requirements relating to collection, retention, and dissemination may apply.
Real-Time	Refers to the data collected as an event occurs. The resulting data is thereafter referred to as actual or real-time versus planned or theoretical data.
Reflight	Any verbal or written reference to a relationship between one or more launches that provides a definitive statement that two launches carry the same type of SV. Examples of definitive statements are: "NROL- XX SV is the same as of NROL-YY SV" or "The K-XX SV is a reflight of the SV flown on B-25". Inferences or speculations based on LV configuration are not considered confirmation of SV reflight. An LV that consists of a similar configuration (hardware software, procedures, processes, ASE GSE etc.), and that may be supported by the same personnel, as a previously flown LV is an example of LV reflight.
S	SECRET security classification.
SAF/SL	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Space Launch.
SAF/SO	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations.
SAF/ST	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Science & Technology.
(U) SCG	Security Classification Guide.
(U) SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information.
(U) SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System.
(U) Sensitive Information	Any information, the loss, misuse, or modification of which, or unauthorized access to, could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal Programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 5 USC 552a (the Privacy Act), but which has not been specifically authorized under criteria

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

	established by an EO or Act of congress to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
(U) SGLS	Space Ground Link Systems.
(U) SMC/AXP	Space and Missile Center, Systems Acquisition Protection Director.
(U) SMC/CL	Space and Missile Center, Launch Programs Office; the SPO for Titan and Atlas LVs.
(U) SMC/CLX	Space and Missile Center, Operations Support and Integration Office.
(U) SMC/IMO	Space and Missile Center, Information Management Office.
(U) SMC/MV	Space and Missile Center SPO for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(U) SOC	Spacecraft Operations Center.
(U) Spacecraft	See SV.
(U) Specific LV	A launch vehicle identified by serial number or sequence number, e.g., K-1, Titan IV1, AC-109, Delta IV-10, or any other identifier.
(U) Specific SV	See SV Identity.
(U) SPO	System Program Office.
(U) Substitute Identifier	Any randomly selected name, number, or other designator used to avoid classification issues related with identifying the SV program.
(U) SV	Satellite Vehicle - the spacecraft bus and its mission enabling payloads.
(U) SV Descriptive Data	Information that describes the SV's shape, mechanical characteristics, and structural dynamics. Information required by the LV mission planners to successfully integrate and launch a satellite will only be released at the NRO's discretion.
(U) SV Envelope	Dimensions of a non-SV shape revealing "box" used to determine the volume that the SV uses or displaces within the payload fairing.
(U) SV Launch Configuration	The SV in its final mechanical state and ready for encapsulation
(U) SV Profile	An outline drawing of the SV that conforms to the SV shape and reveals its physical shape or specific dimensions.
SV Identity	The NRO SV program identity or name. Also see NROL.
SVC	Satellite Vehicle Contractor.
SV Operations Data	Information that is not required by LV mission planners and will not be released. This includes information that describes the SV operational mission in terms of: (1) SV mission, objectives, capabilities, operational limitations, and vulnerabilities; (2) Priorities and plans for space-based intelligence activities; (3) Critical, unique to program, advanced state-of-the-art hardware technology; (4) Satellite constellation health, system needs, and replenishment strategies; and (5) NRO operational infrastructure, elements, and control

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

	nodes.
Trailblazer	A test to verify the compatibility of the SV and its interfaces with the BV, upper stage, PLF SV ASE and AGE
U	UNCLASSIFIED.
USAF	United States Air Force.
Vulnerability	A weakness, shortfall, or uncorrected deficiency that could be exploited to degrade or defeat the effectiveness of a system.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION VI

**Index**

44

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION VII

**Distribution**

Additional distribution is the responsibility of the receiving office.  
Local reproduction is authorized.



(b)(3)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

20 July 1999  
Change 1, 7 April 2000

**SECTION VII - Distribution (Continued)**



(b)(3)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~