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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~


(U) National Reconnaissance Office



SIGINT Program Classification Guide (U)

24 May 2005

Includes revision as of 25 Aug 2008



Acting Director, SIGINT Systems Acquisitions and Operations, NRO

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Classified By:
Classification Reason:
Declassify On:
Derived From:

1.4 (a,c,e,g)
25X1
Multiple Sources (see pg 25)

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**Record of Changes**

Change / Description	Date of Change
Fixed typo that makes the legacy term OSF (U) vice (S)	2 Sep 2005
Corrected omission regarding releasability of SIGINT satellite ephemeris data	18 Oct 05
Corrected note in item V.1.g to include unintentionally omitted dissemination release direction	2 Nov 05
Added a note to item II.1.a.2 explaining the use of cover contract numbers as described in NRO/OC Administrative Note 25, rev 3 of 26 Aug 03 and their classified association with the NRO.	28 Nov 05
	28 Mar 06
Acronym table – change the term POPPY from S//TK to U	12 May 2006
Sec I, Item 1.0,dd – changed to 4 eyes IAW NGA ONIR SCG	9 Jan 2007
Sec I, Item 3.0, j – changed from 3 eyes to 5 eyes to reflect DNI guidance on intel sharing	“
Sec II, Item 3.0, a,b,c&d – changed releasability instructions from 3 eyes to “releasability determined by content of document”.	“
Sec III, Item 6.b – 6.c,1,2,3,4 – 6.e changed releasability to 4 eyes IAW NGA ONIR SCG	“
Sec V, Item 1.0,h – changed releasability from 3 to 5 eyes based on current information distribution channels – i.e. – operational reality	“
Sec VII, Item a. and c. - changed releasability from 3 to 5 eyes based on current information distribution channels – i.e. – operational reality	“
	3 Jan 2008
Incorporates global DIDO approval changing releasability of NRO SIGINT information from 3 or 4 eyes to 5 eyes.	25 Aug 2008

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~~—SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~
1.0 (U) GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1.1 (U) Purpose

(U) The SIGINT Classification Guide compiles into one document all guidance for the classification of National Reconnaissance Office information for all SIGINT programs. As such, it is the baseline classification document for SIGINT operations and activities. It provides the basis for maintaining configuration control of classification management decisions. In conjunction with the "Life Cycle Security" process it will function to provide management with a tool for assessing the impact of change.

1.2 (U) Scope

~~(C)~~ The provisions of this guide apply to all SIGINT plans, systems, subsystems, and operations funded by, or under the cognizance of the SIGINT Systems Acquisition & Operations Directorate (SA&OD). This includes research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); application; production; related technology; and operational use of SIGINT systems. The information contained in this guide has been compiled from numerous source documents, which are listed in Section 23. For additional information or assistance in making classification determinations, contact the Program Security Officer (PSO) for the system in question, the SIGINT Security Office, or for contractor personnel, your NRO Contractor Program Security Officer (NCSPPO).

2.0 (U) APPLICABILITY & EFFECTIVE DATE

(U) This SIGINT Classification Guide applies to all personnel who have access to information addressed in this guide. It is effective as of the date on the title page.

3.0 (U) APPROACH

(U) The SIGINT classification development team used a "Life Cycle Security Process" to develop this guide. The process included analysis of the program life cycle, threat, open source, program segments, work breakdown structure, sensitive technologies, classification decision tool, risk management, and program protection architecture.

(U) The SIGINT classification development team was comprised of government and contractor personnel. It was coordinated with applicable System Program Offices (SPOs), field sites, contractors, and all Headquarters Directorates and Offices.

~~(S//TK)~~ The SIGINT Classification Guide(CG)
 Security Classification Guides(SCGs). In developing the SIGINT CG all criteria from the previous guides were considered.

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6.0 (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY

(U) This guide is issued by the NRO SIGINT (SA&OD). The SIGINT CG establishes original classification guidance for NRO SIGINT operations and activities and is approved by the Director, NRO SIGINT (SA&OD).

7.0 (U) CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

(U) The Director, SIGINT SA&OD (an original classification authority) has established the classification level of and control system for some information contained in this guide. Other information is derived from guidance provided/documented in the:

1. National Space Policy, NSC-49, dated September 1996.
2. NRO Security Classification Guide, 1 May 2000.
3. Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems, 8 April 1997.
4. Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR), 26 May 1999.
5. Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated, 1 December 1995.
6. National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.
7. Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series).

8.0 (U) LEVELS OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

8.1 (U) National Security Classification Levels

(U) **TOP SECRET** shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause **exceptionally grave damage** to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(U) **SECRET** shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause **serious damage** to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(U) **CONFIDENTIAL** shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

8.2 (U) Control Systems:

8.2.1 (U) Collateral Material

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(U) All national security information classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET under the provisions of an Executive Order 12958 for which Intelligence Community systems of compartmentation [such as, Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI)] are not formally established. NRO has authority to classify within the collateral classification protocol.

8.2.2 (U) COMINT

(U) The COMINT Control System (SI) is a SCI control system expressly authorized for handling or transmitting communications intelligence derived from satellite surveillance and other sources.

8.2.3 (U//~~FOUO~~) TALENT-KEYHOLE

(U//~~FOUO~~) TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) is a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Sensitive Compartmented Information control system which protects technical data used in collection tasking; imagery or signals processing/exploitation techniques for collected data; and intelligence products derived from overhead reconnaissance programs. Some exceptions to satellite SIGINT related data include COMINT (Note: when COMINT is identified as satellite collection, it is handled jointly as SI/TK), operational ELINT (Operational Electronic Intelligence - OPELINT), and some technical ELINT (TECHELINT). Generally TALENT-KEYHOLE protects certain information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines:

- 1) (U) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), [REDACTED],
- 2) (U) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), [REDACTED],
- 3) (U) Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), [REDACTED]
- 4) (U) Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), and
- 5) (U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

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8.2.4 (U//~~FOUO~~) RESERVE (RSV) Control System

See RESERVE Security Manual for Guidance

8.3 (U) Proper Compartmentation of Information.

~~(C)~~ The decision to compartment information in the TK Control System should be made using the guidelines and tables in this guide, as well as the program classification guides. Proper compartmentation is critical in order to interact effectively with our mission partners/users.

~~(S)~~ BYEMAN (BYE) was a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) control system that defines protection requirements for sensitive sources and methods used in the research, development and operation of space-based reconnaissance systems. This included certain program budget and funding details; integration of spacecraft with sensor platforms; certain command and control operations; key design and development details; and survivability and vulnerability of systems. The DCI delegated security policy formulation authority for the BYEMAN Control System to the Director of Center for CIA Security, CIA (D/CCS/CIA). The Director of Security NRO (DOS/NRO) was responsible, however, for implementation and was the senior security advisor to the DNRO. The BYEMAN Control System was managed by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The DCI retired the BYEMAN control system effective 21 May 2005. For SIGINT the following marking changes resulted:

Before BYEMAN Retirement

BYE//REL TO 3 EYES
BYE-OSB//REL TO 3 EYES
BYE/NF

After BYEMAN Retirement

TK//REL TO 3 EYES
TK//REL TO 3 EYES
TK/NF

(U//~~FOUO~~) With the retirement of the BYEMAN control system, almost all information about NRO systems is controlled in the Talent Keyhole control system. Automatic dissemination of this information based solely on possessing TK access is not sound OPSEC. Apply need-to-know principles before sharing information about NRO systems with those not directed involved with the NRO.

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8.4 (U) CLASSIFICATION OR CONTROL SYSTEM CONFLICT RESOLUTION

~~(S)~~ The classification tables in this guide specify classification and control system(s) for information related to SIGINT systems and their products. Where control system or classification is not readily apparent from the table, or if a user believes conflicting, inaccurate, or unclear guidance has been provided, protect the information, products or activities at the highest applicable level pending resolution. Request guidance from the responsible SIGINT Program Security Officer or the NRO Director of SIGINT Security. A control system and classification review will be made by the NRO for TK matters under the cognizance of the NRO and the functional program managers within DIA, NIMA, NSA, National SIGINT Committee and the MASINT Committee for TALENT-KEYHOLE information that does not originate or belong to the NRO but falls under the data ownership of these organizations.

(U) The fact that classified information has been inadvertently disclosed or released does not mean that it is automatically declassified. Unauthorized disclosures will be reviewed by the SIGINT SA&OD and other Directorates and Offices to determine appropriate and/or necessary courses of action.

8.5 (U//~~FOUO~~) Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(U//~~FOUO~~) Classified intelligence information relating to intelligence sources and methods is often NOFORN. Release of NRO-related classified information to foreign governments or individuals whether collateral, COMINT, TALENT-KEYHOLE must be in accordance with arrangements between NRO, National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery & Mapping Agency (NIMA), and CIA/Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff (CRES). Potential data release must also satisfy the applicable requirements outlined in Director, Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, DCID 6/7, DCID 6/3, Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR)s Volumes I/II, Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National Reconnaissance Materials [MASINT Policy Series (MPS)], and the Imagery Policy Series. Release of unclassified NRO-related satellite technology is subject to export controls as established by the Departments of Commerce and State, in coordination with Department of Defense. Certain organizations/agencies have authorized memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or other agreements that permit the release of classified intelligence information to foreign nationals. Release of information is bound by the specific terms of the agreements and may supersede other caveats and restrictions.

(U) In accordance with DCID 1/7, intelligence information that bears no restrictive control markings may be released to foreign governments, international organizations or coalition partners provided that:

(U) A positive foreign disclosure decision is made by a Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official in accordance with procedures in DCID 6/7;

(U) No reference is made to the originating agency or to the source of the documents on which the released product is based; and

(U) The source or manner of acquisition of the intelligence (including analytic judgements or techniques), and/or the location where the intelligence was collected (if relevant to protect sources and methods) is not revealed and cannot be deduced in any manner.

(U) SIGINT may be sanitized or otherwise altered to permit foreign release consistent with DCID 5/5, 6/7, NDP-1, and other DNI guidance. See Signals Intelligence Security Manual (SISR) for further detailed guidance.

8.6 (U) Bilateral Agreements.

~~(S)~~ SIGINT and related information (methodologies and techniques), even when not marked "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" (NOFORN), will not be released to foreign governments (except for Second Parties), organizations, or persons other than under the provisions of this regulation. Authorized exchanges of COMINT will be conducted in accordance with bilateral agreements established under the provisions of DCID 5/5 and DCID 6/7 and in consonance with U.S. policy on information sharing with foreign nations. In particular, SIGINT on the foreign recipient's country will not be shared except in rare cases. The Director, NSA, must be consulted in advance in all such cases.

8.7 (U) Second Parties

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(b)(3)**8.8 (U) Third Parties**(b)(1)
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(U) Information identifiable as SIGINT may be released to foreign nations other than the Second Parties only under the terms and conditions of formal SIGINT agreements, either national or military-to-military. Such bilateral agreements will be established by the Director, NSA, in conjunction with the Department of State, appropriate U.S. military commands and services, the Special Assistant to the DNI for Foreign Intelligence Relationships, and the appropriate CIA COS. With regard to Third Party organizations, SIGINT may be disseminated by SOICs to only COMINT-indoctrinated persons for whom access is authorized in approved sharing agreements.

8.9 (U) Authorized for Release to [name of country (ies)/international organization] (REL or REL TO e.g., GBR...).

(U) This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has determined to be releasable or has been released, through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country (ies)/international organization(s) indicated. Further foreign dissemination of the material (in any form) is authorized only after obtaining permission from the originator and in accordance with DCID 6/7, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and National Disclosure Policy - 1 (NDP-1). This marking may be abbreviated REL (abbreviated name of country (ies)/international organization.) It is not authorized for use in conjunction with the: NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN) control marking.

9.0 (U) COMPILATION/AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION

(U//~~FOUO~~) In some instances, the combination of several items of information produces a synergistic effect, i.e., the classification of all items of a similar type, when combined together generate a new piece of information that is classified higher than either of the originals. When originating documents, emails, etc., be aware of issues that may be created when associating information. While portion markings should reflect the classification of the relevant portion headers and footers can be at a higher level if a compilation issue has been created.

10.0(U) ADMINISTRATION**10.1 (U) Visits by Representatives of State/Federal Governments**

(U) The appropriate SIGINT Program Security Officer (PSO) will be notified of any contemplated visits by members of any legislative or Executive Branch of any State or Federal Government to any contractor or government agency if any portion of the visit could involve SIGINT Programs. The notification will include name, position, and area of interest of each visitor and the date of the proposed visit.

10.2 (U) Visits by Foreign Citizens or Representatives of Foreign Governments or Organizations

(U) The SIGINT cognizant Program Security Officer (PSO) will be notified of any contemplated visits by foreign citizens or representatives of any foreign governments, space agencies, or contractors to any United States contractor or government agency if any portion of the visit could involve access to any SIGINT Program information. The notification will include name, position, and area of interest of each visitor and the date of the proposed visit.

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11.0(U) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION

(U) NO NRO information relative to a NRO SIGINT contract will be publicly released unless the company is specifically authorized to release it in writing by the authorized NRO Contracting Officer for that contract. Prime and associate contractors are responsible for ensuring their subcontractors are aware of and comply with, this requirement. Unilateral public release of information pertaining to the NRO and its SV programs, operations, and launches is expressly prohibited.

12.0(U) USE OF THIS GUIDE

~~(C)~~ The Guide is classified SECRET and is controlled within the COMINT//TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly. The following guidelines will be strictly enforced:

(U) Reproduction of this document or any part is permitted for use in program activities. Requests for copies for other uses should be directed to the SIGINT Program Security Officer (PSO).

(U) Dissemination of this guide to organizations outside the security cognizance of the NRO must be approved by the SIGINT PSO and NRO Office of Security Policy and Operational Support.

(U) Government program management personnel, PSOs, and contractor security personnel will ensure strict adherence to the DNRO's "must-know" access requirement policy. PSOs and security officers may extract information from this guide to tailor security classification guidance for tasks, as needed.

(U) CAUTION! Exact situations and classifications cannot always be specified in advance. Protect the information and refer questions to Program security. Any deviation from this guide must be approved by the SIGINT Program Director or PSO.

(U) How to request changes to this guide.

(U) As circumstances or policies change, there will be a requirement to change information in this guide. The form below should be completed by individuals and forwarded through your security organization. They in turn will forward it by secure means to the SIGINT Security Office for review and comment.

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<p align="center">SIGINT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE CHANGE REQUEST</p>

(to be filled out by Program Office PSO)

TO: SIGINT CLASSIFICATION AND POLICY UNIT

FROM: _____

(PSO P.O.C.) (Office)

Originator: _____

(name, organization, _____

functional activity) _____

Date: ____/____/____ Proposed Change: New Item__ Modification__ Challenge__

Item/Listing: _____

(guide section, item number, page) _____

Change description: _____

(include other _____

items affected) _____

Rationale: _____

(to be completed by the SIGINT Classification and Policy Unit)

Date: ____/____/____

Action Officer: _____

Request approved: Yes No

(circle one)

If NO state justification: _____

Coordinated with: _____

Final Classification Determination: _____

Date approved by OCA: ____/____/____ Name of OCA: _____

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**13.0(U) NRO DOD PROGRAM DESIGNATOR**

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14.0(U) NRO LAUNCH DESIGNATOR

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15.0(U) SUBSTITUTE IDENTIFIER

~~(S)~~ Replacing the SV program name, number, or an NRO DoD program designator, with any substitute identifier in order to avoid classification of budgets, analyses, hardware, engineering processes, tests and associated documentation must meet the criteria listed in the paragraphs below. Information relative to SV mission, capability, vulnerability and operations can NOT be declassified through disassociation. Those items that can be handled as unclassified when disassociated from a specific SV program are explicitly identified in the classification tables.

(U) A substitute identifier may be any combination of numbers, letters, or an unclassified name. However, the substitute identifier must be randomly selected for the sole purpose of being used as a substitute identifier with no derivable unclassified relationship between the substitute identifier and the program, satellite vehicle contractor (SVC), or the NRO DoD program designator.

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(U) DoD collateral usage of substitute identifiers must be approved by the OSL prior to implementation. All other usage of substitute identifiers must be approved by the applicable NRO Directorate or Office.

16.0(U) SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) All users of this guide are encouraged to assist in improving and maintaining its currency and relevancy. Comments and recommendations should be forwarded through security offices to the Program Security Officer (PSO) or to the NRO, Director of Security. (See change request form in Section 12.0).

17.0(U) CLASSIFICATION TABLE LAYOUT AND EXPLANATION

(U) The following table provides security guidance itemized by program segments. The table is not and cannot be all inclusive. Absence of a particular item does not imply that the item can be considered UNCLASSIFIED. Refer questions to the Program Security Officer (PSO). If the table indicates that an item of information can be protected in more than one security control system, use the guidelines in section 8.3 (Choice of Control Systems).

(U) The classification column contains the classification level, the control system column contains the symbol for a control system if applicable. The Rationale/Remarks column will contain a rationale for the classification level and other comments.

~~(C)~~ The following key is provided for understanding the symbols used in the classification tables:

EO 12958 CLASSIFICATION LEVELS

TS - TOP SECRET
S - SECRET

CONTROL SYSTEMS

RSV - RESERVE
TK - TALENT KEYHOLE

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~
 C - CONFIDENTIAL SI - COMINT

OTHER DATA

U - UNCLASSIFIED
 FOUO - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
 NF - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN)
 LIMDIS - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
 SHI - SPECIAL HANDLING INFORMATION
 REL TO
 USA/AUS/
 CAN/GBR/NZL - RELEASABLE TO USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL
 CRYPTO - CRYPTOGRAPHIC
 OCA - ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

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18.0(U) REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION

(U) Under the provisions of E.O. 12958, the reason(s) for a classification decision must be documented. To meet this requirement, the E.O. specifies that, at a minimum, reference to the pertinent classification category (ies) described in Section 1.4 of E.O. 12958 plus the letter(s) that correspond to the category (ies) should be listed. The classification categories preceded by their corresponding letter designators are listed below:

- (a) "Military plans, weapons systems, or operations."
- (b) "Foreign government information."
- (c) "Intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology."
- (d) "Foreign relations or activities of the United States, including confidential sources."
- (e) "Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security."
- (f) "United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities."
- (g) "Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security."

19.0(U) DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

(U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 specifies that the original classification authority will apply a date, not to exceed 10 years, or event for declassification that corresponds to the lapse of the information's national security sensitivity. Individuals with original classification authority may determine that certain information must remain classified beyond 10 years. In this case, the information must be annotated with the letter "X" plus a numerical designation that corresponds to a specific exemption category or set of exemption categories described in Section 1.6 of E.O. 12958 (e.g. 25X1 equates to: Reveals an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptology system or activity). The X markings and corresponding declassification exemptions are as follows:

- 25X1 - "Reveals an intelligence source, method, or activities or a cryptology system or activity."
- X2 - "Reveals information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."
- X3 - "Reveals information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system."
- X4 - "Reveals United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans."
- X5 - "Reveals foreign government information."
- X6 - "Would damage relations between the United States and foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for period greater than in paragraph (b)."
- X7 - "Would impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and or other individuals for whom proactive services, in the interest of national security, are authorized."
- X8 - "Would violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

20.0(U) PORTION MARKING

(U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 mandates that all classified information, regardless of its physical form, indicate which portions are classified. The NRO has been granted a limited waiver from the requirement to portion mark information. The NRO is not required to portion mark information that will be maintained internal to the NRO by its government staff and/or contractors. Information produced by the NRO that is disseminated externally must be

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portion marked. In this case, the term external is defined as any organization or entity outside the security cognizance of the Director of the NRO.

(U) Documents that are not portion marked may not be cited as source documents for derivative classification. These documents shall be marked "Warning this document shall not be used as a source for derivative classification." This "warning" marking will be prominently placed on the first page of the document.

21.0(U) REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

1. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, Classified National Security Information, dated 17 April 1995.
2. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space -based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, dated 22 February 1995.
3. (U) NRO Classification Guide, Version 6, 20 May 2005.
4. (U) National Space Policy, NSC-49, dated, September 1996.
5. (U) Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated, 1 December 1995.
6. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/1, Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), 1 Mar 95.
7. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/5, Conduct of SIGINT Liaison with Foreign Governments and the Release of U.S. SIGINT to Foreign Governments, dated May 1983.
8. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/7, Intelligence Disclosure Policy, dated 20 Apr 2001.
9. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information, dated 30 Jun 98.
10. (U) Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR), 26 May 1999.
11. (U) DOD Freedom of Information Act Program, DoD 5400.7-R, dated May 1997.
12. (U) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy, DoD TS-5105.21-M-2, July 1985.
13. (U) National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.
14. (U) National Reconnaissance Office Security Manual (NSM) Volume I – Industry, June 16, 2000.
15. (U) The Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, 24 April 1995.
16. (U) Further Declassification of NRO Contractor Associations, 1 August 1997.
17. (S) SOCOMM message, "Declassification of NRO Launch and Associated Facts," 072114 March 1997, Cite 8496, aka Policy Notice 001/97.
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19. (U) OPNAL Notice 5510 (Limited Dissemination Controls) 29 Dec 89.
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26. (U) Data Communications Group Classification Guide, 25 September 1997.
27. (U) Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems, 8 April 1997.
28. (U) Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series).
29. [REDACTED]
30. (U) Declassification of the terms "TALENT-KEYHOLE" and the satellite mission designator "KH" and their general relationship to intelligence, February 23, 1995.
31. (U) Intelligence community Classification and Control Markings Implementation Manual, 30 Jun 1999.
32. [REDACTED]
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34. [REDACTED]
35. [REDACTED]

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~~—SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**22.0(U) RATIONALE**

(U) The following list is the rationale used to decide what type of information would be revealed by a compromise of data. The number which corresponds to the appropriate rational appears in the classification table in the rationale/remarks column.

1. (U) Reveals a covert or classified relationship.
2. (U) Reveals vulnerability or survivability.
3. (U) Reveals total system design to include communications network and connectivity details.
4. (U) Reveals technology advances in state-of-the-art capabilities or unique new capabilities.
5. (U) Reveals system design and communications network details.
6. (U) Reveals sub-system design and communications network details.
7. (U) Reveals system performance not needed for product analysis.
8. (U) Integration information revealing design details or mission.
9. (U) Reveals intelligence mission.
10. (U) Reveals command and control techniques heightening vulnerability.
11. (U) Launch schedules and logistics revealing system design details, capabilities, or mission.
12. (U) Contractual or administrative information revealing system design details, communications network infrastructure, capabilities or mission.
13. (U) Reveals contractor or other relationship that is covert, compartmented, or classified.
14. (U) Reveals program sponsor (i.e., the NRO).
15. (U) Reveals sensitive sources and methods.
16. (U) Reveals operational, system, communications network or other information which may lead to degradation or negation of mission objectives.
17. (U) Reveals information which may allow an adversary to gain technical competence or advantage.
18. (U) Reveals details of collection capability over denied area that cannot be attributed to any sensor other than a satellite.

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~~—SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~ACRONYM LIST (U)

NOTE: ASTERISKED ITEMS ARE CONTROLLED WITHIN S//TK CHANNELS WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.

		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
(U)AFP	Air Force Program.	
(U)AFSCN	Air Force Satellite Control Network.	
(U)AFSPACECOM	Air Force Space Command.	
(U)AFSPC	Air Force Space Command.	
(U)AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment.	
		(b)(1)
(U)AOTES	Automated Operational Technical Exchange System.	(b)(3)
(U)ARV	Aerospace Research Van.	
(U)AS&TD	Advanced Systems & Technology Directorate.	
(U)ASE	Aerospace Support Equipment.	
(U)ASPO	Army Space Program Office.	
(U)ATP	Advanced Tracking Prototype.	
		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
(U)BV	Booster Vehicle.	
(U)BYE	(U) BYEMAN.	
(U)CAAS	Contract Advisory & Assistance Services.	
(U)CALS	Computer Aided Logistics Support.	
(U)CALVAN	Calibration Van Group.	
(U)CCO	COMINT Channels Only.	
		(b)(1)
(U)CDRL	Contract Data Requirements Lists.	(b)(3)
		(b)(1)
(U)CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.	(b)(3)
(U)CIA/OD&E	Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Development & Engineering.	
		(b)(1)
(U)CMCC	Command Management Control Center.	(b)(3)
(U)COMINT	Communications Intelligence.	
(U)COMSEC	Communications Security.	
(U)CONOPS	Concept of Operations.	
(U)CONUS	Continental United States.	
(U)CPEG	Cross Program ELINT Geolocation.	
(U)CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications Systems.	
(U)CSTC	Consolidated Space Test Center.	
(U)CW	Continuous Wave.	
		(b)(1)
(U)DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.	(b)(3)
(U)DCI	Director of Central Intelligence.	
(U)DCID	Director Of Central Intelligence Directive.	
(U)DEFSMAC	Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center.	
(U) DNI	Director National Intelligence.	
(U)DNRO	Director of the National Reconnaissance.	
(U)DOD	Department of Defense.	
(U)DRSP	Defense Reconnaissance Support Program.	
(U)DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System.	
		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
(U)DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications System.	

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(U)EAGE	Electrical Aerospace Ground Equipment.
(U)ECI	Exceptionally Controlled Information.
(U)ELINT	Electronic Intelligence.
(U)Elsets	Element sets. A set of six numbers (mean motion, eccentricity, inclination, right ascension of the ascending node, argument of perigee, and mean anomaly) that make up the element set and describe the satellite's orbit). The orbital elements are used by the satellite owner/operator and the space surveillance sites to track space objects.
(U)ELV	Expendable Launch Vehicle.
(U)EMC	Electro-magnetic Compatibility.
(U)EMI	Electro-magnetic Interference.
(U)EMP	Electro-magnetic Pulse.
(U)AEPDS	Army Electronic Processing Data System.
(U)ER	Eastern Range.
(U)ERP	Effective Radiated Power.
(S//TK)FARRAH (F-I, F-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.
(U)FOC	Final Operational Capability.
(U)FOSC	Facility Operations Support Center(s).
(U)FOUO	For Official Use Only. (b)(1)
(U)GEO	Geostationary/ Geosynchronous Earth Orbit. (b)(3)
(S//TK)GLORIA (G-I, G-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.
(U)GTG	Ground Terminal Group.
(U)HEMP	High Energy Magnetic Pulse.
(U)HEO	Highly Elliptical Orbit.
(U)HULTEC	Hull to Emitter Correlation.
(U)I&W	Indications and Warning.
(U)ICEBOX	Improved communication Equipment Enclosure.
(U)ILC	Initial Launch Capability. (b)(1)
(U)IMINT	Imagery Intelligence. (b)(3)
(U)IRON	Inter-range Operations Numbers. (b)(1)
(U)LCO	Launch Communications Office. (b)(3)
(U)LEO	Low Earth Orbit.
(U)LEO SPO	System Program Office for Low Altitude Programs.
(U)LMCC	Launch Management Control Center.
(U)LOCC	Launch Operations Control Center.
(S//TK)LORRI (L-I, L-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.
(U)LPO	Launch Program Office.
(U)LSI SPO (SAF/SP)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SAF/SP).
(U)LSI SPO (SMC/IMO)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SMC/IMO).
(U)LSI SPO (SAF/SL)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SAF/SL).
(U)LSIC	Launch Systems Integration Contractor.
(U)LV	Launch Vehicle.
(U)MAGE	Mechanical Aerospace Ground Equipment.
(U)MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence.
(U)MCC	Mission Control Center.
(U)MCS	Mission Control Station.
(U)MECO	Main Engine Cut-Off.

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(U)DMGS	Mission Ground Station.	
		(b)(1)
(U)MS&O	Office of Management, Services & Operations.	(b)(3)
(U)NAVSOC	Navy Space Operations Center.	(b)(1)
(U)NAVSPACMD	Navy Space Command.	(b)(3)
(U)NCST	Navy Center for Space Technology.	
(U)NRL	Naval Research Laboratory.	
(U)NRO	National Reconnaissance Office.	
(U)NROC	NRO Operations Center	
(U)NRP	National Reconnaissance Program.	
(U)NSA	National Security Agency.	
(U)NSG	Naval Security Group.	
(U)NSOC	National Security Operations Center.	
		(b)(1)
(U)NSRL	National SIGINT Requirements List.	(b)(3)
(U)OBP	On-board Processing.	
(U)OCA	Original Classification Authority.	
(U)OCMC	Overhead Collection Management Center.	
		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
(U)OPELINT	Operational Electronic Intelligence.	
(U)OPSCOMM	Operational Communications.	
(U)OPSEC	Operations Security.	
(U)OSF	Operations Support Facility.	
(U)OSL	Office of Space Launch.	
(U)OSO	Operational Support Office.	
(U)P&A	Office of Plans & Analysis.	
(U)P/L	Payload.	
		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
(U)P-989*	Inactive Program Name.	
(U)PADS	Prototype Analysis Display System.	
(U)PARAGON	Prototype Air Reporting and Ground Operating Node.	
		(b)(1)
(U)Pathfinder	A test to verify the compatibility between the SV and its facilities.	(b)(3)
(U)PAWS	Prototype Analyst Work Station.	
(U)PD-14 (OLD SPAWAR-40)	Program Directorate - 14.	
(U)PDEC	Product Development Evaluation Center.	
(U)PDMS	Payload Data Management System.	
(U)PLF	Payload Fairing.	
		(b)(1)
(U)POCC	Payload Operations Control Center.	(b)(3)
(U)POPPY	Inactive Program Name.	
(U)PRI	Pulse Repetition Interval.	
(U)PROFORMA	Machine to machine signals.	
(U)PSO	Program Security Officer.	
(U)R&D	Research & Development.	
		(b)(1)
(S//TK)RAQUEL (R-I, R-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	(b)(3)
(U)RF	Radio Frequency.	
(U)RFP	Requests for Proposal.	
(U)RRC	Regional Reporting Center.	

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(U)RSOC	Regional SIGINT Operations Center.	
(U)RSV	RESERVE Control System	
(U)S	Collateral Secret.	(b)(1)
(U)S//BYE	(U) SECRET BYEMAN.	(b)(3)
(U)S/C	Spacecraft.	
(U)S//TK	SECRET/TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)SAF/SL	Secretary of the Air Force /Space Launch.	(b)(1)
(U)SAF/SO	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations	(b)(3)
(U)SAF/SP	Secretary of the Air Force/Special Projects.	
(U)SAF/SS	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Systems.	
(U)SAO	SIGINT Applications Office	
(U)SAF/ST	Secretary of the Air Force /Science & Technology.	
(U)SBS	Spacecraft Bus System.	(b)(1)
(U)SCC	Space Classified Catalog.	(b)(3)
(U)SCC	Spacecraft Control Center.	
(U)SCG	Security Classification Guide.	
(U)SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information.	
(U)SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.	
(U)SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System.	
(U)SE/GE	Space Element/Ground Element.	
(U)SECDEF	Secretary of Defense.	
(U)SED	Signal External Data.	
(U)SELORS	Ship Emitters Location Report.	
(U)SETO	Systems Engineering Technology Office	
(U)SETA	Support Engineering and Technical Assistance.	
(U)SGLS	Space Ground Link System.	
(U)SH	Special Handling.	
(U)SI	Special Intelligence.	
(U)SIGINT	Signals Intelligence.	
(U)SMC/CL	Space Missile Center/Launch Programs Office.	(b)(1)
(U)SMC/CLM	Space Missile Center/Atlas Program Office.	(b)(3)
(U)SMC/CLX	Space Missile Center/Operations Support & Integration Office.	
(U)SMC/IMO	Space Missile Center/Information Management Office.	
(U)SOCOMM	Special Operations Communications.	
(U)SOI	Signals of Interest.	
(U)SOW	Statements of work.	
(U)SPO	Systems Program Office	
(U)SSD/IMO	Space Systems Division/Information Management Office.	
(U)SSD/OD-1	Space Systems Division/Operating Division – 1	
(U)SSIC	Space Segment Integration Contractor.	
(U)SSPO	Space Systems Program Office.	
(U)STS	Space Transportation System.	
(U)SV	Satellite Vehicle.	
(U)SV SPO	Satellite Vehicle, Systems Program Office.	
(U)SVC	Satellite Vehicle Contractor.	
(U)TAXDIS-B	Tactical Data Information Exchange System Broadcast.	
(U)TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities.	(b)(1)
(U)TEP	Tactical ELINT Processor.	(b)(3)
(U)TK	TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)T-K	TALENT-KEYHOLE.	

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(U)TLD	Titan Launch Dispenser.	
(U)TMGS	Transportable Mobile Ground Station.	
(U)TOPS	Tactical On-Board Processing System.	
(U)Trailblazer	A test to verify the compatibility of the SV and its interface with the LV.	(b)(1)
(U)TS	TOP SECRET.	(b)(3)
(U)TS//BYE	(U) TOP SECRET/BYEMAN.	
(U)TS//SI	TOP SECRET/COMINT .	
(U)TS//TK	TOP SECRET//TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)TSF	Technical Support Facility.	
(U)TT&C	Telemetry, Tracking & Commanding.	
(U)TUDE	Teletype User Data Entry.	
(S//TK)URSALA (U-I, U-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	
(U)USA	U.S. Army.	
(U)USAF	U.S. Air Force.	
(U)USMC	U.S. Marine Corps.	
(U)USN	U.S. Navy.	
(U)VRK	Very Restricted Knowledge.	
		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
Table above is classified S//TK.		

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