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19 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC

SUBJECT: Space System Information Control

It will soon be a year since you signed Directive 5200.13, "Security Policy for Military Space Programs." I believe this is a good time to review the effectiveness of the directive in terms of its actual purpose and to see what, if any significant changes are in order.

As you know, the vast majority of people affected by the directive are not aware of its true purpose. They see the directive as an attempt to "go underground" on all military space systems. To these persons, who must necessarily measure effectiveness by a Provost Marshal's standards, the directive has been less than a complete success, and we find frequent expressions of alarm over what are considered to be leaks in the system. Investigations usually indicate these to be of a minor nature, and not particularly important over the long term.


From the standpoint of its true objective, 5200.13 has been gratifyingly successful. The press interest in our military space launchings has dwindled to a one- or two-paragraph stereetype. I have not seen a press story - even local - on a capsule recovery for months. Speculative "spy in the sky" stories are not nearly so popular as they were six to twelve months ago. Based on the evidence, it is my belief that the directive has proved its worth and should continue in force.

There is one area which requires some strengthening: we do need (1) a clearer definition of what may be exempted from the provisions of the directive and (2) who may grant the exemption. This is of particular concern because of the rapid fall-off in "white" space programs during the past year. Early in 1962, there were

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sixteen "white" military space programs; the activity generated by these programs was a tremendously beneficial cover to our covert surveillance work, and we were counting on a steadily growing military launching activity (especially from Vandenberg AFB) to form a protective blur for future "black" programs. Today, because of a variety of actions - cutbacks, transfers, cancellations, exemptions - the sixteen covering programs have dwindled to four. We have sound security control over two of these programs - 162 and 417 - which are within the Air Force, but the other two - Program 435 (formerly called TRANSIT) and Program 823 (formerly called VELA HOTEL) are being developed under the sponsorship of the Navy and AEPA, respectively, and are not as easy to control.

There is pressure from both sponsors to exempt these programs from 5200.13. I consider it vitally important to insure that the full provisions of the directive are applied to both of these programs: they represent 50% of the remaining protection for our satellite reconnaissance effort.

I solicit your assistance in emphasizing the requirement for full compliance to both agencies. The matter is of particular urgency in the case of the Navy, which I am told is planning a full public exploitation of its next 435 (TRANSIT) launching, now scheduled for late in March.

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Joseph V. Charyk Under Secretary of the Air Force

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