MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MCLUCAS

SUBJECT: SALT Verification

As we have discussed on several occasions, I am concerned that we have received very little guidance on the way our planning should be influenced by the specific verification requirements of SALT. We understand that for the most part current requirements and priority statements for collection are expected to remain valid. It seems reasonable that present considerations of tasking and scheduling photographic systems will not be greatly influenced. However, the formal acceptance of SALT I by the United States would seem to require a detailed review of the specific provisions of all of the associated documents in terms of verification requirements and the best application of our systems to them.

Of specific interest to me would be an appraisal of the importance of to the verification of the ABM treaty. An objective assessment could provide us guidance which would permit a better assignment of priorities to the various changes now under consideration or possible in the future. I have solicited assistance from associates in DIA and NSA without success. A recent letter from the ASD/I to NSA and DIA asked similar questions. I have been provided with the NSA reply but found it too general to be very useful. Therefore, we have attempted to evaluate the Treaty and the interpretations in terms of verification implications to

Of particular note is Unilateral Statement E, which seems to be based on U.S. concern about verification of SAM upgrade or surreptitious development of a new interceptor with ABM capability which could be deployed under cover of SAM.

The identification of an ABM masquerading as a SAM poses difficult problems. By definition the program would be concealed and TLM could be denied with no opportunity to protest since operational SAM tests often do not use TLM. Photographic identification would be very difficult unless one believes nuclear warhead facilities are uniquely identifiable. The provisions of Unilateral Statement E define three test conditions which the U.S. would interpret as SAM components "tested in ABM mode." These are:
1. **A SAM launcher is used to launch an ABM.**

   High resolution photography might detect an ABM missile on or near the SAM launcher.

2. **A SAM interceptor is tested in conjunction with an RV, an ABM missile, an ABM radar, or to an altitude inconsistent with aerodynamic vehicles.**

3. **A SAM radar is tested in conjunction with an RV, an ABM missile, or an ABM radar.**

   Coordinated and locations, obtained during the test, and compared with the data base from previous tests, would permit detection of tests of this nature. In particular, if the SAM radar is a new variant, as is likely, the precision location of that radar at Sary Shagan is required to permit correlation with photographic observations of the test area.

The inclusion of Unilateral Statement E must be based on U.S. concern that an ABM capable system could be deployed under cover of SAM and not be detected during or after deployment. The Treaty restricts testing to current ranges, and the unilateral statement serves to notify the Soviets that we intend to base verification on detection of a SAM "tested in the ABM mode." This must be considered a statement of national policy and implies a firm obligation to provide the necessary intelligence. That intelligence can only be provided with confidence by a system including precision location. A paper by Mr. David Briner of the Aerospace Corporation is attached which gives additional considerations to this and other provisions of the ABM Treaty.

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There are several questions which need further examination.

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. How do we evaluate relative priorities of ABM test monitoring and tactical warning when both tasks are needed?

Although we have had difficulties, I have great confidence in the rework program because I believe that the capability to detect surreptitious development of defensive missile systems is the prime justification for the program, and the need for that capability has not seemed time critical. To date, the Soviet activities in ABM development have not proved very hard to identify, and there has been little immediate concern about a surreptitious development. But that is now changed, and the national need for verification that such development is not occurring has been clearly enunciated by high authority. Soviet capability and philosophy is indicated by the increasing use of techniques to avoid satellite detection and the success of EMCON for the Square Pair radar.

Your comments are requested. It would be very useful to us if we were permitted to engage in meaningful dialogue with those specifically responsible for verification of the ABM Treaty.

LEW ALLEN, JR
Major General, USAF
Director

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