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IST NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

16 October 1972

NOTE FOR GENERAL ALLEN

SUBJECT: SALT and NRP Systems

Attached are a note from Bud Coyle and my comment back to him on the subject of SALT and NRP systems. I think you will find these interesting. They are for your information and comment if you feel so inclined.

I will keep you posted on any developments in the SALT area, including any Staff contacts that we generate along the lines of these two memos.

David D. Bradburn
Brigadier General, USAF
Director

Attachments
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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE	NRO	\ 	

October 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BRADBURN

SUBJECT: SALT and System Improvements

For the past two weeks I have been working with General Allison's people on one of the interagency reviews of a Verification Panel paper authored by the CIA. The paper is on potential qualitative missile limitations and the subject is being considered for the agenda for SALT II. Aside from the substance of the paper, there is an interesting aspect which bears on General Allen's concerns and your recent meetings on improvements vis-a-vis SALT.

(b)(1) (b)(3)

I have become aware of the unique way in which CIA has developed the concept and validity of the based upon deficiencies noted in the SALT and general intelligence collection environments. I believe that the Agency has done a very fine and fully coordinated job in assessing the needs and required hardware for the

One gets the distinct impression that the other collectors are not very useful in SALT verification and that there is little effort being made to make the other collectors more useful.

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It is clear to me that there are many potential gaps in SALT verification which	
General Allen has made a	(b)(1)
good start. I think, however, that the focus may be too	(b)(3)
high level. It should be now reoriented to the analysts	*
at CIA and DIA and perhaps NSA so that the needs and gaps	
can be identified such as they have been by CIA	
In your meeting on September 22 with Dr. Hall, et al,	
the statement was made that collection would be mainly	
oriented toward the threats to the U.S., whether covered	
by treaty or not. Monitoring test range activity is a	
principal problem. Some of the potential qualitative im-	
provement bans such as a MIRV ban are very difficult to	•
handle from the negotiating standpoint and are difficult	
to verify today. These bans may never get into a treaty,	
but they are important intelligence factors. Needed improve-	
ments in collection capability can be specified, I feel, with	
proper coordination.	
It is proposed then, that the Staff, either SS-6 or SS-7,	
take the lead in steering General Allen, Colonel Tiernan, and	
Colonel Simonton through the analyst maze in order to assess	(1.5745
these gaps and reorient out of the static	(b)(1)
"given" category into the dynamic category in which	(b)(3)
has been portrayed for some time.	
But look	

HAROLD S. COYLE, JR. Major, USAF

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

16 October 1972

NOTE FOR SS-5, Major Coyle

SUBJECT: SALT and System Improvements

Your paper on this subject is most interesting. My reactions are as follows:

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generally will be tabled in the November ExCom. I do agree, however, that the intelligence community is probably not conscious of the evolutionary changes in these to the same extent that they are aware of the

c. I think the NRO Staff has the major responsibility in keeping Gen Allen's organization informed about new mission requirements. This service is not needed for CIA program offices because they already have convenient access to that kind of information.

I agree with the intent of your proposal that the Staff should take the lead in "steering" Gen Allen into some liaisons with analysis people, but I prefer to approach the matter in a different way. Rather than promoting more extensive liaison between Gen Allen's organization and the analytic community generally, I would prefer for the NRO Staff to be represented

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and take a leading role in the proper forums and then tell General Allen's organization what is needed. The notion that all NRO systems are highly responsive to changing requirements will be more widely perceived by this means than any other I know.

Please give me a resume of SALT-related organizations and committees, and your recommendations for expanding the NRO Staff contacts to follow up on this theme.

David D. Bradburn

Brigadier General, USAF

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