

STAFF COORDINATION SHEET

	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE, GRADE, AND DATE		TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE, GRADE, AND DATE
1	PA			16	UST		(b)(3)
2				17	OPS		
3		COORD	COPY PROVIDED	18	SEC		
4				19	ADM		
5				20	BUD		
6				21	POL	COORD	29 Nov
7				22	COM		
8				23	CS		
9				24	IG		
10	PA/ DEP	COORD	COPY PROVIDED	25	GC		
11	PA/ DIR			26	LL		
12	PRO A	COORD	COPY PROVIDED	27	COS		
13	PRO B	COORD	COPY PROVIDED	28	DDMS	INFO	COPY PROVIDED
14	PRO C	INFO	COPY PROVIDED	29	SD	ADPR SIGN	NOV 29 1990
15	DSPO			30	SN	INFO	(b)(3)

SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE		SYMBOL	PHONE	TYPIST'S IN	SUSPENSE DATE
Major Jim Rodgers		POL			November 28, 1990
SUBJECT					DATE
Telemetry Parameter Definitions for START					November 28, 1990

SUMMARY
 Yesterday [redacted] of Program B advised us that they were working a (b)(3) informal query from ACIS through OSWR to CIA/OD&E concerning an alternat (b)(6) to the "current practices" position on telemetry in the START negotiations. Policy requested that Program B reply through the Staff. The question appears to be: "If the U.S. were to define parameters for telemetry broadcast by Soviet ballistic missiles under START, what parameters would the intelligence community want to see specified." The answer is required for a meeting at the NSC tomorrow.
 TODAY
 Program B/SPG provided their response (Atch 2) specifying four parameters: response to ACIS echoes those parameters, and emphasizes the (b)(1) proposed (b)(3) importance of precise definitions if we elect to enter into this negotiatic (b)(3) 50 USC + 3024(i)
 Context: Mr. MacEachin is still pursuing "current practices," or variations thereof, in the DDCI-DEPSECDEF meeting on 28 Nov. However, it

is not clear that MacEachin's approach will be adopted, and NSC wants the U.S. to be prepared, if necessary, to enter into detailed technical discussions with the Soviets when they come to town for the next Ministerial (experts arrive approx. 8 Dec, Ministerial in Houston probably 11 Dec). In essence, NSC wants all bases covered and options considered before the Soviets arrive.

We have discussed the proposed response informally with working level contacts in P&A, [redacted], Program B, and NSA. At this time, no response from NSA. We understand that at last week's senior's meeting Adm Studemann advocated negotiating upfront detailed technical parameters. We are aware of no separate NSA input on this issue, but believe they have fed into the ACIS paper informally (see next paragraph). (b)(3)

In addition to Program B's input, P&A provided two paragraphs expressing great concern about pursuing detailed negotiations [redacted]

[redacted] There is also a paragraph stressing the need to ensure that both parties agree to maintain (b)(1) practices that are sufficient to allow the other to monitor the agreement (b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i) factors [redacted] change the collection environment.

Given the speed of this particular train, we recommend signature and forwarding this input to ACIS as soon as feasible, consistent with technical review.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)
(b)(6)

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(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

November 29, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE STAFF


SUBJECT: Telemetry Signal Parameters

We understand the NSC Staff has asked: "If the U.S. were to define parameters for telemetry broadcast by Soviet ballistic missiles under START, what parameters would the IC want to see specified?" The NRO continues to recommend that to ensure that the overhead collectors can meet the verification requirements of any future START Treaty, the Soviets must, at a minimum, maintain current telemetry practices with regard to transmitted power and signal parameters. We also continue to recommend tape and telemetry characteristics information exchanges as an enhancement to the current practices approach.

Understanding that current Soviet telemetry practices allow collection of data that is adequate but not robust (over the duration of a test or from launch to launch), any new U.S. position should enhance our collection capabilities, as a means of furthering the telemetry transparency intended by START. We recommend the following parameters as providing analysts with their desired bit error rates (BERs) over a high percentage of all tests:

[Redacted content]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3) 50 USC + 3024(i)



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We would like to be very clear, however, that the NRO believes it would be potentially very damaging to enter into negotiations involving this level of detail.


[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC ± 3024(i)
(b)(3) 50 USC ± 3024(i)

We continue to believe that the best approach is to hold to treaty language that states explicitly that both parties agree to maintain practices that are "sufficient" to allow the other party to monitor the provisions of the agreement, that "sufficiency" is further defined as "current practices" with respect to transmitted power and modulation, and that a regular data exchange would substantially enhance both the verifiability of the treaty and the confidence of both parties in each others' compliance. Finally, the treaty should state explicitly that, in order to uphold the principle of "sufficiency," both parties agree to engage in technical exchanges, when made necessary by changing environmental or other conditions, to maintain practices that enable the other side to confidently verify the provisions of the treaty. We believe that this mutual, national commitment to the principle of "sufficiency" is central to verification success.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC ± 3024(i)


J. D. HILL

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