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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C.

TEICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 18, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE STAFF

SUBJECT: Soviet Request for Mandatory OSI Sites (RFG XV-006) (U)

I request your continued assistance in protecting from Soviet inspection sensitive National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) facilities located at two sites identified by the Soviets for inclusion in the mandatory on-site inspection (OSI) regime for the START agreement (RFG XV-006).
(b)(1)
Similarly, preparing a site diagram for would exclude sensitive facilities probably is not practicable.

The Soviets would insist on the maximum possible access to all such large facilities.

There are also broader equities at stake, since accepting unjustified, mandatory OSI at or near sensitive facilities could set precedents for future quallenge inspections which could put

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(b)(1) (b)(3)

Soviets
Should other Community principals differ on this issue, I would be glad to brief them prior to a DCI decision. My staff is available to provide briefings to appropriately cleared officials from the National Security Council Staff or non-IC agencies. To support potential end-game discussion, I am prepared to provide technical experts on these facilities to support directly any special negotiating teams that may be convened in either the U.S. or Geneva.
Please call me if you have any questions.

at risk sources and methods belonging to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). There appears to be a real possibility the

(b)(3)

martin Jaga

Martin C. Faga

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