STRATEGIC ARMS
REDUCTION TREATY (START)
ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

SEPTEMBER 5-6, 1991

IMPACTS ON THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEMS ONLY
Introduction.

On 5 and 6 September 1991 at the request of James L. Rodgers of the NRO Policy Staff, BIF-0611 of Arlington, Virginia conducted an in-depth review of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The objectives of this review were to determine which items in the treaty text could affect NRO operations and to determine appropriate actions that could be taken by the NRO to negate threats to its sensitive programs. Following is a list of participants:

BIF-179
BIF-0611
BIF-0611
BIF-0611
BIF-0611

Procedures.

Each of the articles and protocols and the memorandum of understanding was briefed to the working group by a designated individual who had read the text and prepared briefing slides based on his understanding of the issues involved. Depending upon the degree to which a section pertained to the NRO and its operations participants examined the text in depth. Open discussion of the issues allowed the development of a better understanding of treaty issues for all concerned. Through this process many of the questions raised during the briefing were solved before the conclusion of the review.

Areas of Concern.

The areas of concern raised during this review are shown in Appendix A. Two issues raised the most concern: NRO support of intelligence community taskings and preventing the compromise of NRO facilities and programs during the on-site inspection process associated with the treaty raised the most concern. In addition, concerns raised pertaining to tasking of assets and support of intelligence requirements should be brought
to the attention of COMIREX to ensure that NRO systems are used to their fullest extent, and that are tasked in coordination with on-site inspection activities.

The on-site inspection process may cause serious problems for NRO operations and facilities, especially at Vandenberg AFB. However, with good planning most of the adverse effects can be mitigated. Program performance and security should not be seriously affected by START inspections if NRO plans for them and is prepared to execute suitable protection measures. A more disturbing possibility is that programs could be compromised through special rights of access agreed to in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). As the protocol on the JCIC now stands, the parties may decide to use the procedures contained in the Inspection Protocol for special rights of access. This could be disastrous for NRO facilities, especially those facilities belonging to or operated by contractors where intrusive inspection will compromise sensitive compartmented information. NRO should ensure that the procedures for special rights of access are negotiable and that NRO representatives are involved as experts in any discussions involving special rights of access. NRO also needs to ensure that contractors are not involved in processes that will leave them vulnerable to such visits.

An important component in executing protective measures will be early notification of an inspection. Currently, the NRO is notified of a pending inspection first by voice by OSIA, and later by message. Dissemination within the NRO is not as formalized. There is no inspection notification system within NRO at this time. A redundant notification system would ensure that all affected parties are notified of a pending inspection in time to prepare adequately for it. Such a notification system will become far more important as the number of treaties that could affect NRO facilities grow.

Conclusions.

The panel generally concluded that the challenges associated with START are manageable with suitable prior planning. Appendix A lists those concerns that should be addressed in the near future. Only those items that were of concern during the review are raised in Appendix A.
APPENDIX A

- ARTICLE II: Provides time phased standards for the reduction of strategic arms covered by the terms of the treaty. At the end of 84 months from entry into force each side will be restricted to 1600 ICBMs, of which 154 may be heavy ICBMs, and 6000 warheads attributed to ICBMs, SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.

NRO CONCERNS:

- Probable effects of U.S. strategic force reduction on NRO architectures and programs. Can the NRO be made smaller in size and still support U.S. forces adequately, what are the likely impacts of DoD reductions in response to START on NRO force structure?

- ARTICLE III: Provides counting rules for deployed weapons systems and their warheads. Designates existing weapons systems covered by the treaty and states when limitations become effective for newly fielded systems.

NRO CONCERNS:

- Determine systems and methodologies that will allow the most effective monitoring of production sites in the Soviet Union, to include the most effective interaction of OSI and NRO assets for detection of Soviet cheating or diversion of strategic systems.

- Paragraph 9(b) states that if a ballistic missile is flight tested or deployed for weapons delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered weapons delivery systems. If the first
stage of Peacekeeper is used for Taurus does Peacekeeper's designation as a weapons delivery system transfer to the Taurus system?

- ARTICLE IV: Provides procedures pertaining to the storage and locational restrictions for nondeployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Sets limits on the number of static displays, and nondeployed accountable stages that may be maintained by the parties. Places limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs that may be stored at space launch facilities for launching operational payloads into space.

NRO CONCERNS:
- Paragraph 4.(c) limits the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMS to no more than the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers at that facility. What effect, if any, will the limitation placed on storage of launch vehicles have on the usability of Taurus as an NRO launch system?

- ARTICLE V: Provides for the modernization of strategic weapons systems, except as prohibited by treaty provisions.

NRO CONCERNS:
- Paragraph 15 states that the parties will not use SLBMs or ICBMs to deliver objects into space for purposes inconsistent with international obligations. What are the implications of existing agreements for NRO operations. Could an interpretation of these agreements result in restrictions on NRO operations?

- Paragraph 18.c. states that neither party will use missile or other launch systems for the introduction of weapons of mass destruction into earth orbit or fractional earth orbit. Could this be used as a means to obtain inspection of payloads for space launch?

- ARTICLE VI: Specifies guidelines and restrictions for the deployment and operation of mobile strategic missile systems.
NRO CONCERNS:

- NRO Policy Staff requires a set of two to three briefing charts that graphically depicts the restrictions and operational guidelines established in Article VI.

- ARTICLE VII: Provides guidance on the conversion and elimination of strategic offense arms and fixed structures for mobile ICBMs.

NRO CONCERNS:

- Conversion and elimination procedures will be verified through the use of NTM.

- ARTICLE VIII: Provides for notifications by the parties through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers maintained by each party.

NRO CONCERNS:

- Coordination procedures must be strengthened between NRO, COMIREX, and ACIS to ensure that opportunities for synoptic or sequential tasking of systems in support of cooperative measures are not missed.

- NRO needs to develop an internal notification system that will be provide notice of cooperative measures and inspections that may affect NRO activities.

- ARTICLE IX: Provides for the use of NTM to verify treaty compliance. Forbids the use of concealment, camouflage, and deception techniques to disrupt collection by NTM of the other party.

NRO CONCERNS:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(3)
• ARTICLEx AND THE TELEMETRY PROTOCOL: Provides for the exchange of telemetry data from ICBM and SLBM test flights by the parties. Proscribes the use of encryption, narrow directional beaming, and encapsulation of signals.

NRO CONCERNS:
• Both Article X and the Telemetry Protocol state that test flight telemetry must be made available for review by the other party and that it must be unencrypted. Do these same standards apply to space launch using an ICBM or SLBM accountable stage as a booster? Are space launch activities specifically exempted from the requirements concerning exchange and encryption?

• ARTICLEx XI AND THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL: Provides guidance on the procedures for inspection of facilities covered by the START treaty.

NRO CONCERNS:
• Paragraph II.7(a) states that inspectors, monitors, and aircrews will be diplomatically inviolable under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations dated 18 April 1961. Office areas, other than in the operations area, living quarters, papers and effects, and inspection aircraft also enjoy diplomatic protection. Substantive differences could exist in protection provided by diplomatic immunity for personnel conducting inspections or participating in the movement of personnel and equipment. Research and explain the extent of diplomatic immunity that START inspectors will have.

• NRO needs to examine the effect that sequential inspections specified in Paragraph III.7. will have warning time and preparation for inspections at NRO facilities.

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- Paragraph IV.4. provides that Soviet aircraft may fly, with permission of the United States, to the closest airport designated by the United States to the site of continuous monitoring. NRO or other agencies need to determine if by allowing such flights there is a possibility that sensitive facilities will be compromised. Issues of concern include the types of sensors that could be surreptitiously mounted and concealed by the Soviets on an aircraft and problems surrounding the routing of aircraft over sensitive areas.

- Officials need to be apprised of the procedures to be used in continuous monitoring and the possible threat that Soviet monitoring could pose at their facility.

- NRO needs to develop standards for contractors for START-related inspections. Standards should specify those types of activities that are likely to subject a facility to special right of access or intrusive on-site inspection.

- NRO should resolve whether declaring a portion of its facilities at Vandenberg as a space launch facility will provide significant benefits in terms of reducing exposure to inspection.

- ARTICLE XV AND THE JCIC PROTOCOL: Establishes the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, procedures for convening sessions of the commission, and procedures for special right of access inspections.

NRO CONCERNS:

- Paragraph III.1.(c) establishes the right of the parties to request a special right of access visit to resolve the concerns of a party requesting a special session of the JCIC. Paragraph III. 3. (b) states that this special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the Inspection Protocol. These types of inspections will be too intrusive to protect NRO facilities. NRO must insure that its facilities are protected by ensuring that standards for special rights of access are negotiable, rather than allowing the use of inspection protocol standards, which thereby become a mandatory feature of these activities.
• Examine whether use of Vandenberg AFB by SAC strategic bombers could result in requests for a special right of access visit which could impede NRO operations.

• PROTOCOL ON THROW-WEIGHT: Establishes an aggregate limitation on throw-weight and provides for demonstrations and verification procedures.

NRO needs to determine which systems will be used for verification. ACIS must determine at what point a throw-weight that exceeds the 3600 metric ton aggregate becomes militarily significant.

• OTHER CONCERNS:

• Determine the impact of the ABM Treaty on START. Article XI states that "The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

• Check Washington Summit Statement of 1 June 90 for items that may affect the interpretation of clauses in the START Treaty.

• Determine what treaty-limited items are; they are undefined as such in the treaty text. Are they the same as the items of inspection defined in Paragraph IV. 20 of the Inspection Protocol?