SECRET 211805Z NOV 91 CITE 0804

PRIORITY

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY

OPS/SECUR/FIN

FOR: GEN. LINDSAY

FOR J.

CABALLERO/

FOR RADM

BETTERTON/

J.D. HILL

SUBJ: PLANNING FOR START INSPECTIONS AT VAFB

1. THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START), SIGNED 31 JULY 1991 AND EXPECTED TO ENTER-INTO-FORCE (EIF) BY SUMMER 1992, WILL REQUIRE THAT "DATA UPDATE" INSPECTIONS BY SOVIET OFFICIALS BE PERMITTED AT VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE (VAFB) ON A PERIODIC BASIS. THIS MESSAGE TASKS IN COORDINATION WITH TO EVALUATE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SUCH INSPECTIONS TO NRP ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES AT VAFB, AND RECOMMEND MITIGATING ACTIONS, IF REQUIRED, FOR DNRO APPROVAL. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH EACH AFFECTED PROGRAM OFFICE AND PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION TO THE DNRO AND PROGRAM DIRECTORS NLT 15 JAN 92.

2. BASELINE DATA:

A. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR "DATA UPDATE" INSPECTIONS AND ANY OTHER RELATED START ACTIVITIES AT VAFB ARE DETAILED IN THE START AGREEMENT, WHICH HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE ARMS CONTROL POINTS OF CONTACT IN EACH OF YOUR OFFICES. JIM RODGERS OF THE POLICY STAFF CAN ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOUR STAFFS MIGHT HAVE REGARDING TREATY REQUIREMENTS.

B. SOVIET INSPECTORS WILL BE PERMITTED UP TO TWO ON-SITE "DATA UPDATE" INSPECTIONS PER YEAR AT VANDENBERG AFB, IAW THE TIMELINES AND PROCEDURES SPECIFIED IN THE START AGREEMENT. THESE INSPECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE ONLY WITHIN DEFINED AREAS THAT CURRENTLY DO NOT INCLUDE NRO FACILITIES.

C. THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS DO USE INSPECTIONS TO GAIN HUMINT AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION UNRELATED TO

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C. THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS DO USE INSPECTIONS TO GAIN HUMINT AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION UNRELATED TO
ARMS CONTROL, AND AS A VEHICLE TO IDENTIFY LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR LATER RECRUITMENT AS AGENTS. IN ADDITION, THERE HAS BEEN NO REDUCTION OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. THUS, WE MUST PRESUME THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO GAIN FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF NRP ACTIVITIES AT VAFB, AND WILL ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT PERSONNEL WORKING IN THE SPACE LAUNCH WORLD, IF GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY.

3. KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:
   A. WHETHER INSPECTION NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES NOW BEING ESTABLISHED THROUGH NRO OPERATIONS SUPPORT AND THROUGH "WHITE WORLD" CHANNELS TO VAFB ARE LIKELY TO BE ADEQUATE, OR NEED TO BE IMPROVED.
   B. SHOULD PROGRAMS DELAY OR INTERRUPT SCHEDULED PAYLOAD ARRIVALS AND/OR MOVEMENTS AT VAFB WHILE SOVIET INSPECTORS ARE INBOUND OR PRESENT?
   C. SHOULD PROGRAMS DELAY OR INTERRUPT PAYLOAD TESTING, INTEGRATION, ELECTRONIC TESTING, ETC., WHILE SOVIET INSPECTORS ARE INBOUND OR PRESENT?
   D. ARE ENHANCED OPSEC/COMSEC TRAINING OR OTHER CI MEASURES NEEDED FOR BYEMAN-CLEARED PERSONNEL AT VAFB? SHOULD THERE BE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF BYEMAN-CLEARED PERSONNEL AS INSPECTION ESCORTS?
   E. ARE CHANGES REQUIRED TO CURRENT TRAINING OR PROCEDURES FOR PAYLOAD MOVEMENTS AND HANDLING? ARE MODIFICATIONS TO PAYLOAD CONTAINERS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE CHANGED PROCEDURES?
   F. ARE ANY PROTECTIVE MEASURES REQUIRED TO HEDGE AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF LATER CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS?

4. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPACTS OF START INSPECTIONS AT VAFB MAY VARY SOMEWHAT BY PROGRAM, AND EACH PROGRAM OFFICE SHOULD IDENTIFY ITS OWN UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS. STILL, WE SHOULD BE CONSISTENT IN OUR GENERAL APPROACH AND PHILOSOPHY; THUS, AS THE NRP AGENT FOR LAUNCH SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN PROPOSING ANY COMMON MEASURES OR POLICIES THAT MAY BE NECESSARY.

5. FOR FY91 AND 92, ALL U.S. PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO ABSORB THE COSTS OF ANY ARMS CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES THAT ARE NECESSARY. SHOULD IMPLEMENTATION COSTS BE SIGNIFICANT, PROGRAMS SHOULD IDENTIFY THEM FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE NORMAL BUDGET PROCESS. THE EVALUATION SHOULD INCLUDE COSTS ESTIMATES OF IMPLEMENTING ANY PROPOSED MEASURES TO PROTECT OPERATIONS, FACILITIES OR PERSONNEL. WHERE SEPARABLE, INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM OFFICES SHOULD PAY FOR MEASURES TO PROTECT SPECIFIC PROGRAM ACTIVITIES. COSTS FOR COMMON MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED UNDER AS THE LAUNCH MANAGER. ESTIMATES SHOULD INCLUDE, IF WARRANTED, BOTH ONE-TIME AND RECURRING MANPOWER/DOLLAR COSTS TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE INSPECTION NOTIFICATIONS AND REACTIONS, PROCEDURAL CHANGES, PROGRAMMATIC DELAYS,
ETC., NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF SECURITY AND AVOID EXCESSIVE ATTENTION FROM SOVIET INSPECTORS. 6. POC FOR GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS REQUEST WILL BE JIM RODGERS, FOR BUDGET QUESTIONS FOR OPS SUPPORT QUESTIONS, DECL: OADR SEC RET BT #0804
Recommended Replacement Language to Specific Policy #1:

"White channel notifications run through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the State Department, to the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) at Dulles Airport, to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to the affected Services and bases, which notify our people.

Currently, NRO Operations Support is notified of a START inspection in two ways: AUTODIN messages from OSIA, and telecon from the Air Force Operations Support Center (This ensures no single point of failure). NRO Operations Support will then notify the PSO of an impending inspection at Vandenberg AFB via telecon, with a follow-up message. This redundant notification procedures would augment the white world notification network and give us added assurance that we will get notification as early as possible.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)