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	DLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ON		*
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PRIORITY		DDMS	+
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNEL OPS/SECUR/FIN	S UNLI	RF	
FOR: GEN. LINDSAY		FOR J.	
CABALLERO/		FOR RADM	(b)(1)
BETTERTON		FOR RADM	
	HILL		(b)(3)
SUBJ: PLANNING FOR START		· · · ·	
	DUCTION TREATY (START), S		
1991 AND EXPECTED TO ENTE REQUIRE THAT "DATA UPDATE			
			(b)(1)
PERMITTED AT VANDENBERG A BASIS. THIS MESSAGE TASK			(b)(3)
DADID. IIID MEDDAGE IADA	TO EVALUATE POTENTI		
SUCH INSPECTIONS TO NRP A			
RECOMMEND MITIGATING ACTION			
THESE RECOMMENDATIONS SHO			
AFFECTED PROGRAM OFFICE A			• *
AND PROGRAM DIRECTORS NLT			
2. BASELINE DATA:	10 0111 921		
	"DATA UPDATE" INSPECTIONS	AND ANY OTHER	
RELATED START ACTIVITIES			
AGREEMENT, WHICH HAS BEEN			
CONTACT IN EACH OF YOUR OF			(b)(3
	QUESTIONS YOUR STAFFS MIC		
REGARDING TREATY REQUIREM			
B. SOVIET INSPECTORS WILL		N-SITE "DATA	
UPDATE" INSPECTIONS PER YE			
AND PROCEDURES SPECIFIED		HESE	
INSPECTIONS WILL TAKE PLAC		AS THAT	
CURRENTLY DO NOT INCLUDE N	TRO FACILITIES.		
C. THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENC	CE THAT THE SOVIETS DO USE	INSPECTIONS	
TO GAIN HUMINT AND OTHER]	INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION U	NRELATED TO	
			. *
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*	SECRET	•	*
	E VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONL		* *
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ARMS CONTROL, AND AS A VEHICLE TO IDENTIFY LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR LATER RECRUITMENT AS AGENTS. IN ADDITION, THERE HAS BEEN NO REDUCTION OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. THUS, WE MUST PRESUME THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO GAIN FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF NRP ACTIVITIES AT VAFB, AND WILL ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT PERSONNEL WORKING IN THE SPACE LAUNCH WORLD, IF GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY. 3. KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO: WHETHER INSPECTION NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES NOW BEING Α. ESTABLISHED THROUGH NRO OPERATIONS SUPPORT AND THROUGH "WHITE WORLD" CHANNELS TO VAFB ARE LIKELY TO BE ADEQUATE, OR NEED TO BE IMPROVED. SHOULD PROGRAMS DELAY OR INTERRUPT SCHEDULED PAYLOAD ARRIVALS В. AND/OR MOVEMENTS AT VAFB WHILE SOVIET INSPECTORS ARE INBOUND OR PRESENT? SHOULD PROGRAMS DELAY OR INTERRUPT PAYLOAD TESTING, С. INTEGRATION, ELECTRONIC TESTING, ETC., WHILE SOVIET INSPECTORS ARE INBOUND OR PRESENT? ARE ENHANCED OPSEC/COMSEC TRAINING OR OTHER CI MEASURES D. NEEDED FOR BYEMAN-CLEARED PERSONNEL AT VAFB? SHOULD THERE BE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF BYEMAN-CLEARED PERSONNEL AS **INSPECTION ESCORTS?** ARE CHANGES REOUIRED TO CURRENT TRAINING OR PROCEDURES FOR Ε. PAYLOAD MOVEMENTS AND HANDLING? ARE MODIFICATIONS TO PAYLOAD CONTAINERS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE CHANGED PROCEDURES? ARE ANY PROTECTIVE MEASURES REQUIRED TO HEDGE AGAINST THE F. POSSIBILITY OF LATER CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS? I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPACTS OF START INSPECTIONS AT VAFB MAY 4. VARY SOMEWHAT BY PROGRAM, AND EACH PROGRAM OFFICE SHOULD IDENTIFY ITS OWN UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS. STILL, WE SHOULD BE CONSISTENT IN OUR GENERAL APPROACH AND PHILOSOPHY; THUS, AS THE NRP AGENT FOR SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN PROPOSING ANY COMMON LAUNCH MEASURES OR POLICIES THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. FOR FY91 AND 92, ALL U.S. PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO ABSORB THE COSTS OF ANY ARMS CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES THAT ARE NECESSARY. SHOULD IMPLEMENTATION COSTS BE SIGNIFICANT, PROGRAMS SHOULD IDENTIFY THEM FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE NORMAL BUDGET PROCESS. THE EVALUATION SHOULD INCLUDE COSTS ESTIMATES OF IMPLEMENTING ANY PROPOSED MEASURES TO PROTECT OPERATIONS, FACILITIES OR PERSONNEL. WHERE SEPARABLE, INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM OFFICES SHOULD PAY FOR MEASURES TO PROTECT SPECIFIC PROGRAM ACTIVITIES. COSTS FOR COMMON MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED AS THE LAUNCH MANAGER. ESTIMATES SHOULD INCLUDE, UNDER IF WARRANTED, BOTH ONE-TIME AND RECURRING MANPOWER/DOLLAR COSTS TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE INSPECTION NOTIFICATIONS AND REACTIONS, PROCEDURAL CHANGES, PROGRAMMATIC DELAYS,

(b)(3)

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* HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY	*
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ETC., NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF SECURITY AND AVOID EXCESSIVE ATTENTION FROM SOVIET INSPECTORS.	(b)(3)
6. POC FOR GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS REQUEST WILL BE JIM RODGERS, FOR BUDGET QUESTIONS FOR	· .
OPS SUPPORT QUESTIONS,	
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Recommended Replacement Language to Specific Policy #1:

"White channel notifications run through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the State Department, to the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) at Dulles Airport, to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to the affected Services and bases, which notify our people.

Currently, NRO Operations Support is notified of a START inspection in two ways: AUTODIN messages from OSIA, and telecon from the Air Force Operations Support Center (This ensures no single point of failure). NRO Operations Support will then notify the PSO of an impending inspection at Vandenberg AFB via telecon, with a follow-up message. This redundant notification procedures would augment the white world notification network and give us added assurance that we will get notification as early as possible.

> (b)(1) (b)(3)