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COORDINATION SHEET										
	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE, GRADE, AND DATE			TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE, GRADE, AND DATE		
1	PRO A	COORD			11	POL	COORD	4 May 92		
2	PRO B	COORD			12	BSC	COORD			
3	PRO C	COORD			13	SA	COORD			
4	PA	INFO	COPY PROVIDED		14	IG	INFO	COPY PROVIDED		
5	MS&O	INFO	COPY PROVIDED		15	GC	INFO	COPY PROVIDED		
6	DSPO	INFO	COPY PROVIDED		16	LL	INFO	COPY PROVIDED		
7	UST	COORD			17	COS	RE VW			
8	OPS	COORD			18	DDMS	COORD			
9	SEC	COORD			19	DDNRO	APPR			
10	BUD	COORD			20	DNRO				
SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER			SYMBOL		PHONE #		TYP IN		SUSPENSE DATE.	
Major Rodgers			POL				ilr			
SUBJECT								DATE		
Planning for START Inspections at VAFB								April 29, 1992		

SUMMARY:

PROBLEM: Per DNRO tasking, Program A has studied the issue of future START inspections at Vandenberg AFB, CA. Gen. Lindsay's response [] 7494, at Tab 1) summarizes results of that study and subsequent recommendations. At Tab 2 is a complete copy of the study, including rationale and recommendations. Recommend Mr. Hill approve the policies/planned actions identified by Program A.

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BACKGROUND:

o The START agreement will permit several types of inspections at VAFB soon after ratification and entry-into-force (EIF). [There will be no START inspections initially at Cape Canaveral AFS, since that facility does not now have any START-accountable facilities/activities. If the Navy resumes SLBM testing out of CCAFS, portions of the Cape would become inspectable at that time.]

o [] tasking in Nov 91 [] 0804, at Tab 3) assumed rapid START ratification and implementation, thus requested rapid response from Program A.

-- Due to cataclysmic events in, and eventual dissolution of, the former Soviet Union (FSU) in December 1991, START ratification and implementation have been delayed, perhaps into 1993.

-- Given these changes and subsequent lessened urgency, NRO Staff/Policy worked with Program A staff to extend deadlines for completing the study.

o Given current political situation in both the FSU and the U.S., we need to proceed with our implementation planning for START at VAFB.

-- If the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) can agree on the modalities of START implementation, ratification and EIF could occur rapidly.

-- Senior U.S. officials are now engaged in active negotiations to bring that scenario about.

DISCUSSION: The Program A study was led by SP-3, with participation by and other SPO's, including Programs B and C, and Vandenberg personnel.

o The fundamental approach was to recognize the potential intelligence threat at VAFB due to START-related activities, while not overreacting to the periodic and temporary presence of inspectors. In particular, it was deemed that the best way to avoid any NRO activities being called into question by inspection teams was to keep as low a profile as possible. This led to recommendations to "eliminate the overt exposure" of NRO hardware and/or activities during inspections. To do that, Program A identified several policies, summarized here: (b)(1)
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-- A general policy that the NRO will take steps to comply with the treaty's intent, but will insure that appropriate legal, permitted measures are taken to protect BYEMAN hardware, facilities, activities, indicators and intentions.

-- NRO procedures to provide direct notification for each START visit to affected offices will be developed and maintained. [NOTE: Our experience in INF at CCAFS is that "white world" notifications are often many hours late. Thus, the OSF has already established BYEMAN alert procedures through both telephonic and channels.]

-- Stop all observable or detectable BYEMAN activities on North VAFB during the 24 hours the inspection is in progress (not to include activities on South VAFB, or activities inside BYEMAN facilities).

--- If hazardous operations are ongoing, they will continue to completion.

-- BYEMAN-briefed personnel would not be used to escort the inspection team.

-- BYEMAN activities at the VAFB airfield will be delayed until inspection teams depart, if possible. If BYEMAN payloads are being unloaded, or is inbound, when an inspection notification is received, the payload will be relocated to a non-inspectable facility. If not possible or desirable to download the payload, the aircraft will be closed-up and protected.

-- The VAFB Program Security Office (PSO) will establish an open working relationship with the VAFB Treaty Compliance Office, to facilitate necessary interactions and alerting.

-- To avoid challenge inspection problems, BYEMAN payloads would be prohibited from being co-resident with START-accountable missile stages (e.g., PEACEKEEPER Stage 1 used for the TAURUS launch vehicle) until integration at the launch pad. Once at the pad, START would require that the TAURUS launch pad be declared under the treaty, but would not be inspectable.

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-- BYEMAN-briefed personnel at VAFB will be trained on inspection procedures, and how to react to any issues that arise.

-- Each affected program doing work at VAFB will prepare an individualized START contingency plan, and incorporate into plans/contracts, as appropriate. Programs are developing such plans now; due date is 6 May 92.

o Program A's recommended policies are consistent with U.S. obligations under the START treaty, and clear-cut enough to permit program offices and personnel to implement quickly and easily, without burdensome costs. However, there will be flexibility in implementing the policies to allow for good judgment to be exercised in unusual cases.

o Implementation of the policies will take place through the VAFB PSO, and the compliance plans of the individual program offices operating out of VAFB.

-- We understand that none of the program offices have raised concerns about any of the policies, and that all are well along in preparing their compliance plans.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Hill approve the policies on START Treaty implementation for NRO facilities/activities at Vandenberg AFB, as recommended by Maj. Gen. Lindsay.

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DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

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PRIORITY [REDACTED] INFO PRIORITY [REDACTED]
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SECUR
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PLANNING FOR START INSPECTIONS AT VAFB
RETURN-PATH: (LESS [REDACTED] (GREATER)
RECEIVED: FROM [REDACTED] WED, 15 APR 1992 14:30:15 GMT
DATE: WED, 15 APR 92 07:37:49 -0700
FROM: [REDACTED]
MESSAGE-ID: (LESS)9204151437.AA09121(AT) [REDACTED] (GREATER)
RECEIVED: BY [REDACTED] (5.61/3.14)
RECEIVED: ID AA09121; WED, 15 APR 92 07:37:49 -0700
TO: [REDACTED]
C: [REDACTED]

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SUBJID: SECUR
HEADING: HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY
FOR: [REDACTED] J. HILL
INFO: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] N. LINDSAY
SUBJ: RESPONSE TO PLANNING FOR START INSPECTIONS AT VAFB
1. PER MESSAGE 211805Z NOV 91 CITE [REDACTED] 0804, [REDACTED] WAS
TASKED TO EVALUATE THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF START "DATA UPDATE"
INSPECTIONS BY RUSSIAN OFFICIALS TO NRP ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES
AT VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE (VAFB) AND TO RECOMMEND MITIGATING
ACTIONS, IF REQUIRED, FOR DNRO APPROVAL. SPECIFICALLY, AS THE
NRO AGENT FOR LAUNCH, WE WERE ASKED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROPOSING

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ANY COMMON MEASURES OR POLICIES IF APPROPRIATE AND NEEDED. THE TASKING RAISED KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED, INCLUDING NOTIFICATION, PROCEDURES, PAYLOAD ARRIVALS/MOVEMENT, TESTING, INTEGRATION AND TRAINING REQUIRED. RECOMMENDATIONS WERE TO BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH EACH AFFECTED PROGRAM OFFICE.

2. ELEVEN POLICIES WERE PROMULGATED. POLICIES RANGE FROM A GENERAL POLICY THAT THE NRO WILL COMPLY WITH THE TREATY'S INTENT TO SPECIFIC ACTIONS ONCE THE INTENT TO INSPECT VAFB IS KNOWN.

3. THE RECOMMENDED POLICIES ARE PREMISED ON THE NRO GETTING AS QUICK A NOTIFICATION AS POSSIBLE BY ADDING A BYEMAN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM, TAKING AWAY THE TEMPTATION TO ASK TO LOOK AT CARGO BY KEEPING CARGO OUT OF SIGHT ON NORTH VAFB INVOLVED TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN START CONTINGENCY PROGRAM. THE POLICIES INCLUDE A RECOMMENDATION TO AUGMENT THE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS. THE MECHANISM IS ALREADY IN PLACE. THIS WILL ENSURE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE AND VALIDATED ALERT OF AN INSPECTION.

4. A RECOMMENDATION IS MADE TO STOP ALL OBSERVABLE OR DETECTABLE ACTIVITIES ON NORTH VAFB DURING THE 24 HOURS THE INSPECTION IS IN PROGRESS. SINCE SOUTH VAFB ACTIVITIES ARE NOT OBSERVABLE FROM NORTH VAFB, PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES SHOULD CONTINUE THERE. FOR THE VERY FIRST BASELINE INSPECTION, THE INSPECTION PERIOD COULD BE LONGER THAN 24 HOURS. OBSERVABLE OR DETECTABLE ACTIVITIES ON NORTH VAFB INCLUDE RF TESTING/EMANATING, PAYLOAD AND AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS, AND ANY ACTIVITY THAT WOULD PROVIDE INDICATORS OR COMPROMISE BYEMAN FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES OR INTENTIONS. THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE ACTIVITIES THAT CAN CONTINUE UNOBSERVED WITHIN BYEMAN FACILITIES.

5. WE HAVE AT LEAST 23 HOURS TO BEGIN ACTIONS THAT WOULD SAFELY RELOCATE OUR HARDWARE TO A NON-INSPECTABLE AREA IF WE HAVE SOMETHING OUT IN THE OPEN WHERE THE INSPECTORS COULD SEE IT. THE EXCEPTION IS IF AN AIRCRAFT IS ON THE AIRFIELD AND CANNOT BE DOWN LOADED, THE RECOMMENDATION IS TO CLOSE IT UP AND APPROPRIATELY PROTECT IT, ENVIRONMENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY, UNTIL THE INSPECTION TEAM DEPARTS.

6. INBOUND AIRCRAFT WOULD RETURN TO THE POINT OF ORIGIN IF THEY CANNOT REMOVE AND STORE THE HARDWARE PRIOR TO INSPECTION TEAM ARRIVAL. SOME PROGRAMS MAY ELECT TO CONTINUE INTO VAFB AND IMPLEMENT THE POLICY IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.

7. HAZARDOUS PAYLOAD/BOOSTER OPERATIONS WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL COMPLETION.

8. A RECOMMENDATION IS MADE THAT EACH PROGRAM TO BE LAUNCHED FROM VAFB WILL DEVELOP A START CONTINGENCY PLAN THAT ADDRESSES PAYLOAD TIMELINES AND OPERATIONS DURING AN ON-SITE INSPECTION TO GIVE EVERYONE THE NECESSARY BACKGROUND GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES TO FUNCTION DURING THE INSPECTION. PROGRAMS ARE DEVELOPING THEIR

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SPECIFIC START CONTINGENCY PLANS AT PRESENT. THESE CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE DUE ON 6 MAY 92.

9. A POLICY RECOMMENDATION IS MADE TO ENSURE ESCORTS ARE TRAINED AND SENSITIZED TO RESPOND TO ACTIVITIES THAT COULD IMPACT CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES. A SEPARATE POLICY RECOMMENDS TRAINING FOR ALL WHO SUPPORT BYEMAN LAUNCH ACTIVITIES TO BE TRAINED TO PROTECT THOSE ACTIVITIES DURING AN INSPECTION.

10. WHEN TAURUS USES A PEACEKEEPER STAGE 1 AS THE TAURUS STAGE 0 FOR SPACE LAUNCH, TAURUS SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES MUST BE DECLARED BUT ARE NOT INSPECTABLE. HOWEVER, BYEMAN PAYLOADS INTENDED FOR LAUNCH ON TAURUS SHOULD NEVER BE CO-RESIDENT WITH THE PEACEKEEPER 1ST STAGE UNTIL INTEGRATION AT THE PAD DUE TO POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION. THIS POLICY RECOMMENDATION WOULD PROHIBIT THE CO-RESIDENCY OF BYEMAN PAYLOADS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE BOOSTERS UNTIL THEY REACH THE LAUNCH PAD WHERE THEY WILL BE MATED.

11. APPROVAL OF THESE POLICIES ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE CIS PRESENCE REPRESENTS A POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING THREAT WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, NOT OVERREACTING ABOUT A PERIODIC AND TEMPORARY SOVIET PRESENCE AT VAFB. THIS TEMPERED REACTION DICTATES THAT WE ELIMINATE THE OVERT EXPOSURE OF ANY NRO HARDWARE ON NORTH BASE DURING THE ENTIRE VISIT OF THE CIS INSPECTION TEAM. IN ADDITION, WE NEED TO ELIMINATE ANY OPEN AND UNNECESSARY EXPOSURE OF NRO HARDWARE LOCATED ON SOUTH BASE, ESPECIALLY DURING THE AIRBORNE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF THE INSPECTION TEAM, AND WE WILL STRIVE TO LIMIT THE CIRCULATION OF HIGH VISIBILITY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONALITIES DURING THE INSPECTION PERIOD.

12. THE COMPLETED STUDY AND ACCOMPANYING SUPPORT MATERIAL WILL FOLLOW UNDER SEPARATE COVER THROUGH THE NRO STAFF.

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Working Paper

BULLET BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
START TREATY RAMIFICATIONS FOR VANDENBERG

This package is a response to a tasking from Mr. Hill. We were asked to evaluate potential impacts of Soviet inspections to NRP activities and facilities at VAFB, and recommend mitigating actions, if required for DNRO approval. Specifically, as the NRP agent for launch, we were asked to take the lead in proposing any common measures or policies if appropriate and needed. The tasking raised key issues to be addressed, including, notification, procedures, payload arrivals/movement, testing, integration, and training required.

- SP-3 Policy, the launch integration PSO, Vandenberg AFB PSO and staff reviewed issues and options. White world START preparations for VAFB also were reviewed.

Eleven policies are submitted for your approval. They range from a general policy that the NRO will comply with the treaty's intent to specific actions once the intent to inspect VAFB is known. These recommended policies are listed at Tab 1. Tab 2 includes all the supporting information for the recommended policies.

While inspections will take place only within defined areas that currently do not include NRO facilities, evidence indicates the former Soviet inspectors use inspections to gain HUMINT and other intelligence information unrelated to arms control.

- Inspectors are under OSIA and VAFB escort at all times while on site.

--No OSIA or VAFB escort is BYEMAN briefed.

Russian inspectors have no explicit right to inspect any NRO payload containers, aircraft cargo, or any NRO facility at VAFB, as part of the quota of items declared inspectable under START.

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- That protection is only useful and effective as long as OSIA and VAFB escorts do not permit the inspectors latitude to go beyond their rights in the treaty.
- Russian inspectors can ask to look inside NRO cargo they can see, but have no inherent right to be allowed to look.

The recommended policies submitted for your approval are premised on the NRO getting as quick a notification as possible and adding a BYEMAN notification system, taking away the temptation to ask to look at cargo by keeping it out of sight on north VAFB, and getting the programs to be launched from VAFB involved to develop their own START contingency plan.

- The policies include a recommendation to augment the notification system via BYEMAN channels. The mechanism is already in place. This will ensure the earliest possible and validated alert of an inspection.
- A recommendation is made to stop all observable or detectable activities on north VAFB during the 24 hours the inspection is in progress. Since south VAFB activities are not observable from north VAFB, physical activities should continue there. For the very first baseline inspection, the inspection period could be longer than 24 hours. Observable or detectable activities on north VAFB include RF testing/emanating, payload and aircraft movements, and any activity that would provide indicators or compromise BYEMAN facilities, activities, or intentions. This does not preclude activities that can continue unobserved within BYEMAN facilities.
- We have at least 23 hours to begin actions that would safely relocate our hardware to a non-inspectable area if we have something out in the open where the inspectors could see it. The exception is if an aircraft is on the airfield and cannot be downloaded, the recommendation is to close it up and appropriately protect it, environmentally and physically, until the inspection team departs.
- Inbound aircraft would return to the point of origin if they cannot remove and store the hardware prior to inspection team arrival. Some programs may elect to continue into VAFB and implement the policy in the preceding paragraph.
- Hazardous payload/booster operations would continue until completion.
- A recommendation is made that each program to be launched from VAFB will develop

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a START contingency plan that addresses payload timelines and operations during an on-site inspection to give everyone the necessary background, timelines, and procedures to function during the inspection.

- A policy recommendation is made to ensure escorts are trained and sensitized to respond to activities that could impact classified or sensitive activities. A separate policy recommends training for all who support BYEMAN launch activities to be trained to protect those activities during an inspection.
- When Taurus uses a Peacekeeper Stage 1 as the Taurus Stage 0 for space launch, Taurus space launch facilities must be declared but are not inspectable. However, BYEMAN payloads intended for launch on Taurus should never be co-resident with the Peacekeeper 1st stage until integration at the pad due to potential for challenge inspection. This policy recommendation would prohibit the co-residency of BYEMAN payloads and ballistic missile boosters until they reach the launch pad where they will be mated.

Recommendations

Approval of these policies acknowledges that the CIS presence represents a potential intelligence gathering threat while, at the same time, not overreacting about a periodic and temporary Soviet presence at VAFB. This tempered reaction dictates that we eliminate the overt exposure of any NRO hardware on North Base during the entire visit of the CIS inspection team. In addition, we need to eliminate any open and unnecessary exposure of NRO hardware located on South Base, especially, during the airborne arrival and departure of the inspection team. The recommended policies will fulfill those requirements.

Recommend that you approve the proposed START policies. Proposed policies will then be coordinated with Programs B and C. After their concurrence/coordination, the package will be sent through the NRO staff to the DDNRO for approval.

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START TREATY RAMIFICATIONS FOR VANDENBERG

Task

This package is a response to a tasking from Mr. Hill. Program A was to take the lead in defining the impact of regular, declared facility inspections at Vandenberg AFB, and proposed mitigating actions/activities, if appropriate and needed. The tasking raised key issues that included notification procedures, payload arrivals/movement, testing, integration, and training required.

Response

SP-3 Policy, the launch integration PSO, Vandenberg AFB PSO and staff met at Vandenberg in mid December. Issues were reviewed and options evaluated. Material was gathered from the Vandenberg AFB START office. The recommended response to the tasking is a series of policies by Program A.

Recommended START Policies For Vandenberg

Policy 1: NRO notification procedures should be developed to provide direct notification for each START visit to the Vandenberg PSO through BYEMAN channels. A procedure to ensure a [redacted] message notifies the Program A Director of Security of and the VAFB PSO of an impending START inspection also should be developed.

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Policy 2: The NRO will comply with the intent of the treaty but will insure all legal measures are taken to protect BYEMAN hardware, facilities, activities, indicators and intentions by minimizing impact of potential CIS on-site inspectors.

Policy 3: If a BYEMAN payload is in the operations/integration flow, all observable or detectable activities at north Vandenberg will stop for the duration of the inspectors stay on Vandenberg AFB. [redacted]

Policy 4: BYEMAN briefed personnel will not be used to escort the on-site inspection team during their stay at Vandenberg AFB.

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Policy 5: BYEMAN [] operations will be the same as for any BYEMAN payload. All observable activities will stop at north VAFB during the on-site inspection period.

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Policy 6: The VAFB airfield will be used by the OSIA team for arrival and departure. Previously planned BYEMAN airfield activities which inadvertently coincide with the START inspection time period will be delayed until the OSIA team departs. If an aircraft containing BYEMAN hardware is on the airfield being unloaded, or is inbound, when an inspection notification is received, every effort will be made to safely relocate the BYEMAN hardware to a non-inspectable facility. The aircraft will be released for immediate departure. If an aircraft is on the airfield and cannot be down-loaded, it will be closed-up and appropriately protected until the OSIA team departs.

Policy 7: The VAFB PSO must establish an open working relationship with the VAFB START OPR. This relationship is needed to ensure the PSO maintains a day-to-day awareness of local alterations in START planning, as well as, to influence the training curriculum for OSIA escorts. The PSO needs to encourage that OSIA escort training conducted under the auspices of the START Office be expanded to include pre-established guidelines for response to OSIA team inquiries which could impact classified or sensitive activities.

Policy 8: If hazardous payload/booster operations are on-going at north VAFB when the inspection notification is received, they will continue until completion.

Policy 9: Each program to be launched from VAFB will develop a START contingency plan that addresses payload timelines and operations during an on-site inspection.

Policy 10: All government and contractor personnel who support BYEMAN launch activities at VAFB will be trained and sensitized to combat the potential threat resulting from an on-site CIS presence associated with START inspections at VAFB.

Policy 11: It is paramount that BYEMAN payloads intended for launch on Taurus never be co-resident with the Peacekeeper 1st stage until integration at the launch pad.

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START TREATY RAMIFICATIONS FOR VANDENBERG

Background

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the United States and the old Soviet Union, now the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) requires the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive nuclear arms to help reduce the risk of nuclear war and, thereby, strengthen international peace and security. Treaty enforcement and monitoring is achieved by giving each party the right to conduct inspections to verify the other party's compliance. The types of inspections permitted are baseline data, data update, new facility, suspect-site, re-entry vehicle, post-dispersal, conversion or elimination, close-out and formerly-declared facility inspections. Since VAFB is a test range and a missile test location with no deployed or stored ICBMs, it will be subject to baseline data, data update, and close-out inspections. In addition, and like any other inspectable site, VAFB is a potential candidate for suspect site inspections.

The baseline inspection will be the most intrusive. It is the first one to confirm accuracy of data exchanged. It only occurs once but the CIS is expected to be at Vandenberg 24-32 hours, but that time can be extended for the inspection to be completed. Data update inspections follow and could occur as often as twice a year. These inspections confirm compliance with changes in reported data and are limited to 24 hours with a maximum time extension of 8 hours. Since the CIS is only allowed 15 total data update inspections, it is unlikely that Vandenberg would be targeted twice a year with 31 other locations subject to inspection. Russian inspectors could be performing inspections at VAFB within 45 days after the treaty enters into force.

Once the US is notified of the CIS intent to inspect, inspectors must arrive at the point of entry not earlier than 16 hours after notification. Inspectors are then given rest for 4-24 hours. The Soviets took the maximum amount of time for rest in the past for INF. Travel to the site must be completed within 9 hours. The minimum amount of time from notification to arrival at the site and the earliest the inspectors could be at Vandenberg is about 23 hours after notification of intent to inspect somewhere in the western US (16 + 4 + 3.). Minimum time after notification that Vandenberg is the inspected site is 3 hours.

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The START Treaty mandates a significant reduction in the strategic arsenal in the four republics in which offensive nuclear forces are based--Russia (71% of the strategic weapons), Ukraine 16% of the strategic weapons), Kazakhstan (12% of the strategic weapons), and Byelarus (1% of the strategic weapons). None of the four republics has ratified the agreement, although each has affirmed its intention to do so separately. Russian President Yeltsin has indicated ratification by the four states will be coordinated to occur on the same date. The four republics belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which has agreed upon a joint strategic military command and unified control of nuclear forces with the Russian president as principal authority.

Until the transition of authority from the former USSR to Russia through CIS auspices is complete, the US can expect complications in START implementation. A December 1991 launch of a modified SS-19 ICBM with encrypted telemetry that apparently contravenes a unilateral Soviet pledge not to use encryption after November may be an example of such complications.

To meet the START limit of 6,000 accountable warheads by the end of the seven-year time period, the 4 republics will have to destroy over 800 ICBM silos and deactivate over 30 submarines.

More than one -third of the old Soviet Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) inspectors have been identified as members of the Soviet Intelligence Services. INF inspectors have spent much of their time gathering information via note taking, sketching, and elicitation during INF inspections. They demonstrated a sophisticated interest in our weapon systems, hardware, and associated equipment. They tried to develop personal relationships with U.S. escorts. It is expected that inspection teams in START will be comprised of about the same proportion and quality of intelligence officers as the INF teams.

CIS inspectors are maintained under escort throughout the conduct of their START inspections by members of the US On Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). While on VAFB, the OSIA Team is further augmented and supported by VAFB escorts, none of which are BYEMAN briefed. The CIS has no explicit right to inspect any NRO payload containers, aircraft cargo, or any NRO facility at VAFB, as part of the quota of items declared inspectable under START. However, that protection is useful and effective only as long as the OSIA and VAFB escorts do not permit the Russians latitude to go beyond their rights in the treaty. In essence, if the Russian inspectors see something, they can ask to look, but they have no inherent right to be allowed to look.

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START Impact on VAFB

Due to its involvement in ballistic missile testing, VAFB is the only US test range declared in START. This declaration results from the fact that test ranges are limited in the number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and the number of associated launchers which can be present. The treaty impact on VAFB is primarily related to ballistic missile testing; however, there is a secondary impact on space launch activities. START limits the allowed number of space launch facilities (SLFs) at test ranges to five. It requires the designation of facilities from which ICBM/SLBM boosters may be used for space launch. It also limits the number of ICBM/SLBMs present at an SLF to zero. Further, the treaty prohibits flight testing of reentry vehicles from SLFs.

START Impact on VAFB BYEMAN Activities

BYEMAN activities are impacted only when there is a BYEMAN payload in the operations flow while an inspection is in progress. The major impact would occur when a BYEMAN payload is either located at, in-bound or being moved on North VAFB. During the period of CIS presence, it would be necessary to ensure the payload is housed within a BYEMAN certified facility and not moved until their departure. Since none of the BYEMAN facilities at either North and south VAFB are identified among the START declared facilities, they currently represent a safe haven from the CIS inspectors. However, it is expected that the Soviets will increase their collateral HUMINT activity to coincide with their presence at VAFB.

Current START Planning

The Vandenberg START team has been extremely productive in developing the necessary planning and implementation tools for on-site inspections. The VAFB START compliance plan is very thorough and supports a well developed set of procedures that ensures a standardized method of processing inspection teams. The checklists are developed for each position on the team and are very thorough.. Escort guides have been developed to enable training of escorts as well as provide guidance for on-site inspection activities. The VAFB START Team has established credible local notification procedures which rely on the receipt of notification via Air Force Command Post Channels. However, there is a need to augment that notification process via BYEMAN channels. This direct BYEMAN notification approach is needed to ensure that VAFB BYEMAN elements are given the earliest possible and validated alert of a

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planned CIS inspection visit.

The AFSPACECOM START focal point has the responsibility to track all START declared facilities, hardware, etc. This is being done through an automated tool called STARS...START Tracking and Reporting System. It accounts for treaty limited items, i.e. 1st stages but does not keep track of where they are on VAFB. The detailed location accountability is accomplished at the respective organizational level having responsibility for the inspectable items.

In the case of BYEMAN facilities and hardware located on VAFB, the 6595 ATG is the responsible organization for the oversight control and tracking of those resources. However, policy guidance on the conduct of BYEMAN operations involving those BYEMAN resources during a CIS presence on VAFB is lacking, and needed. It is imperative that such policy guidance exist to ensure that BYEMAN payloads, facilities, operations and intentions are not compromised.

In developing such policy, it is mandatory that a consistent approach exist for Program A, B, and C. Since Program A is the launch agent for Programs B and C, it is incumbent on Program A to develop the needed policy and in the process, obtain coordination/approval from Programs B and C.

Recommended Program A START Policies

Policy 1: NRO notification procedures should be developed to provide direct notification for each START visit to the Vandenberg PSO through BYEMAN channels. A procedure to ensure a [] message notifies the Program A Director of Security of and the VAFB PSO of an impending START inspection also should be developed.

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White channel notifications run through the state department to the NMIC to the Air Force Operations Center to the affected bases to our people. Currently, the Air Force Operations Center notifies the NRO Operations Support staff of a START inspection. The message is transmitted via AUTODIN. At the same time, the SAFSS Support Element is notified. We already have the mechanisms and people in place to get the PSO notified through the NRO Operations Support staff. They do it for us at the Cape. This back-up, or redundant procedure would give us the added assurance that we will get the notification as early as possible.

Policy 2: The NRO will comply with the intent of the treaty but will insure all legal

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measures are taken to protect BYEMAN hardware, facilities, activities, indicators and intentions by minimizing impact of potential CIS on-site inspectors.

We recognize that the NRO must comply with the treaty but measures must be taken to protect the NRO activities at Vandenberg. Those protection measures need to be within the legal framework of the treaty language. We believe it would cause severe problems if the US were detected doing illegal activities to hide classified space launch activities. It is more prudent to stay within the legal framework and minimize the impact by using common sense solutions.

Policy 3: If a BYEMAN payload is in the operations/integration flow, all observable or detectable activities at north Vandenberg will stop for the duration of the inspectors stay on Vandenberg AFB. Observable or detectable activities include RF testing/emanating, payload and aircraft movements, and any activity that would provide indicators or compromise BYEMAN facilities, activities, or intentions.

The risk of compromise is greatest during payload operations and integration. Add a CIS on-site inspection to that risk, and the risk is significantly greater. Limiting the activity that can be observed by the inspection team would cease observable or detectable activities. This does not preclude activities that can continue unobserved within BYEMAN facilities or at south VAFB where no START facilities/inspectors will exist.

Policy 4: BYEMAN briefed personnel will not be used to escort the on-site inspection team during their stay at Vandenberg AFB.

Exposing potentially naive BYEMAN briefed escorts to highly trained CIS START team members isn't an acceptable risk. HUMINT collection techniques will be used by the CIS team to discern as much as they can about space launch operations in general and BYEMAN launches in particular. Untrained BYEMAN briefed escorts could inadvertently provide information the CIS is seeking.

Policy 5: BYEMAN [] operations will be the same as for any BYEMAN payload. All observable activities will stop at north VAFB during the on-site inspection period.

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Since [] operations are nearly identical to actual payload operations, it makes sense to cease any observable [] operations at north VAFB while the

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inspection is in progress.

Policy 6: The VAFB airfield will be used by the OSIA team for arrival and departure. Previously planned BYEMAN airfield activities which inadvertently coincide with the START inspection time period will be delayed until the OSIA team departs. If an aircraft containing BYEMAN hardware is on the airfield being unloaded, or is inbound, when an inspection notification is received, every effort will be made to safely relocate the BYEMAN hardware to a non-inspectable facility. The aircraft will be released for immediate departure. If an aircraft is on the airfield and cannot be down-loaded, it will be closed-up and appropriately protected until the OSIA team departs.

Aircraft transporting BYEMAN hardware to VAFB are in jeopardy if they are on the ground when the inspection team arrives at the VAFB airfield. This policy would give the program the option of returning an inbound aircraft to the point of origin if they cannot remove and store the hardware prior to the inspection team arrival. For aircraft that are already on the ground, every effort should be made to remove and store the hardware in a BYEMAN facility. If they cannot remove it or return it to its point of origin, then it must be physically and environmentally protected on the skid strip until the inspection team departs.

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Policy 7: The VAFB PSO must establish an open working relationship with the VAFB START OPR. This relationship is needed to ensure the PSO maintains a day-to-day awareness of local alterations in START planning, as well as, to influence the training curriculum for OSIA escorts. The PSO needs to encourage that OSIA escort training conducted under the auspices of the START Office be expanded to include pre-established guidelines for response to OSIA team inquiries which could impact classified or sensitive activities.

Since the training information would be given to the VAFB START team to administer to the escorts, the training would not highlight involvement of the PSO. The training would focus on protecting classified and sensitive information and their need to not talk about space launch operations and associated payload activities.

Policy 8: If hazardous payload/booster operations are on-going at north VAFB when the inspection notification is received, they will continue until completion.

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any practice that denies full access to telemetric information. Although this does not apply to pure space launch vehicles, it does apply to the Peacekeeper 1st stage (Taurus zero). Since the CIS has been given telemetry decoding capability, it would allow them to determine orbits if the same equipment/algorithm is used for the space launch booster. In any case, the mixing of space launch facilities and START accountable ballistic missile assets should not be allowed to proliferate the US space vehicle inventory.

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FOR: GEN. LINDSAY/[REDACTED] FOR J.
 CABALLERO, [REDACTED] FOR RADM
 BETTERTON, [REDACTED] W. SAVEY

FROM: [REDACTED] J.D. HILL

SUBJ: PLANNING FOR START INSPECTIONS AT VAFB

1. THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START), SIGNED 31 JULY 1991 AND EXPECTED TO ENTER-INTO-FORCE (EIF) BY SUMMER 1992, WILL REQUIRE THAT "DATA UPDATE" INSPECTIONS BY SOVIET OFFICIALS BE PERMITTED AT VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE (VAFB) ON A PERIODIC BASIS. THIS MESSAGE TASKS [REDACTED] IN COORDINATION WITH

[REDACTED] TO EVALUATE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SUCH INSPECTIONS TO NRP ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES AT VAFB, AND RECOMMEND MITIGATING ACTIONS, IF REQUIRED, FOR DNRO APPROVAL. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH EACH AFFECTED PROGRAM OFFICE AND PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION TO THE DNRO AND PROGRAM DIRECTORS NLT 15 JAN 92.

2. BASELINE DATA:

A. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR "DATA UPDATE" INSPECTIONS AND ANY OTHER RELATED START ACTIVITIES AT VAFB ARE DETAILED IN THE START AGREEMENT, WHICH HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE ARMS CONTROL POINTS OF CONTACT IN EACH OF YOUR OFFICES. JIM RODGERS OF THE POLICY STAFF [REDACTED] CAN ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOUR STAFFS MIGHT HAVE REGARDING TREATY REQUIREMENTS.

B. SOVIET INSPECTORS WILL BE PERMITTED UP TO TWO ON-SITE "DATA UPDATE" INSPECTIONS PER YEAR AT VANDENBERG AFB, IAW THE TIMELINES AND PROCEDURES SPECIFIED IN THE START AGREEMENT. THESE INSPECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE ONLY WITHIN DEFINED AREAS THAT CURRENTLY DO NOT INCLUDE NRO FACILITIES.

C. THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS DO USE INSPECTIONS TO GAIN HUMINT AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION UNRELATED TO

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ARMS CONTROL, AND AS A VEHICLE TO IDENTIFY LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR LATER RECRUITMENT AS AGENTS. IN ADDITION, THERE HAS BEEN NO REDUCTION OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. THUS, WE MUST PRESUME THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO GAIN FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF NRP ACTIVITIES AT VAFB, AND WILL ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT PERSONNEL WORKING IN THE SPACE LAUNCH WORLD, IF GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY.

3. KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:

A. WHETHER INSPECTION NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES NOW BEING ESTABLISHED THROUGH NRO OPERATIONS SUPPORT AND THROUGH "WHITE WORLD" CHANNELS TO VAFB ARE LIKELY TO BE ADEQUATE, OR NEED TO BE IMPROVED.

B. SHOULD PROGRAMS DELAY OR INTERRUPT SCHEDULED PAYLOAD ARRIVALS AND/OR MOVEMENTS AT VAFB WHILE SOVIET INSPECTORS ARE INBOUND OR PRESENT?

C. SHOULD PROGRAMS DELAY OR INTERRUPT PAYLOAD TESTING, INTEGRATION, ELECTRONIC TESTING, ETC., WHILE SOVIET INSPECTORS ARE INBOUND OR PRESENT?

D. ARE ENHANCED OPSEC/COMSEC TRAINING OR OTHER CI MEASURES NEEDED FOR BYEMAN-CLEARED PERSONNEL AT VAFB? SHOULD THERE BE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF BYEMAN-CLEARED PERSONNEL AS INSPECTION ESCORTS?

E. ARE CHANGES REQUIRED TO CURRENT TRAINING OR PROCEDURES FOR PAYLOAD MOVEMENTS AND HANDLING? ARE MODIFICATIONS TO PAYLOAD CONTAINERS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE CHANGED PROCEDURES?

F. ARE ANY PROTECTIVE MEASURES REQUIRED TO HEDGE AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF LATER CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS?

4. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPACTS OF START INSPECTIONS AT VAFB MAY VARY SOMEWHAT BY PROGRAM, AND EACH PROGRAM OFFICE SHOULD IDENTIFY ITS OWN UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS. STILL, WE SHOULD BE CONSISTENT IN OUR GENERAL APPROACH AND PHILOSOPHY; THUS, AS THE NRP AGENT FOR LAUNCH [] SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN PROPOSING ANY COMMON MEASURES OR POLICIES THAT MAY BE NECESSARY.

5. FOR FY91 AND 92, ALL U.S. PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO ABSORB THE COSTS OF ANY ARMS CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES THAT ARE NECESSARY. SHOULD IMPLEMENTATION COSTS BE SIGNIFICANT, PROGRAMS SHOULD IDENTIFY THEM FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE NORMAL BUDGET PROCESS. THE EVALUATION SHOULD INCLUDE COSTS ESTIMATES OF IMPLEMENTING ANY PROPOSED MEASURES TO PROTECT OPERATIONS, FACILITIES OR PERSONNEL. WHERE SEPARABLE, INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM OFFICES SHOULD PAY FOR MEASURES TO PROTECT SPECIFIC PROGRAM ACTIVITIES. COSTS FOR COMMON MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED UNDER [] AS THE LAUNCH MANAGER. ESTIMATES SHOULD INCLUDE, IF WARRANTED, BOTH ONE-TIME AND RECURRING MANPOWER/DOLLAR COSTS TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE INSPECTION NOTIFICATIONS AND REACTIONS, PROCEDURAL CHANGES, PROGRAMMATIC DELAYS, []

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[REDACTED] ETC., NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE LEVELS
OF SECURITY AND AVOID EXCESSIVE ATTENTION FROM SOVIET INSPECTORS.
6. POC FOR GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS REQUEST WILL BE JIM
RODGERS, [REDACTED] FOR BUDGET QUESTIONS [REDACTED] FOR
OPS SUPPORT QUESTIONS, [REDACTED]
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