The NRO and ARMS CONTROL in the 90's
NRO wasn’t concerned announced as the Permanent Portal Monitoring site
Cape Canaveral AFS - Declared Site
Signed 8 Dec 87
Purpose

- Reduce Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs)

Status

- Ratified by the U.S., Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
- Ukraine holding out

Treaty will not enter-into-force until all instruments of ratification are exchanged
### START I Central Limits

#### Delivery Vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>Deployed ICBMs, SLBM, Heavy Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>Heavy ICBMs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Attributed Warheads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>ICBM, SLBM, and Heavy Bomber Warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>ICBM and SLBM Warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>Heavy ICBM Warheads (S-18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>Mobile ICBM Warheads</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bi-Lateral agreement
Contingent upon START I being ratified
Uses START I inspection protocols
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>START</th>
<th>START II Phase I</th>
<th>START II Phase II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Strategic Warheads</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>3800-4250</td>
<td>3000-3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Warheads</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>No Specific sub-limit</td>
<td>No Specific sub-limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRVed ICBM Warheads</td>
<td>No Specific sub-limit</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy ICBM Warheads</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile ICBM Warheads</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>No Specific sub-limit</td>
<td>No Specific sub-limit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
START Impacts

Early intervention by the NRO mitigated most of the risk
- Transportation systems
- SLVs

VAFB Declared Site
- Only includes the Peacekeeper and MM activities
Purpose
Status
Preparatory Commission
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

"Anytime, Anywhere" challenge inspection protocol led to

(b)(3)
CWC Impacts

Challenge inspection regime

• Anytime, anywhere
• Can protect National Security, Constitutional, and Proprietary interests
• Must demonstrate compliance
Bi-Lateral CW Agreements

Two between the US - USSR (now Russia)

• Begins data exchange
• Inspections using CWC inspection protocols
• Destruction of CW stores

Status

• US has presented data and started destroying stocks
• Russia attempting to comply
Bi-Lateral CW

Uses same inspection protocols as the CWC

SECRET

HANDLE VIA
BYEeman CONTROL SYSTEM
ONLY

Approved for Release: 2019/10/07 C05101512
Open Skies

Purpose

Promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities

Status

Signed on 24 Mar 92
Ratified by US on 6 Aug 93
Entry-into-force ??

Overflights by unarmed, fixed wing aircraft equipped with sensor suite

Optical - 30 cm resolution
IR - 50 cm
SAR - 3 m

Up to 42 overflights per year
Space Talks

UN and Geneva

Numerous papers submitted

- Advance launch notification
- Debris studies
- More detailed satellite operational reporting
- Sharing of all data from all satellites
- Keep out zones

Prohibit weapons/militarization in space
Space Talks Impact

Desert Storm
Mostly non-space experts
Want to level the playing field
Could be major impact to NRO
USG has no position on theses issues
Other Treaties

BW
CTBT
CFE
Where to get more info

Treaty Handbook