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Major RodgersPOLDBJECTFinal Iteration: Space Launch Issues					175		J.4.4.	DATE	
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Enclosed is a memorandum (Tab 1) to OSD/ISP (Steve Hadley) responding to questions posed by his Verification Policy office (Sally Horn) regarding space launch issues in START. Also enclosed is a parallel memorandum (Tab 2) to Chief, ACIS (Doug MacEachin) to make sure a parallel input is provided through IC channels. OSD specifically requested written response at the management level.									
Baseline of the discussion is a Request for Guidance (RFG)-074 (Tab 3) from the START delegation in Geneva involving key space launch issues. In addition, we have been asked several additional "what if" questions by OSDwe understand these originated from high-level "arms control ungroup" discussions on the subject, with a decision expected early 25 Jan.									
Summary of Issues:									
- We think RFG-074 is good, as long as the numerical limit (5) on "space launch facilities" applies only to those facilities used to launch									

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ICBMs/SLBMs converted to space launch use. This was the intent of previous Washington guidance on this issue. [We have verified that is what Ambassador Burt intended, and that is the ACIS understanding of the issue.]

- Given the above understanding, RFG-074 contains some very favorable provisions from the NRO perspective: space launch facilities normally would be uninspectable per agreement with the Soviets (but still subject to challenge inspections), and Pegasus would be recognized explicitly in the negotiating record as a space launch vehicle only, with no accounting under START, which is a good precedent for other space launch-only system.

- The additional questions posed by OSD/Policy are more troublesome. As addressed in the enclosed suggested DDNRO memoranda:

-- What would be the impact of limiting U.S. space launch facilities to five or fewer, period, whether they were involved with ICBMs/SLBMs-related space launches or not? We recommend a strong statement advising against this approach. For clear policy as well as national security reasons, we recommend avoiding discussions in START of space launch or other space activities. While this approach would not immediately impact the NRO's Vandenberg or Cape launches, it would constrain future U.S. options for national security launches, and probably civil and commercial launches as well. We also recommend pointing out that while the NRO does not now launch from such locations as Wallops Island or White Sands, we may need to do so in the future.

-- What are the impacts from reducing the aggregate number of launchers for converted ICBMs/SLBMs at space launch facilities from 25 to 20, or changing from 15 to 10 the proposed sublimit on silo and mobile launchers (again, only applicable to those used for ICBMs/SLBMs converted to space launch use) at space launch facilities.

RECOMMENDATION

That the DDNRO sign the enclosed memoranda to Mr. Hadley and Mr. MacEachin.





s) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

SUBJECT: Space Launch Issues (RFG-074)

Your Verification Policy office asked us to comment on the potential agreements regarding space launch issues proposed by the U.S. START Delegation in Request for Guidance (RFG)-074, and related issues that have arisen subsequently in Washington.

a) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has no substantive problem with the approach outlined in RFG-074, assuming that paragraph 8 is meant only to limit the number of space launch facilities from which ICBMs or SLBMs converted to space launch use can be launched. We understand this was Ambassador Burt's intent.

We believe paragraph 6 needs clarification--it is unclear whether the agreement would be to limit the number of converted ICBMs/SLBMs at a given space launch facility to no more than the number of launchers at that facility <u>declared</u> for such use, or the (presumably larger) overall number of space launchers for all space systems at the facility. Also, policy-makers should be aware that this approach may limit future options for quick reaction concepts such as the "tactical satellites" now being studied--we defer to OSD/Acquisition on those impacts.

b) We were also asked to assess the impacts of changing the START definitions such that the U.S. would be limited to 5 or fewer space launch facilities, period. We strongly advise against limiting the number of space launch facilities except those directly involved in launching ICBMs/SLBMs converted to space launch use. Indeed, we think it imperative that there be no discussions in START of any limitations on space launch or any other space activities not directly involving ICBMs/SLBMs used for space launch purposes.

The NRO currently utilizes only Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) for the launch of space payloads--there would be no immediate, direct impacts to the NRO as long as those two facilities were protected

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for space launch purposes. However, such an approach would severely constrain future U.S. options for new or different space launch facilities, and thus constrain national security, civil (e.g., NASA and NOAA), and commercial activities. We believe that would be unwise.

Also, would the space launch facilities at Wallops Island, Barking Sands and White Sands be included in this overall limit? The NRO does not now utilize those facilities, but may need to in the future. Would future commercial launch activities be restricted to those same facilities?

c) Regarding reducing the limits on the number of launchers at space launch facilities for converted ICBMs/SLBMs from 25 to 20, and reducing the sublimit on silo and mobile launchers at space launch facilities from 15 to 10: the NRO would not be impacted by such a change, although other potential users might be.

d) We recommend maintaining the position, now agreed with the Soviets, that the Pegasus space launch vehicle is neither a ballistic missile nor a weapon-delivery vehicle, and therefore is not limited by the START Treaty. It is important to maintain the principle that space launch vehicles, per se, are not limited by the START agreement.

Please call me if you have any questions on our input.

J. D. HILL

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE STAFF

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J. D. HILL





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REQUEST FOR QUIDANCE - SPACE LAUNCH SUBJECT : START : TABLES

REF: STATE 402810 (XIV-G-108)

THIS IS NET/START-OWIDANCE REQUEST XIV-074. ٩. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

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
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2. HEQDIATOR REACHED AD RECEIVENEE METHOD AD A PROTECTION OF A ANNOLINAMES. IN LARGE PART, THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED THE U.S. APPROACH AS OUTLINED IN REFTEL. OVERALL, NEGOTIATOR BELIEVES THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT GIVEN THE EXTREME POSITION THE SOVIETS TABLED IN HOUSTON WHICH WOULD HAVE AMONG OTHER THINGS, CAPTURED AND LIMITED THE PEGASUS PROGRAM. CHE INFORTANT CHERTYPHEN THE THIS THEORE ON POMMETER SLOS AT SPACE VALUED FACELITIES. SHICH THEY HAVE LINKED THE THOMAN THE THEOREM SACTIONS FOR THEY HAVE LINKED THE CALL MARKE THAT SHARE THE GALLET BAS P-MC INTERD TO PRESERVE THE OPTION OF USING MOBILE LAUNCHERS POR SPACE LALINCH.

THE FOLLOWING OUTSTANDING ISSUES REQUIRE WASHINGTON 3. CONSIDERATION.

SILD AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS AT SPACE LAUNCH PACILITIES 4. THE SOVIETS STATED THERE THIS THINK TO USE BOTH SILE AND HORSE LARCHERE THE TRACE DURCH THERE . (THEY CURRENTLY HAVE TWO SILOS AT ONE DECLARED SPACE







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LAUNCH FACILITY.) THEY SAID THAT, FOR ECONOMIC REASONS, THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF BUILDING OR USING SOFT-SITE LAUNCHERS FOR THIS PURPOSE. FURTHERMORE, THEY ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN TYPES OF LAUNCHERS FOR SPACE USE WAS SENSELESS, PARTICULARLY SINCE FLIGHT-TESTS OF RVS FROM SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES WOULD BE BANNED. IN ADDITION, THEY SAID THAT VERIFICATION BY NTM WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM SINCE THE CONVERSION REQUIRED FOR SILOS WOULD BE READILY APPARENT. AND MOBILES ARE EASILY OBSERVABLE.

5. INITIALLY, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A MAXIMUM AGGREGATE LIMIT OF 15 LAUNCHERS (INCLUDING SOFT-SITE, MOBILE, AND SILD LAUNCHERS) AT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES, AND RESISTED ANY ATTEMPT TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN TYPES IN THE FORM OF SUBLIMITS FOR SILD AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS. ULTIMATELY, THEY AGGREGATE SUBLIMIT OF 15 FOR SILD AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS, WITH AN AGGREGATE SUBLIMIT OF 15 FOR SILD AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS, WITH AN AGGREGATE SUBLIMIT OF 15 FOR SILD AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS, COATED AT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES WOULD ALSO BE COUNTED UNDER THE NON-DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER LIMIT. GIVEN THAT IT PROBABLY IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO FORCE THE SOVIETS TO BUILD NEW SOFT-SITE LAUNCHERS,

NUMBER OF ICEMS/SLEMS AT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES

6. THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ICEMS/SLEMS AT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES, RATHER THAN CREATING AND LIMITING A SPECIAL CATEGORY OF ICEMS/SLEMS DESIGNATED FOR SPACE LAUNCH. OUR PROPOSED LIMIT WAS BLANK, ALTHOUGH WE ASSUMED THE LIMIT WOULD PARALLEL THE NUMBER OF ICEMS/SLEMS PERMITTED AT TEST RANGES. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, PROPOSED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ICEMS/SLEMS AT A GIVEN SPACE LAUNCH FACILITY TO NO MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS LOCATED AT THAT FACILITY, "UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED", THEY ARQUED THAT IF THE SIDES

AGREED THAT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES COULD NOT BE INSPECTED, THE NUMBER OF ICEMS/SLEMS PERMITTED AT SUCH FACILITIES SHOULD BE MINIMAL. WE AGREED TO THIS APPROACH, AD REF.

7. THE SOVIETS ALSO INDICATED THAT CERTAIN ICEMS/SLEMS RETROFITED FOR SPACE LAUNCH AND STORED AT A STORAGE FACILITY FOR ICEMS OF <u>SLEMS PRIOR</u> TO TRANSIT TO A SPACE LAUNCH FACILITY IN SUCH A CASE.

NUMBER OF SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES

8. WE HAVE LONG PROPOSED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SPACE Launch facilities to no more than six, "Unless otherwise Agreed". The soviets counter-proposed a limit of three. We agreed, ad Ref. to five, "Unless otherwise Agreed".

PEGASUS

9. THE SOVIETS MAVE LONG BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE PEGASUS PROGRAM AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR MILITARY APPLICATION. THE PAPER THEY DAVE US IN HOUSTON WOULD HAVE IMPOSED AN





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ELABORATE (AND UNACCEPTABLE) REGIME TO REGULATE AND LIMIT PEGASUS AND ITS LAUNCH AIRCRAFT UNDER THE TREATY. AFTER LONG NEGOTIATION, THEY AGREED TO DROP THIS DEMAND AND HAVE COMPLETELY ACCEPTED OUR POSITION THAT PEGASUS IS NEITHER A BALLISTIC MISSILE NOR A WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLE, AND THEREFORE IS NOT LIMITED BY THE TREATY.

RECOMMENDATION

10. NEGOTIATOR RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS LOCATED AT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES SHALL NOT EXCEED 25, WITH AN AGGREGATE SUBLIMIT OF 15 SILO AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS AT SUCH FACILITIES, UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED. MOBILE LAUNCHERS LOCATED AT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES SHALL ALSO COUNT UNDER THE LIMIT OF NON-DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS.

-- THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICEMS/SLEMS LOCATED AT A GIVEN SPACE LAUNCH FACILITY SHALL NOT EXCEED THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS AT THAT FACILITY, UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED.

-- THE NUMBER OF SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES SHALL NOT EXCEED FIVE, UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED. SUCH FACILITIES SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION.

11. THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR SPACE LAUNCH PROPOSAL.

GUIDANCE REQUESTED

12. NEGOTIATOR REQUESTS WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 10 ND LATER THAN DOB (GENEVA) JANUARY 24, 1991.

BURT##

END OF MESSAGE

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