

NOT A RESPONSIVE RECORD



NOT A RESPONSIVE RECORD

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
1040 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1040

NOV 4 1994

The Honorable John Warner
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Warner

Your letter of September 7, 1994, regarding the request by the family of Ms. Tina Ricca for information concerning her death was forwarded from the CIA to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) for a response.

We are very sympathetic to Mr. Ricca's desire to understand the circumstances associated with the tragic death of his daughter, Tina, and we are very hopeful that the individual responsible will be apprehended.

The NRO has provided all information with regard to Ms. Ricca to the Fairfax County Police Department, which has the responsibility for the investigation. The investigation of this case is being conducted by Detective Richard Cline. We hope Mr. Ricca will understand that we do not want to jeopardize the police investigation by commenting on an ongoing police investigation. He should contact Investigator Cline for information concerning the case.

However, I can assure you and Mr. Ricca that there was never any classified information, nor were there ever any surveillance cameras in the so called "blue building." In fact, the "blue building" is a modular building with blue siding that serves as a construction office for the NRO Headquarters project and contains copiers, computers, blueprints, plans, and other construction information about the facility. None of that information is classified. During normal business hours, Rockwell employees, U.S. Government employees, and subcontractor personnel work in the building.

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
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The Vance Security officers are present to protect property, control access to the site, and provide the normal security services associated with any large construction site. After hours, the Vance officers conduct routine security checks of the building. The purpose of the rounds is to ensure that the building is locked and secure. All of the Vance officers are allowed access to the "blue building" for use of the restroom and break area facilities.

After the discovery of Ms. Ricca's body and before the police arrived at the building on November 6, 1993, the building was not cleansed in any manner. After the police arrived, all Rockwell, Vance, and government personnel were excluded from the site by the police for approximately 24 hours as a routine procedure incident to a homicide investigation.

We have provided full assistance and cooperation to the Fairfax County Police Department and will continue to cooperate fully with the police investigation.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. K. Harris", is written over a horizontal line.

JEFFREY K. HARRIS
Director

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

1040 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1040

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE


SUBJECT: Closure of NRO IG Project 94-06

We have conducted a preliminary inquiry in response to a NRO IG hotline report that a NRO employee had overstepped the bounds of propriety during a meeting held in response to the fatal shooting of a Vance security guard on 6 November 1993. The NRO employee questioned a contract security guard about the shooting. It was alleged the questioning was law enforcement and inappropriate for an Intelligence Community organization. This inquiry did not disclose any violation of Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.

The intent of the meeting appears to have been clear and appropriately focused on security concerns. While it is recognized that some questionable inquiries may have taken place, there is no reason to surmise that the intent or result was in violation of E.O. 12333. The Executive Order permits the collection, retention, and dissemination of "information needed to protect the safety of any person or organization..." or "information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical, or communications security investigation" and authorizes agencies to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Questioning reasonably falls within these parameters.

This inquiry has been completed and closed by the NRO IG and no further action is anticipated. The Report of Investigation is attached, less the exhibits. If you have any questions please contact [redacted] at [redacted] (secure).

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DENNIS M. DRUMMOND
Inspector General

Attachment

1. Report of Investigation, dtd 14 August 1995

cc: DNRO (w/o Atch)

This is a PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT that cannot be released in whole or part to persons or agencies outside the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), nor can it be republished in whole or part in any document not containing this statement, without the express written approval of the NRO Inspector General.

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

14 August 1995

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

NRO IG PROJECT 94-06

SUBJECT: Possible E.O. 12333 Violation; Collection of
Information on Contractor Employee

Prepared by: [redacted] Investigator, [redacted] (secure)

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PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

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	<u>PAGE</u>
Synopsis	3
Statutes	3
Background	3
Narrative	4
Summary Findings	5
Investigative Status	6
List of Witnesses and Exhibits	6

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SYNOPSIS:

A preliminary inquiry was initiated based on information from a NRO IG hotline call. The caller expressed concern that

[redacted] had overstepped the bounds of propriety in a meeting held in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of a contract security guard.

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It has been determined that the meeting was intended to address counterintelligence and security concerns and not to conduct a law enforcement investigation or collect data on U.S. persons. No evidence was obtained to support the inferred allegation of Executive Order 12333 violation and therefore this case is considered closed.

STATUTES:

This report details information concerning possible violation of Executive Order 12333, Section 2.3: United States Intelligence Activities, Collection of Information.

BACKGROUND:

- 6 November 1993, Saturday night. Vance contract security guard was fatally shot at the NRO Westfield's facility. The facility was under the cover of Rockwell; NRO's affiliation, at the time, was a SECRET BYEMAN fact.

- 7 November 1993, Sunday. Meeting was held in Room 2C06, North Annex with [redacted] (NRO Security), [redacted] (NRO Security), [redacted] (MS&O Security), [redacted] (NRO Counterintelligence), [redacted] (NRO Public Affairs), [redacted] (NRO General Counsel), and "lots of Vance, Collins International Services Company (CISCO), and MS&O people". It was reported that the meeting was intended to address counterintelligence and security concerns with respect to the shooting at the covert NRO facility; to identify what had happened; and to outline what NRO and Rockwell CISCO needed to do to enhance security and notify appropriate individuals.

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- 8 November 1993, Monday. NRO IG received call on the NRO IG hotline alleging that [] had overstepped the bounds of propriety during the meeting.

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(b)(7)(c)NARRATIVE:

1. On 8 November 1993, an NRO IG hotline call was received. According to the complaint (W1-1), the confidential source advised of a meeting held by [] on 7 November 1993, in response to the fatal shooting of a Vance contract security guard at the construction site for the NRO headquarters building. The source alleged that [] implied that the Fairfax County Police may have overlooked something in the investigation. A security guard who was on duty at the time of the shooting was asked to provide his version of the night's events. This questioning session, according to the source, became a free-for-all, verging on conducting law enforcement, and was inappropriate for an Intelligence Community organization. The source advised that questions included things such as the presence of entry and exit wounds. At one point during the meeting, in response to side discussions, [] suggested an adjournment at which time concerns were addressed with [] and []. According to the source, [] was nonplussed after the break and persisted in questioning the guard.

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2. On 8 November 1993, Dennis Drummond, NRO Inspector General, interviewed [] (W2-1) to validate the confidential source's allegations. [] advised that the objective of the meeting was clear and that he was favorably impressed with most of what took place. [] expressed concern with the questioning of a "potential suspect" (the previously mentioned security guard) and whether or not the individual had made a formal statement to the Fairfax County Police. [] advised that he deferred to [] who at one point suggested a break. According to [] [] spoke privately at which time concern was expressed about a "record being created which could possibly help the defendant". According to [] when the group reconvened, the meeting was focused on what happened after the initial response and lessons learned.

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3. On 25 January 1995, Mr. Drummond issued the quarterly report for the Intelligence Oversight Board to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (W3-1). The memorandum addressed the situation as a possible violation of E.O. 12333 in which concern was expressed that management inquiries into the circumstances surrounding the fatal shooting may have been perceived as conducting improper law enforcement activities. The memorandum further states that the NRO IG review found that management was primarily interested in understanding security weaknesses and taking protective measures at other facilities, and understands that responsibility for criminal investigation rests with the local police force.

4. Presidential E.O. 12333, dated 4 December 1981, permits the collection, retention, and dissemination of "information needed to protect the safety of any person or organization..." or "information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical, or communications security investigation" (Sections 2.3(d) and 2.3(g) respectively). E.O. 12333, Section 2.6(a), further authorizes agencies to cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting employees, information, property, and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community.

SUMMARY FINDINGS:

The intent of the meeting on 7 November 1993, appears to have been clear and appropriately focused on security concerns. While it is recognized that some questionable inquiries may have taken place, there is no reason to surmise that the intent was to violate E.O. 12333 regarding the collection of information on U.S. persons. The presence of the NRO General Counsel during the meeting, as well as several security officers schooled in the requirements of the Executive Order, implicitly, although erroneously, validates the line of questioning.

The NRO (including its supporting employees and contractors) may not intentionally collect information on U.S. persons outside the scope of E.O. 12333 mandates. The questioning of the security guard, and possibly others, could reasonably fall within the parameters of E.O. 12333 as cited in Paragraph 4 above. It

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is noted however, that while no E.O. 12333 violation has been assessed, and with full understanding of the emotions generated by the situation, it is asserted that questioning as to wounds and any other crime (vice security) related issues was inappropriate.

INVESTIGATIVE STATUS:

This investigation has been closed by the NRO IG and no further investigative activity is anticipated.

LIST OF WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS:

<u>NO:</u>	<u>WITNESS</u>	<u>NO:</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u>
W1	Anonymous Complainant	-1	MFR - NRO IG, 9 Nov 93
W2	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 280px;"></div>	-1	MFR - NRO IG, 9 Nov 93
W3	E.O. 12333 Quarterly Report	-1	Memo for Assistant to SECDEF, 25 Jan 1994

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NRO INTERNAL

Page 1 of 2

9 Nov 93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Complaint Regarding Possible EO 12333 Violation
(NRO IG Case 94-06)

1. At about 1600 on Monday, 8 Nov 93, I received a phone call from a source who asked for confidentiality in this matter. The source was concerned that [redacted] had overstepped the bounds of propriety the previous day (Sunday, 7 Nov) in a meeting that was held in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of a Vance guard at Rockwell's Westfields facility Saturday night (6 Nov).

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2. Although the meeting was apparently intended to address counterintelligence and security concerns with this shooting at a covert NRO facility, it took place in [redacted] with a room full of people, including [redacted] (NRO Security), [redacted] (NRO Security), [redacted] (MS&O Security), [redacted] (NRO Counterintelligence), [redacted] (NRO Public Affairs), [redacted] (NRO General Counsel), and "lots of Vance, CISCO, and MS&O people."

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3. The source indicated that [redacted] said this was a serious event, and that the Fairfax County police were investigating. There was an implication that they may have overlooked something, and the group attempted to reconstruct what had happened. In doing so, they asked the second guard on duty at the time to give his rendition of the night's events. According to the source, this became a free-for-all questioning session, verging on conducting law enforcement, and inappropriate for an Intelligence Community organization. The source was of the opinion that the nature of the questioning, which addressed such things as presence of entrance and exit wounds, was not the kind that should have been done [redacted]

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[redacted] At one point, in response to side discussions, [redacted] suggested an adjournment, and then met with [redacted] to discuss the concerns. [redacted] was described as being nonplussed afterward, and persisting in questioning the guard, with questions including "Who did you talk to about this..."

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NRO INTERNAL

Page 2 of 2

4. The source is concerned about how much information is being amassed, whether it is germane to a law enforcement investigation, and whether the Government's and the individuals's interests are being protected.

[DENNIS M. DRUMMOND]
Inspector General

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10 USC 425

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NRO INTERNAL

Page 1 of 2

9 Nov 93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview With [REDACTED] 8 Nov 93
(NRO IG Case 94-06)

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10 USC 425

1. At about 2000, Monday, 8 Nov 93, I called [REDACTED] NRO Office of Security, to get his recollection and perceptions of the Sunday meeting which the source had described. The interview was conducted over a secure STU-3 call between our residences. I asked [REDACTED] whether the objective of the meeting was clear.

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2. He said that it was. He took notes as a backup to [REDACTED] (MS&O Security) who was the designated recorder, and he gave her his notes. As he recalls, the purpose was to identify what had happened, and to outline what the NRO and Rockwell CISCO needed to do to enhance security and to notify the appropriate people in an instance such as this. He was favorably impressed with 90 percent of what went on. He did have a problem with the questioning of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] principal concern was whether the individual had or had not already made a formal statement to the Fairfax County police investigators. [REDACTED] said he deferred to [REDACTED] (NRO General Counsel), who at one point called a time out. [REDACTED] (NRO Security), [REDACTED] (NRO Counterintelligence), and [REDACTED] all huddled. Concern was expressed about a "record being created which could possibly help the defendant." [REDACTED] recalls a private question as to why [REDACTED] didn't speak up earlier, with the answer being that different lawyers specialize in different things, and that [REDACTED] may not be well-versed in the various aspects of criminal law.

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3. After the huddle, the meeting was focused on what happened after the initial response: what the reactions and the weaknesses were, whether actions were needed in the area of mutual support. A question came up as to how the Facility Duty Officer from [REDACTED] who was on the scene and who is a CIA employee, was identified to the Fairfax County investigators. A decision was made to brief three people (at the SECRET level) about the

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NRO INTERNAL

Page 2 of 2

linkage between Rockwell, the DOD, and the CIA. The three are the Fair Oaks District commander, and individual at the Massey Building, and the Police Chief.

4. [] said that the group then addressed the various lessons learned, including notification of people such as [] [] was assigned to work the case because of his familiarity with working release of information to the police. [] had worked the CIA shooting earlier this year.) [] felt that this was done, in part, because [] (MS&O Security) was in over his head.

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5. []

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6. One other question arose, as to whether guards should continue to be armed. [] said the answer was yes, and that was cast in concrete, and that it would take a lot of chipping away to change his mind. (Concern had been expressed about the additional cost of armed guards, but [] concern was safety in isolated areas.)

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DENNIS M. DRUMMOND
Inspector General

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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 25, 1994


MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report for the Intelligence Oversight Board

One possible violation of E.O. 12333 was reported during the first quarter, FY94. Concern was expressed that management inquiries into the circumstances surrounding a fatal shooting of a contract guard might have been perceived as conducting improper law enforcement activities. The NRO IG review found that management was primarily interested in understanding security weaknesses and taking protective measures at other area facilities, and understands that responsibility for criminal investigation rests with the local police force.

No other questionable, illegal, or improper collection activities, as defined by E.O. 12333, were conducted by NRO personnel or programs during the first quarter, FY94.

Intelligence oversight activities conducted in support of E.O. 12333 during this period included the initial indoctrination and training of 160 individuals assigned to the NRO. In addition, 517 rebriefings of NRO personnel were conducted this quarter.



DENNIS M. DRUMMOND
Inspector General

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

FACTS


- On Saturday, 6 November 1993, between the hours of 2140 and 2245, Lt. Tina Ricca was shot and killed inside the Westfields Construction Trailer.
- Lt. Ricca's body was discovered by
- Fairfax County Police Department and Rescue Squad called to the scene. Rescue Squad checked Lt. Ricca for vital signs but unsuccessful. FCPD took control of site at 2315 hours

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

FACTS


- Site returned to Rockwell at 2000 hours on Sunday
- Investigation has determined:



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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

FACTS

A large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, indicating redacted information.

**Cause of death due to
gunshot wound**


A large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, indicating redacted information.

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES

- All employees notified of incident and available facts
- Increased security at



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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT
COUNSELING SERVICES

COUNSELING SERVICES AVAILABLE TO ALL


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Office Location:
(after 1pm) Phone:

AM Phone:
Home Phone:

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT
ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES



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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

6 NOVEMBER 1993

30



WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

PURPOSE

- EXPLAIN CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
- EXPLAIN FACTS OF CASE AS KNOWN TODAY
- EXPLAIN FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS TAKEN TO DATE



WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

CHRONOLOGY

- **Saturday, 6 Nov**

2315	Received phone call at home from FDO
2320	Notified D/MSO
2340	Notified C/NPG

- **Sunday, 7 Nov**

0015-0400	Fact-finding at NRO HQS (D/MSO)
1500-1800	Additional fact finding at NRO HQS (D/MSO + C/NPG)



WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

CHRONOLOGY

• Monday 8 Nov

1530

Established team of [REDACTED] & NRO/GC to review info flow to outside

1600-1830

Established Westfields Incident Committee

D/MS&O

[REDACTED]
MS&O Security Officers

MS&O Group Chief
[REDACTED]

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

CHRONOLOGY

- **Tuesday, 9 Nov**

All Day Conducted four briefings to affected population

- **Wednesday, 10 Nov**

Afternoon Continued briefing affected population

- **Next Week**

Continued briefing at [REDACTED]

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

FACTS

- On Saturday, 6 November 1993, between the hours of 2140 and 2245, Lt. Tina Ricca was shot and killed inside the Westfields Construction Trailer.
- Lt. Ricca's body was discovered by Vance and Facility Security Officers.
- Fairfax County Police Department and Rescue Squad called to the scene. Rescue Squad checked Lt. Ricca for vital signs but unsuccessful. FCPD took control of WF Site at 2315 hours.



WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

FACTS

- WF Site returned to Rockwell at 2000 hours on Sunday, 7 November
- Investigation has determined:



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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

FACTS

- Cause of death due to gunshot wound

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

ADDITIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES


- All employees notified of incident and available facts
- Increased security at [REDACTED]

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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

ADDITIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES



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WESTFIELDS INCIDENT

• COUNSELING SERVICES AVAILABLE TO ALL

Office Location:

Phone:

AM Phone
after 1 pm
home

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NOV 08 1993

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Subsequent to the fatal shooting of Officer Tina Ricca at the Westfields compound on 6 November 1993, a meeting was held at 1500 hours in [] with representatives from Management Services and Operations, General Counsel, External Relations, NRO Security Staff, [] CI Staff, CISCO, and Vance International. []

[] presided.

[] began the meeting with a moment of silence for Officer Ricca. The purpose or the objectives of the meeting were then outlined and were as follows:

1. Reconstruct the events of the previous evening;
2. Draft internal and external statements to prevent/lessen "Rumor Mill";
3. Identify collective actions of Government and Contractors to be taken over the next 3-5 days;

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In an attempt to reconstruct the events of 6 November 1993, the following individuals recounted their previously documented experiences:

Officer [] Security Officer
Mr. [] Facility Duty Officer
Mr. [] Operations Manager

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[redacted] Community Relations Manager
Vice President, Vance International

Following the accounts of events, attention turned toward the second and third objectives of the meeting; internal and external statements and identification of collective actions. Action items resulting from discussion of these objectives are provided below.

ACTION ITEMS

1. Issuance of initial internal (NRO-wide) notice regarding incident - MS&O/SS
2. Issuance of initial external notice by Rockwell for Westfields contractors - MS&O/SS and Rockwell
3. Creation of consistent Vance and CISCO external statements for press and outside inquiries - CISCO and Vance
4. Subsequent internal messages addressing the incident - [redacted]
5. Notify [redacted] DDA, CIA - FSO

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6. Obtain counseling services for CISCO, Vance, and NRO employees - D/MS&O and Vance

7. Assign Vance Officer to cover [redacted] facility on the day shift during the week - Vance

8. Schedule meeting in [redacted] Auditorium for Vance employees - [redacted]

9. Brief FCPD officers. [redacted]

[redacted] CISCO and MS&O/SS

10. Conduct 100% badge check at Westfields Construction Site on 8 November - Vance

11. Notify all government workers at the Westfields Site to report to another facility on 8 November - [redacted]

12. [redacted]

[redacted] CISCO

13. Check equipment used by Vance Officers - Vance

14. [redacted]

- CISCO

15. [redacted]

[redacted] Vance

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16.

17. Upon return of the site from FCPD, conduct site check to determine extent of damage and missing items - D/MS&O, and CISCO

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