OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) NRO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

JOINT INSPECTION OF
AEROSPACE DATA FACILITY COLORADO,
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY COLORADO, AND
NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DENVER

(b)(3) Project Number 2016-001 J
8 February 2017

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MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION


(U) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) participated in the Joint Inspection of the Aerospace Data Facility Colorado (ADF-C), National Security Agency Colorado (NSAC), and the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency-Denver (NGA-D) during the period 18-29 April 2016. Since joint inspection reports include findings for multiple agencies, the OIG has prepared the attached executive summary on findings that directly relate to the NRO. A copy of the full 3 February 2017 joint inspection report is attached (Reference JT-16-0001).

(U//FOFO) I appreciate the courtesies extended to my staff during the joint inspection. Please direct any questions you may have to the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, on (secure).

Attachments:
1. (U) NRO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - Joint Inspection of the ADF-C, NSAC, and the NGA-D
2. (U) Joint Inspectors General Joint Inspection of ADF-C, NSAC, and the NGA-D

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(U) NRO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
JOINT INSPECTION OF AEROSPACE DATA FACILITY COLORADO, NSA COLORADO, AND NGA-DENVER

(U) INTRODUCTION

(U//FOUO) From 18 through 29 April 2016, inspectors from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) joined with Inspector General staffs from the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS); the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA); the 25th Air Force; the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC); Director of National Intelligence; and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to conduct an inspection of the Aerospace Data Facility Colorado (ADF-C), National Security Agency Colorado (NSAC), and the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency-Denver (NGA-D). The NSA OIG recently finalized the Joint Inspection Report and provided the report to the NRO OIG for further distribution. The purpose of this executive summary is to describe the joint inspection process and to summarize the NRO specific details and highlights of the 2016 joint inspection. Since joint inspection reports include findings for multiple agencies, this executive summary primarily focuses on those issues related to the NRO or that have a direct impact on the NRO at the Site¹ or headquarters (HQ) level.

(U//FOUO) The NRO OIG has consistently advocated a collaborative approach when performing its joint inspections. In addition, our experience has demonstrated that the use of inspectors from across the Intelligence Community (IC) who work as an interagency team--an approach that closely mirrors the makeup of NRO ground stations--creates a more accurate result with a broader perspective. The joint inspection process follows an inspection model/approach that NSA developed and these inspections are conducted at each NRO ground station. Responsibility for transmitting inspection recommendations to NRO leadership resides with the NRO OIG. Additionally, the NRO OIG is responsible for communicating with all involved NRO HQ entities as well as coordinating with NSA/CSS and NGA OIGs to adjudicate multi-agency recommendation status and closure.

(U) INSPECTION OBJECTIVES

(U) This joint inspection included the evaluation of mission accomplishment, policy and guidance, and general climate. Functional review areas related to NRO included command topics; intelligence oversight (IO); mission systems and engineering; facilities and safety; resource programs; security; information technology (IT) and systems; and training.

¹ (U) For purposes of this report, the term “Site” refers to the physical building/location on Buckley Air Force Base that houses ADF-C, NSAC, and NGA-D.
(U) BACKGROUND

ADF-C, NSAC, and NGA-D are co-located on Buckley Air Force Base (BAFB) near Denver, Colorado. Collectively, these organizations are responsible for supporting worldwide defense operations and multi-agency collection, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence information. The Site provides data to defense, intelligence, and civil agencies supporting the U.S. Government and its Allies. The Denver Leadership Team (DLT) is comprised of the leadership from each of the three organizations. The DLT meets regularly to ensure the organizations at Site are working collaboratively and addressing mission needs. ADF-C, the primary NRO component at Site.

(U) INSPECTION RESULTS

The attached joint inspection report contains numerous findings, observations and recommendations levied on ADF-C, NSAC, and NGA-D, as well as on NRO, NSA, and NGA HQ elements. The report also contains several commendable areas that could be emulated at other Sites. This Executive Summary is a high-level synopsis of observations, findings and commendable areas directly related to ADF-C or that have a significant impact on the NRO activities at the Site or HQ level. Please see the attached full report for additional details, to include specifics on observations, findings and recommendations.

(U) Command Topics

Strong interagency collaboration and innovation continue to be the hallmark of ADF-C. The OIG team found a dedicated collaborative DLT, which employs an effective Inter-agency Operating Model (IOM) while managing with independent and separate authorities. Additionally, while overall morale and workplace climate at the Site appeared positive, a few concerns were noted.

The workforce identified ongoing organizational alignments and initiatives within the NRO, NSA, and NGA agencies as areas of concern. The Inspection Team found a mixed level of understanding among the workforce of the NRO’s Operations Transformation effort. While those personnel whose mission will be most impacted by the Operations Transformation seemed to have a better understanding of the effort, the nascent nature of the transformation has produced a climate of “wait and see” as to how the effort will impact the Commander’s authorities, budget, and mission efficiency and effectiveness. The NRO workforce, in particular, fears that the organization is returning to a stovepipe environment with little autonomy at the Site level.

The workforce also informed inspectors of concerns with government and contractor staffing at ADF-C. NRO Cadre personnel expressed a desire for more information related to the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) and NRO-specific processes related to the newly established personnel system. Additionally, because of limited ability for some contractors to integrate with the workforce (e.g., morale events, awards and
recognition), some contractors opined that the government/contractor relationship has gradually declined over time. DLT and contractor Site lead meetings reportedly are not as frequent and regular as they could be to maintain optimal contractor relations. Contractors also shared concerns related to unclear roles and responsibilities, as well as concerns about the skills and experience of government contracting professionals. Finally, differences in agency and military service policies related to transgender personnel, civilian time-off, military commitments, and early release (to name only a few) are contributing to confusion and frustration at the site.

Finally, ADF-C personnel expressed some concerns about their quality of life, but the net opinion of quality of life was positive. Shift schedules and lack of on-site and on-base food options for evening/night shift workers remain unresolved issues. There is continued frustration with the lack of adequate on-base medical facilities, quality of on-base housing construction (e.g. poor insulation resulting in high out-of-pocket costs), BAFB Child Development Center availability/hours, and the lack of on-base Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) services. The Site has been working these concerns with the BAFB Commander who recently conducted outreach to the ADF-C workforce in a Town Hall.

(U) Intelligence Oversight

The DLT has set a supportive tone that enables a culture of collaboration in the Intelligence Oversight (IO) area throughout the Site. Overall, the workforce knowledge of IO standards is very good, and IO-required training is tracked automatically by NRO University (NROU) and is tied to continued access to the NRO IT systems. Additionally, interviews of ADF-C Watch Floor personnel indicated they were well versed in understanding the requirements. While there were no findings related to the NRO IO Program at Site, the inspection team noted one observation for an area in need of improvement.

(U) Mission Systems and Engineering

Overall, the Mission Systems and Engineering programs, activities, and operations at ADF-C perform at or above NRO requirements. The inspectors issued two commendables for operational activities at ADF-C.
Inspectors also noted areas for improvement and issued four findings that require attention at the HQ level.

(U//FOUO) Facilities and Safety

Facilities and safety inspectors found a number of challenges associated with ADF-C’s maintenance of a 45-year-old facility with aged power, cooling, and other equipment. Challenges in the areas of facilities, emergency management, personnel health and safety, inspections and labeling, fire protection, environmental management, and general safety are highlighted below.

(U//FOUO) Inspectors identified several items for improvement in the facilities area.

Finally, inspectors conducted a walk-through of the new MOUNTAINVIEW facility and a number of issues were noted that will be addressed before or during the building’s operations and maintenance (O&M) transition to the NRO.

(U//FOUO) Inspectors noted a single issue in the emergency management area. The new MOUNTAINVIEW building will use a separate public address system to make emergency announcements (such as snow closures) which will require adjustments in Site practices to ensure the safety of all personnel. With regard to personnel health and safety, inspectors found...
With regard to fire protection, inspectors noted several areas for improvement in order to protect personnel and comply with federal requirements (e.g., National Fire Protection Association 1 Fire Code; American with Disabilities Act) and NRO policy (e.g., ADF-C Emergency Safety and Health (ESH) Plan). The inspectors issued findings that covered the following shortfalls:

In the area of environmental management, inspectors noted deficiencies in the program at ADF-C.

In the general safety area, inspectors issued a commendable to ADF-C.

**Resource Programs**

The majority of the inspection results were favorable within the resource programs area, which encompasses the personnel and support functions at the Site. Inspectors issued a commendable to the NRO Property Management Team.

The inspectors also identified a few ADF-C and NRO-related findings that require attention.
(U) Security

(S//REL) Inspectors noted two findings in the area.

(U//FOUQ) In the area of

(S//TK//REL) Inspectors issued five findings in the
In the area of Information Technology and Systems (ITS), inspectors issued a commendable in the area of Information Technology and Systems. Inspectors found that the Information Technology and Systems (ITS) area has improved since the last joint inspection of three agencies. The three agencies collaborate to sustain current IT systems. A summary of the team’s findings in the areas of infrastructure, configuration management (CM), and information systems security (ISS) follows. In the infrastructure area, inspectors commended data center managers for...
Inspectors found the overall local CM program is efficient and ensures all stakeholders are aware of changes affecting the ADF-C systems.

In the area of information systems security, inspectors found ADF-C personnel are knowledgeable and demonstrate a commitment to ensuring that all aspects of their programs are implemented effectively. However, similar to joint inspections at other MGSs, the inspectors noted concerns in the areas of:

(U) Training

(U) Inspectors issued a commendable for ADF-C’s overall training performance citing a comprehensive OI and exceptional training posture. A second commendable was noted regarding ADF-C’s School of Leadership and Management (SLM), which provides an outstanding program focused on leadership and organizational development for staff at Site. The Site maximizes local training resources to improve mission readiness through impressive coordination between mission elements and tenant units (i.e., NSA and NGA).

(U) No findings were issued in the training area, although two observations were noted regarding mandatory training and requirements for NRO IT access.
(U) MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

(U//FOUO) The OIG team issued sixty NRO recommendations to the Site. Due to the proactive nature of the Site, a number of the recommendations were closed prior to issuance of the final report. The OIG team also issued forty recommendations to NRO HQ elements.

(U//FOUO) The Site and NRO HQ elements concurred with the open recommendations and provided corrective action plans to address the deficiencies. A list of recommendations and management responses/corrective action plans are included in the attached final report.
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