




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5 January 1971


MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Science  
and Technology

SUBJECT :  and EOI Program Planning

Both the  program and the EOI program are about to enter new phases of activity. In the case of  there is the initiation of the  competitive design phase. In the case of EOI, the critical decision making activities in January are followed immediately by Phase II System Definition. In both cases we must establish a CIA position on how to proceed in these programs and develop a definitive plan for the year's activities. I have just completed a review of both of these programs and have concluded that some changes from previous plans are required. I have noted particularly in the EOI program we have some open decisions which must be firmed up immediately. This memo contains my recommendations on both  and EOI for your comment. I would like to review these recommendations with you no later than 6 January so that we can jointly seek Carl's concurrence before the end of the week.




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
SUBJECT:  and EOI Program Planning



B. EOI

1. There are three major EOI program issues which need immediate resolution: (1) CIA recommendations to ExCom for 29 January meeting; (2) timing and content of Phase II System Definition; and (3) supplementary system studies. The resolution of these issues is complicated by the readout system studies now under way at SAFSP. I think we should push as hard as possible to make ExCom focus on the systems alternatives on 29 January and select from the alternatives a single course of action leading to an early systems acquisition phase. However, since in any case ExCom will have an opportunity to review the program again prior to the initiation of an acquisition phase, a clean January decision may be difficult to obtain. As a more practical

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SUBJECT: [ ] and EOI Program Planning

and I think acceptable alternative, we should push for proceeding with Phase II System Definition with a single EOI configuration while at the same time carrying some low level CIA parallel studies in the same vein as the SAFSP alternative studies. If ExCom then elected any of the OSP or SAFSP backup alternatives, they would then also have to accept a schedule delay while a detailed design and competitive phase was conducted. At the same time, ExCom would be preserving the option of proceeding with an early acquisition program by conducting a competitive Phase II activity for the most promising selected system.

2. Consistent with this strategy, the CIA should recommend that the EOI system Configuration A be selected for Phase II System Definition. We would, however, propose to relax the Configuration A design requirements for the first two flight vehicles from a best [ ] to a best [ ]. This relaxation will result in some flexibility in dealing with the development program problems as they arise while at the same time leading to an early capability for a GAMBIT-3 or better image quality.

3. The major outstanding configuration question is whether or not to incorporate [ ] at a poorer image quality. Depending upon how the various study activities go during the upcoming months, we may defer final decision on that issue until a month or so into Phase II. We have made a firm decision on using [ ] relays [ ]

4. Based on our review of the Phase I contractor reports, we have concluded that a six months' Phase II rather than the planned eight months' Phase II will be sufficient to support the generation of solid proposals. All four contractors have done an excellent job and have expended substantial resources of their own in Phase I. Table II is a revised schedule for EOI based on this reduction of Phase II duration. This schedule change will not have any significant funding impact and has the additional advantage of phasing the subsystem technology programs more efficiently into the systems acquisition phase.

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SUBJECT:  and EOI Program Planning

5. OSP has been tasked to submit to the NRO a document summarizing the status of the program and recommending program alternatives for decision. This paper will include a summary of the Phase I Configuration A and B studies, a review of the subsystem engineering development programs, and if you and Carl concur, a recommendation that a modified Configuration A be pursued in Phase II. The proposed schedule will be as discussed above.

6. We should also consider carrying one or at most two supplementary system studies at one or both of the losing imaging satellite contractors. Two major candidates for low level systems studies are Configuration B essentially as we now know it with the possible inclusion of some additional  and Configuration B optics with the tape storage camera, or one of its variants. These studies should be pursued at about the same level as the SAFSP study at LMSC. The primary objective of these studies would be to satisfy the presumed ExCom desire to have all options available for consideration at the time the acquisition decision is made and at the same time ensuring that the SAFSP does not expand its studies to include non-GAMBIT-3 based alternatives. In all cases, it is imperative that we constrain SAFSP to the 44" GAMBIT-3 optics and the GAMBIT spacecraft as it now exists. I would like your guidance on how best to approach the issue of supplementary studies to the NRO.

7. OSP must start actions this week which are dependent upon resolution of these issues. I would appreciate your earliest consideration of this paper.

HAROLD L. BROWNMAN  
Director of Special Projects

Attachments: a/s

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Page Four

GAMBIT-3  
OPTICS



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Attachment I to:  
BYE-106781-71

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Table II: Revised EOI Program Schedule

18 January 1971	Source Selection Complete
29 January 1971	ExCom
1 February 1971	Start Phase II
30 July 1971	Receive Contractor Proposals
15 September 1971	Source Selection Complete
1 October 1971	Start Acquisition Phase
April - May 1975	First I/S Launch

Attachment II to:  
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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Acting DD/S&T		<i>ED</i>
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<b>ACTION</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>DIRECT REPLY</b>
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		<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>PREPARE REPLY</b>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>RECOMMENDATION</b>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>RETURN</b>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>SIGNATURE</b>
<b>Remarks:</b>			
<p>Please raise the subject matter of this memorandum at the Monday morning staff meeting (18 January).</p> <p>At convenience, please ascertain whether or not Ed David has received a copy of this letter. If not, please provide him with one since I believe it would be a mistake for Packard and me to be privy to its contents while David remains innocent.</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;"><i>WJ</i></p> <p>(Xerox copy of letter has been sent to DD/I FYI.)</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
<b>FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.</b>			<b>DATE</b>
Richard Helms, DCI			6/6/71
			15/1/71
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FORM NO. 1-67 **237**

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEMS  
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January 15, 1971

Dear Dick:

In the past two years I have had many occasions while studying foreign policy problems to use the excellent photographic reconnaissance data provided by satellite systems. I have also been informed of your active plans for future satellites, and recognize that the systems that you now have under development will be of tremendous assistance to those of us called upon daily to act on foreign and national security matters.

It is disturbing to learn, however, that even with the fastest possible implementation of these plans we probably must wait some five years for a satellite system that could give us, on short notice, photographic coverage of areas where activities may be in train critically affecting our international interests and plans. Our manned aircraft and our drones are a valuable asset, but their use is often severely restricted by political difficulties or hazards. I realize that the new satellite system presently planned for deployment this year will increase our coverage and to some extent our flexibility, but it cannot provide the quick responsiveness and flexibility that we require for crisis management. It also seems to me to be clear that the vulnerability to countermeasures of our present satellite systems makes somewhat questionable our complete reliance upon them in times of deep crisis.

My staff has discussed this matter with me in some detail in recent weeks, and they tell me that preliminary investigations by interagency expert groups indicate strongly that current American technology, using components now on the shelf, could provide us with an adequate twenty-four hour response system giving us good photographic detail relatively quickly and cheaply. I urge you and your colleagues to support and participate in the development of such a system, above and beyond others you are developing, because it would satisfy a very important intelligence requirement of the Department of State.

I understand that at the EXCOM meeting scheduled on January 29 you intend to discuss the Electronic Optical Imagery (EOI), near real time satellite system. It is my hope that every effort will be expended to

The Honorable  
Richard Helms,  
Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency.

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KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEMS  
JOINTLY

bring this system into readiness as soon as it is feasible. I also feel strongly that you should now launch a design study of a low cost satellite system with a quick response capability which could be complementary to the more elaborate systems, and fill the gap until the near real time system is ready. This EXCOM meeting could provide a timely and appropriate occasion at which to initiate action on the simpler system which would meet State Department needs, as well as those of other agencies concerned with crisis management. We do not see these systems as competitive but, on the contrary, as complementary. As Ray Cline puts it, we need a "Model T" or "Volkswagen" to get us to the brushfire on time when our more expensive and less maneuverable Cadillacs are not able to cover that particular crisis on that particular day or week.

Because of the urgency of this matter, I am sending the Secretary of Defense a copy of this letter, in order that coordination can be expedited. Ray Cline tells me you are already aware of our interest in this subject and he will, of course, be available at any time to give you further details of our views.

Sincerely yours,

  
William P. RogersBYE-17351/71  
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CIA - Hon.	Richard Helms	15	JAN 1971			JJK	15 JAN 1971
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# BYEMAN- TALENT -KEYHOLE

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