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22 APR 1971

BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DCI

Revision # 1

SUBJECT: EXCOM Issues

1. There are three issues concerning the EOI (ZAMAN) system:

a. Should the [redacted] be made part of the design studies for the remainder of the Phase II effort? The addition increases the area coverage capability of the system and its flexibility at an additional cost of about [redacted]. We recommend you support this addition. We expect the other members to support it also.

b. Should the ongoing Phase II competition be continued as planned toward a contractor selection before the November EXCOM? We believe all members will agree that technical accomplishments since the last EXCOM fully support going ahead as planned with the definition studies.

c. There may be a question about schedule slip of EOI to allow for one of the interim systems. We have submitted costs for a 1 and 2 year slip. We believe that any longer delay in starting development would argue that we terminate EOI now, with a view to recompeting and restructuring the program whenever the budget would support a new start.

2. With regard to the interim systems, the relative costs, schedules and performances are quite important. The interim systems have been costed on the basis of what we consider to be high risk, "success oriented" schedules. On this basis

[redacted] than EOI, and Film Readout Gambit (FROG) about 1-1½ years. You can expect Messrs. Packard and David to say that the EOI schedule is more likely to slip than [redacted] or FROG. However, FROG is a very complicated system and we believe you can be comfortable about taking a position that EXCOM should consider all the programs equally likely to slip and to suffer equivalent cost escalations.

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With regard to performance it is clear that [redacted]

FROG gives better crisis coverage and, in addition, a capability for surveillance and indications/warning intelligence. The Air Force claims that it can also replace 2 GAMBIT missions a year and thereby makes the total program cost impact look less severe. [redacted] cost numbers follow the Air Force line.) However, this would severely reduce our coverage of key technical intelligence targets and Mr. Inlow recommends that you not allow this assumption to be made. (The cost figures we put together for you are in line with Mr. Inlow's views.)

We think everyone will agree that in comparing EOI and FROG performance, EOI is significantly more capable in all categories including resolution, target coverage, timeliness and growth potential.

3. The essence of the interim system issue is whether 1 to 2 years earlier crisis capability is worth the additional money needed to buy such a system and the delay to EOI availability which might result. The five year costs and first launch dates of the programs suggested for consideration by NRO are:

[redacted]	[redacted]	
FROG	- 675M;	Feb 1974
EOI	[redacted]	May 1975

*Sydney
4/15/74*

Mr. Packard seems inclined to say "there's no doubt we eventually want to develop EOI, but maybe we should go ahead with FROG now and relieve pressure on EOI which we could start a couple or so years later." John McLucas also follows this line and suggests it might be best to make no decision at this meeting.

We think that the best solution is to buy no interim systems and believe there is enough information available now to support that conclusion. We recommend you argue along the following lines:

a. Assume that there is no disagreement about the fact that the ZAMAN system is the way we want to go as soon as possible and that the technology is ready for a development start on December 1. The issue then is whether to start something interim a little before but in addition to ZAMAN.

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b. From the budgetary standpoint alone it is unrealistic to plan for a \$675M FROG program to be followed a few years later by a [redacted] EOI program. Even if it were, we question the advisability of paying \$675M just to get an earlier (by 1½ years) crisis capability. This opinion becomes even stronger when the initiation of FROG forces a delay in the realization of EOI.

c. Therefore FROG can only be realistically considered instead of rather than in addition to EOI. Panel recommendations and EXCOM decisions over the past years have committed over [redacted] to EOI and have already discarded this alternative.

d. [redacted]
[redacted] ZAMAN becomes available is not worth [redacted] particularly if that money comes at the expense of ZAMAN or some other NRP program.

4. In summary, we believe you can put this issue to rest for good by taking the following line:

Although you recognize the value of crisis reconnaissance you are not willing to pay the price that seems to be necessary to advance its availability by 1 or 2 years. Until EOI is operational, you will be satisfied with the capability provided by the longer lifetime GAMBITS and HEXAGONS (which are already planned) and by the

[redacted]
want to say something to the effect that you are the individual really "under the gun" on this subject and thus qualified to make this judgement.

We think Schlesinger would have no choice but to support this position.

5. The next most acceptable fallback position would be to accept [redacted] provided there be no slip to EOI. If, however, those who want FROG cannot be turned aside, we suggest you insist on more study with a decision deferred until the November EXCOM.

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