

Functions: AFSC ✓
Functions: (S) NRO

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21 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The 1962 AFSC Assault on the (S) NRO

The attached papers were generated by a Study Group convened under General Schriever's sponsorship in the Spring of 1962 to "do something about the (S) NRO problem." The AFSC grievances against the (S) NRO are self-evident in the papers. Colonel [redacted] and [redacted] headed this group.

The papers were handed (undated and unsigned) to Dr. Charyk in June 1962. Since that date, General Martin has held them. In August 1964, at the time of his departure, he gave them to me.

Attachment

[redacted]
PAUL WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

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SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

TO: Under Secretary of the Air Force

1. I am aware that you are in the process of developing basic policies for establishing the functions and responsibilities within the NRO on a sound basis. To assist you in this task, I am taking this opportunity to present my views for improving the management relationships for the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). These relationships should simplify your management problems, while at the same time enabling AFSC to maximize its contribution to the NRP.

2. Up until recently the informal arrangements we have had with the CIA and within SSD itself have been equal to the task at hand. However, with the growth of the NRP now that we are approaching a large number of launches in 1962, with attendant multiple orbital control problems and the initiation of black projects by the Air Force our problems have multiplied. At SSD alone more than one-half of the personnel are working either directly or indirectly on the NRP. Authorities and responsibilities have become diffused and confused down to and including the contractors involved in our space efforts.

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3. Under the present security arrangements, artificial restraints such as exist between the NRP and non-NRP projects make coordination of resources and support very difficult. A security plan for all space activities as presented to you on 5 January 1962, should greatly enhance the Commander's ability at SSD to manage more efficiently. It would appear that if the proposed DOD security directive is published, many of your problems in the NRO would be materially alleviated.

4. Recognition of the increasing scope and magnitude of the NRP and a potential solution to the security problem leads me to suggest an alternate management arrangement. The NRO will in time assume paramount stature and become the arena for many political arguments on program scope, content, and direction. In the interest of program stability and national security, it is suggested that the NRO concentrate on establishing a permanent jointly manned office to review and approve projects in NRP; assign approved requirements, and prepare mission satellite operation directives.

5. The above course of action would result in assigning approved NRP projects to AFSC for implementation as the executive agent of the NRO and as outlined in the 6 March 1961 DOD directive.

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Under this management arrangement, I would in turn allocate the resources along with the assigned requirements to SSD which would be established as a strong, central activity having operating management responsibility for all aspects of the NRP assigned. Our "red-line" procedures would give the same rapid response as the present arrangement.

6. This approach to the problem has many inherent future benefits. It will provide program flexibility, improved capabilities, and counter-measures. It frees the policy makers from the burdens of implementation and operational details as the NRP progresses. It will safeguard other essential space efforts by optimizing the resources made available. Finally, it protects the Air Force capabilities from further inroads by other agencies or departments.

7. I trust these views will be of assistance to you in the development of these very urgent and critical matters of national policy and procedure. Should you desire, I will be most happy to discuss them with you in greater detail.

B. A. SCHRIEVER
General, USAF

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MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

I. Introduction.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss appropriate management arrangements for the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). Various basic policy proposals for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) will be covered with particular reference to current problems and an alternative approach aimed at a more practical solution. Although this paper will be limited to satellite overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy, mapping photography, and electronic signal collection, other overflight systems could be managed in a similar fashion.

II. The Problem.

The immediate objective is to arrive at basic policy decisions which will determine the relationships between the NRO and the agencies involved and to define the functions and responsibilities within the NRO. The solution to this problem is dependent upon devising a management scheme which will best serve the national needs for the planning, development, procurement, operation and exploitation of reconnaissance systems.

Such a scheme should provide for a single individual to execute programs established by a jointly constituted NRO of designated DOD

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and CIA personnel. This scheme should also provide for maximum amount of cover and the minimum of interference with other national high priority programs.

III. Background.

The present management pattern has evolved out of expedient actions following a series of discontinuities in the management and direction of the satellite reconnaissance program. The program originally initiated by the Air Force and approved as a system in July 1956, was later transferred to ARPA in May 1958. The program was returned to the Air Force on 17 November 1959 and placed under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force. It was expedient at that time to establish a Director of the Satellite and Missile Observation System (SAMOS) Project reporting directly to the Secretary of the Air Force. On 6 September 1961, the NRO was established based on a DOD-CIA agreement.

Prior to the establishment of the NRO, CIA had jointly participated in the NRP with the Air Force providing support to the various black projects under CIA's control. Since the establishment of the NRO, there has been little change in the actual conduct of the program. In the meantime, the program has grown to such size that it is dominating the entire defense space effort. The shifting of various projects from

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white to black with various shades of gray has resulted in considerable confusion and diffusion of effort.

Now that policies are being considered for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the NRO, it is time to take a fresh look at the total problem. A management scheme is needed which will not only take care of the situation today, but one which will also provide for continuity and plan for the Nation's future needs.

IV. Present Situation.

The scope of the NRP and its interactions with other space programs is frequently not recognized. Figure I illustrates the programs and activities of the Space Systems Division (SSD) of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) in three categories: those which are a part of the NRP; those which are not a part of the NRP; and those which are common to both. Also shown are the management channels used. In the aggregate, the organizations involved comprise close to [REDACTED] military spaces augmented by many [REDACTED] contractor personnel. They reside at sites and stations around the globe.

An examination of Figure I reveals that the fully funded, highest priority programs are under the direct control of SAFUS, while the other space programs, including those in support of other agencies,

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are under the Commander SSD. The SAMOS Program Director (SAFSP) and a token number [REDACTED] of his staff are assigned to SAFUS. Actually the manning of the SAMOS office includes [REDACTED] spaces, most of which are supplied by SSD. Since SAFSP has the additional duty as Vice Commander SSD and his deputy has the additional duty as the Deputy SSD for Satellite Systems, they enjoy double-hat control over many other elements of SSD.

This diffusion of responsibility gives rise to many problems. It does not provide for adequate planning, coordination of effort and resources for a growing national space program. Under the present arrangement divided responsibilities and security complications make it very difficult to have effective management. Although it is impossible to sort out individuals in detail, it is safe to estimate that one-fourth of SSD is under the direct control of SAFSP, with an additional one-fourth to one-third under his nominal control.

In like fashion, the contractors are confused by unclear channels of authority and responsibility. Since the same hardware is often used in NRP and non-NRP projects, security, priority and Secretarial prestige tend to cloud normal management channels. Similar confusion is extending to the satellite launch, command and control, and recovery organizations which are confronted with multiple orbit control and increasing launch rates for all space programs. In addition to the organic elements of SSD, many organizations of AFSC and other

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government agencies support and interact with the NRP and SSD programs. The national ranges, military installations and units of DOD contribute to and participate in the launch, operation and recovery of satellites. The various technical centers, laboratories and test facilities in AFSC contribute to the programs on a continuing basis. The CIA is providing technical and operational direction to the NRO on those programs which are identified as black projects. Elements of OSD and the National Security Agency are repeatedly attempting to exercise control over the NRO.

In short, there are many pressures at play and while Secretarial prestige can cope with many of the problems on a day-to-day basis, the present arrangement depends too much upon the strength and integrity of a single person. As a result, continuity, consistency, and sustained effort are subject to severe erosion.

V. Security.

Another item of concern under the present scheme as the NRP is currently scheduled, is the question of security. By January 1965, according to the plans being made there will only be one white project left in the NRP (Project 35) unless Project 102 (Ferret) is extended. The cover is already thin on DISCOVERER and will probably not hold up through the summer. The proposed security plan for all space

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efforts, recently presented by AFSC, would alleviate the tendency to go black on the entire NRP. The CIA may desire to retain management control on all black contracts which greatly complicates management. Further, the shifting of white projects to black creates confusion and division of assigned responsibilities. Headquarters AFSC and SSD are organized and have the machinery to contract for black programs and should be given the entire task.

Another potential problem in the present management arrangement is the dependence on an individual as a person to head up the NRO. Could the head of the NRO be replaced by an individual from the CIA? Or, since the Navy and Army have been given spaces in the NRO, it could be a member from one of the other military departments. If Dr. Charyk is replaced by someone who will only wear the DOD/AR hat, what will happen to the direct and indirect controls SAFUS has over most of the elements of SSD in connection with the NRP? Certainly a management scheme with more permanence is desirable.

VI. An Alternative Solution.

In order to develop a sound counter-proposal, it is necessary to examine the total problem in broad perspective and select the basic factors for further consideration. Figure II illustrates the functional process in the formulation of reconnaissance requirements

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and a projected Air Force concept for providing the hardware and the operation of it to satisfy the requirements received.

The problem breaks down into four functional areas as depicted on Figure II. The National Policy area deals with National Objectives and decides the level of effort and manner in which these objectives may be satisfied. The Satellite Reconnaissance Requirements area must validate and determine the priority of meeting all U.S. approved reconnaissance requirements. The Program Review and Operational Control area limits itself to the final determination of the programs needed to satisfy authorized requirements and the overall control of satellite operations to meet the priorities for intelligence as established by the USIB. The actual performance and accomplishment of the NRP is delegated to the Air Force and, in turn, is redelegated to AFSC as the executive agent to the NRO. This is in consonance with the 6 March 1961, DOD Directive and provides a single point and individual who can be given the authority and resources to do the total job. It further eliminates the divided responsibilities and complications which result when the two latter functions are combined.

An organizational chart has been prepared, Figure III, to depict the relationships which would exist based on the functional management concept portrayed in Figure II. The Commander AFSC would be directly responsible to the NRO for carrying out all aspects of the National Aerospace Reconnaissance Program (NARP). The

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Commander AFSC with the assistance of a small staff would keep informed on the status of satellite reconnaissance and would allocate resources along with the assigned requirements to SSD.

The Commander SSD would consolidate all of his requirements, both NRP and non-NRP and implement them in accordance with the priority and availability of resources. He would be responsible for all activities from receipt of the requirement to the delivery of the "take". This management scheme would permit the Commander SSD to give attention to the impact that future technological advances would have on the program and alternate courses of action which must be devised to counter Soviet capabilities or changes in National Policy. He will also have the flexibility of adjusting his organization or shifting his resources to meet expediencies or changes in the NRP on a more practical basis.

Procedures are in existence at the present time to give the NARP the special emphasis and attention it would require. The "red-line" (AFR 375-6) procedures with only slight modification permit the same rapid response that exists under the NRO organization today. A good example of how these procedures would work can be illustrated with the AGENA D program which supports the NRP as well as non-NRP projects. The AGENA D Program Director reports directly to the Commander SSD. The "red-line" system is used to

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keep higher management levels informed. A SYSTO has been appointed in the Air Staff and the program is reviewed and approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. The "red-line" channels are direct from the Program Director to the Secretary of the Air Force for status and decisions when the urgency requires such action.

The NRO would be a jointly staffed office with members from the three military departments and CIA, and headed by the DOD/AR. The DOD/AR should be a representative of OSAF since the Air Force will be the executive agent for almost all of the NRP. The NRO will be constituted to review and approve programs, receive and assign authorized requirements and prepare mission directives.

VII. Conclusions.

1. The current and projected NRP is of a size which will not only destroy cover, but will seriously tax the resources of AFSC; particularly in the space area.

2. Previously employed management arrangements are becoming overtaxed and are leading to confusion, and diffusion of responsibility and authority.

3. A sound solution is to establish an NRO, jointly manned by CIA and DOD as a program review and approval activity with the additional function of assigning approved requirements and

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preparing mission directives. The Air Force and, in turn, AFSC would be designated as the executive agent to prepare plans to satisfy assigned requirements and implement the approved plans, conducting such satellite operations as covered in mission directives. SSD would be established as a strong, central activity having operating management responsibility for all aspects of the program including integration of the non-NRP projects to optimize the total effort expended on space activities.

4. A comprehensive security and information plan for all space efforts would alleviate many of the present artificial management restraints which is severely complicating the efficient conduct of both NRP and non-NRP space projects.

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



Figure I.

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
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Figure II.

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Organization



Resource Allocation
 Program Review
 National Directives
 Forces/Program
 Coordination
 Management
 Planning
 Programming
 Operations
 Contractors
 Use-suit personnel

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