
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


## (S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

January 12, 1971




SUBJECT: Strategic Forces Survivability Study

On January 7, I attended a working group meeting at the Agency to review a draft of one section of the Strategic Forces Survivability Study. The overall study is being performed at the request of the President through the National Security Council. Bill Baier's group at the Agency has prepared the section on the U.S. capability to detect against selected Soviet Weapons Improvements - 1970-1978. The OSD is working on the other sections of the study which apparently deal with our overall survivability capability. The overall study is going to coordinate with the JSOP and, I think, the SIOP by the Defense Program Review Committee so that the National Security Council can review the overall U.S. strategic and defensive posture.


There are three items of note pertaining to the section of the study on the Capability to Detect Improvements which I pass along for your information.

1. Admiral Moorer, on October 21, requested Dr. Kissinger to consider a formal updating of the SALT Verification Study which was completed in October 1969. Dr. Kissinger responded by memo on December 4, stating that "we attempted to focus on the verification aspect in the terms of reference for the survivability study where we required a review of our ability to detect and acquire demonstrable evidence of violations of an agreement. I think that this study will accomplish what you suggested." Therefore, there is not expected to be a formal update of the verification study.



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- 2. The section of the study under review contained a subsection on systems and capabilities expected to be available through 1978. This subsection consisted of a COMIREX style projection of photosatellites, based largely on the October COMIREX study; and also a section on SIGINT capabilities. I obtained comments from Ed Zura and Bill Kennedy on the latter. In the review at the Agency, the patent optimism contained in the section of the overall study was toned down at my request.
- 3. One of the other shortcomings of the study draft was that it was not specific enough. This creates a dilemma in that to make the study more specific, then the classification is needed. The coordinated executive summaries on the studies for the National Security Council will be maintained at the Top Secret level so that the action agencies will have as much data access as possible. In an effort to resolve this dilemma, I asked Bill Baier to work two versions of the capability to Detect Improvements section one at the level and one at the Top Secret level, each for the appropriate agencies. He is attempting to do this now.

RECOMMENDATION: This memorandum is for your information only, no action is necessary.

HAROLD S. COYLE, JR. Major, USAF

