MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Laird and Packard on 19 May

Tagboard. I said that we had had a successful Tagboard flight over the Hawaiian Islands and that based on this we would now like to run one over Alaska because we felt the need to get more coverage over land rather than over water. We cannot evaluate our systems very well flying over water. I told him that we had approval of the FAA and had selected a route which would minimize the probability of any failure which might result in this overflying a populated area. Before Laird could answer, Packard said, well now before you waste a flight flying over Alaska, let's see if we don't have another mission for it, and we'll know within the next 10 days or so.

Meeting with Senator Ellender and Company. I told them that Senator Ellender gave me a 10-minute lecture on how we should have never gotten involved in Southeast Asia and that if people have been listening to his speeches over the last ten years they know that he has proved right so far and more right as time goes on. We then described our NRO program to him; he seemed impressed with it, although he had a little trouble keeping all the systems sorted out; but he did much better following it than I thought he would. Then when we described our new systems he said, but you are already doing such a good job with the current systems, I don't see why you need all these new ones. We did the best we could with this type question. But when it was all over he said that he had been shocked to find that we were spending $____ on intelligence; that he was not sure that there was any money being wasted here but that was an awful lot of money and it was hard for him to believe that we really needed to spend that much. He said that we had better start looking for places that we can cut because he's pretty sure that when this thing goes on the floor there are going to have to be cuts made. With respect to our program he said he wasn't sure
that we had to take any cuts but we certainly had to take them somewhere in the intelligence field. On the way out Woodward suggested that we take a 5% cut and see if that wouldn't take care of the Senator's problems. I reviewed all this with Laird and he said that he agreed with me that this was not the only problem we had to worry about, that we were likely to end up with about a 10% cut in the Air Force. I said that in that case I felt that we should take a 5% cut in the NRO and that we could do that without too much trouble. Dave said that before agreeing to that he would have to take a much closer look.

John L. McLucahs