CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN

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T.S.-S.A.
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A. BACKGROUND

The intensity and scope of Caribbean surveillance has been increasing steadily over the past several months, with heavy focus on Cuba. The reason for this growth is expressed in the formal communique of the Informal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, which reads, in part:

The meeting observed that it is desirable to intensity surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the communist regime in Cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere.

B. GENERAL SITUATION

The increased surveillance activity takes many forms, illustrated by the variety of instruments and vehicles which can be, or are, employed. The latter include satellites, U-2 aircraft, conventional aircraft, drones, surface vessels, and submarines. These vehicles are the carriers for many kinds of equipment - some standard, some
quite new - and take part in a wide range of operations intended to
satisfy a complex set of national requirements.

C. PROBLEM

In reviewing the diverse requirements, vehicles, instruments,
and operations, a question arises: Are the national requirements
for Caribbean intelligence being fulfilled as completely as possible,
and in the most efficient manner? Specifically, are the best available
equipments being used in the right places? Are proper new equipments
being planned and built? Is the total coverage organized on a master
pattern? Are there undesirable gaps or overlaps in the coverage?

It is generally agreed that there is an urgent need for insuring
that Caribbean surveillance is managed efficiently and effectively as
a total national program.

D. BROAD MANAGEMENT SOLUTION

The objective of insuring a well-managed Caribbean surveillance
program can be met best by designating a single executor for the
function. It is proposed that the Secretary of Defense be assigned
that function (covering the areas of ELINT, COMINT, and photo sur-
veillance) for the duration of the present emergency. With this
assignment will go the authority to task all governmental departments and agencies, as required to meet the mission.

E. SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS

Figure 1 illustrates the details of an arrangement for managing Caribbean surveillance. It will be noted, both in this chart and the discussion which follows, that the arrangement is based largely on presently-established functions and procedures.

1. Requirements

National Caribbean surveillance requirements are developed by the U. S. Intelligence Board and furnished to the Department of Defense.

2. Program Management

As indicated in D, above, the Secretary of Defense is designated as the single executor for Caribbean surveillance (specifically for ELINT, COMINT, and photographic data).

3. Technical Responsibility

The National Reconnaissance Office would have its mission augmented - for the duration of the present emergency - to
include technical responsibility for all intelligence collection
in the Caribbean area (excepting agent activities), and all
photographic data processing. Acting for the Secretary of
Defense, the NRO will be responsible for receiving UNE
requirements, and translating them to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the terms of the most effective and efficient technical
plan. In carrying out this responsibility the NRO will super-

supervise the technical development, installation, testing, and
evaluation of surveillance equipment, tasking governmental
departments and agencies such as the NSA, Navy, Air Force,
Army, CIA, etc., as necessary in this area. It will review

operational plans continually, analyzing them against the

4. Program Recommendations and Approvals
The Special Group will continue to provide the necessary
final program recommendations and approvals for Caribbean
surveillance.
1. Operations

2. Product Processing

3. Data Exploitation

F. ADVANTAGES OF THE PLAN

This management plan meets the recognized requirement for establishing a single point of responsibility for the Caribbean surveillance program. It meets this need without disrupting presently assigned functions and procedures, without the need for more manpower.
G. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Secretary of Defense be designated the single executor for the Caribbean surveillance program, including ELINT, COMINT, and photographic surveillance, for the duration of the present emergency.

2. That the mission of the National Reconnaissance Office be augmented to include technical responsibility for ELINT, COMINT, and photographic surveillance of the Caribbean, including responsibility for all photographic data processing.

3. That the overall Caribbean surveillance management arrangement illustrated in Figure 1 be approved.