MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PACKARD

SUBJECT: Actions Approved at the ExCom Meeting (23 April 1971)

The attached memorandum covers some thoughts about the recent ExCom meeting which I would like to review with you.

John L. McLucas

Attachment
SOME EXCOM THOUGHTS

At the meeting on 23 April, the ExCom reviewed the work which had been called for at the January ExCom meeting concerning an and also reviewed the studies which had been done to see if

The ExCom reached certain conclusions and made the following decisions for the first time:

1. Develop an

Firm proposals will be in hand by the time of the July ExCom Meeting.

2.

The consequences of these two decisions are many. I will mention some of them. The overall effect is to commit the NRO to major expenditures to achieve
By the time of the July ExCom meeting—about two months from now—reasonably accurate estimates of system costs can be made. Today, about the best we can do is estimate costs at about for FY 1971 through 1977.

The incremental cost of adding these two programs to the baseline NRO budget is roughly $100,000 a year for five years.

Added costs will be roughly as follows:

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<th>FY 72</th>
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The baseline NRO budget for the ExCom approved programs is as follows:

Including the total of baseline totals as follows:
The recent OMB report cites generally valid criticisms of the performance of intelligence groups and does not omit criticisms of the NRO. We are accused of unnecessary duplication of systems and lack of adequate control over those NRO programs executed by CIA.

The course that was selected by ExCom at the last meeting is not universally acclaimed. I have discussed the outcome of the meeting with Messrs. Helms, David, Foster, Froehlke, Seamans, Schlesinger, Anderson (FPIAB), and others. With the exception of Dick Helms, these men almost universally think that a different course would be better and are in suprising agreement as to what we should do instead.* Specifically, they well challenge whether we ought to finish the development. We are open to challenge each year for five years. Our recent good luck in passing Congressional committee scrutiny with essentially no cuts is due at least in part to our having cut the budget ourselves below the FYDP and returning about in unused funds below the President's budget over the last four years. If we now come in for requests above the FYDP, we will be reversing recent trends and inviting criticism as well as cuts.

The way to avoid Congressional cuts, according to this

*Admiral Anderson did not take a position either way on this issue.
The desire would be to replicate if possible; if not, then to reduce their frequency so that overall costs would be less than or no greater than they are now.

I believe that these criticisms are well taken and should not be ignored, and that we should take some action dealing with to reduce its vulnerability to this kind of criticism.

A double-barreled approach, one through the program office and one through an ad hoc advisory committee reporting to DNRO. This action would not interfere with the on-going system definition on Configurations A and C, which may turn out to be adequate; i.e., may achieve the desired increases

This additional study should be accomplished by October so that it can be assimilated before the November ExCom meeting which will consider the initiation development in December 1971.
This action can be accomplished within present funding in time for appropriate action at the November ExCom meeting. It may be that the doubts which are expressed about the suitability of our present course of action and schedule will prove unfounded. If so, then we can proceed along the lines of the recent ExCom decisions. If the doubts materialize in the form of Congressional budget cuts or through our own decision to modify the present plan, we will have alternate courses of action open to us.