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# (8) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

25 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATIMER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, ASD(I)

SUBJECT: Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI)
Task Force


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
This is in response to your memorandum, same subject, 23 February 1976. Colonel Response to the second extension 53433, will represent the NRO on your ad hoc task force.

The National Reconnaissance Office is included in the Executive Order of 18 February 1976 under the guise of "special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs." Unlike many intelligence organizations, the NRO has not been covered by a National Security Council Intelligence Directive, but rather by a joint DOD-CIA Agreement. It appears most appropriate to update the organizational framework by publication of a classified charter, signed by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. We will prepare a draft of this document.

The attached papers contain comments which you requested on the four draft papers.

l Attachment Draft Papers





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GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11625 TXEMPTION CATEGORY SEZ DECLASSIFY ON UMP DET.

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#### REVISION OF NSCIDS

The General Wilson recommended approach, that Executive Order material be referenced, but not written into the text of NSCIDS and, that the NSCID numbering and titles be retained, appears to be the most desirable way to proceed. This would make the NSCIDS shorter documents, incorporating the broadest information. The lower level implementing documents would then contain greater detail.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF A SERIES OF CFI DIRECTIVES (CFIDs)

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There does not appear to be an overriding argument for selecting either proposed series designation for CFIDs over the other. Use of the series designation which corresponds to the CFI responsibilities assigned in the Executive Order of 18 February seems to provide for a logical presentation and would result in fewer documents. Conversely, adopting the schemes of aligning the CFIDs with NSCID numbering and titling easily leads to expanding on the NSCIDs in a logical and consistent way. This would allow the formulation of abbreviated NSCIDs, recommended by General Wilson. On balance we tend to prefer the latter scheme.

## TOP SECRET




#### DRAFT CFID CONTINUING USIB ON A TEMPORARY BASIS


continuation of the USIB on a temporary basis is believed essential to the smooth operation of the intelligence function. Particularly important is continuation of the committee and subcommittee functions, for it is through this mechanism that the NRO receives its tasking. Proposed changes made at any level in this structure must be carefully staffed and should not be made precipitously. It is considered improbable that this process could take place before 1 March 1976, and the proposed CFID would alleviate the immediate problem.

Disestablishment of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Council is appropriate.









The IRâD Council is a useful and valuable forum for all-source discussion of projects relating to intelligence. This kind of forum should preclude duplicative efforts from proceeding to the point where valuable resources are wasted. The Council could be used in a direct advisory capacity for new projects which impact on organizations represented on the Council, and could serve to generate RâD interests in areas not presently covered in any program.

The proposed CFID appears to cast the IR&D Council in too structured a role and at too high an organizational level to be as useful as it might be. It is recommended that the Council be a sub-group or committee of the USIB or its successor organization, and that the mission and functions be recast to reflect the advisory role discussed above.

Finally, while the Council is a useful forum for information exchange, the proposed organization structure (Para. 4b) may tend to generate a plethora of studies and splinter groups which are of questionable value when viewed in the context of limited resources and the prime reason for the Council.