MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: Congressional Record Item of October 12, 1973

Lt Col has researched and prepared this package in response to your question.

At Tab A is an extract from the proceedings of the Special Congressional Committee studying questions related to classified government documents, dated October 12, 1973. As you are aware, this document published, as unclassified, the term "National Reconnaissance Office." We found out about this item after publication and therefore there was no practical means of deleting it. Since this credible document divulges the existence of the NRO, the question arises as to what—if anything—should be done.

The NRO Staff determined that Senator Mccollan had requested the DCI to provide budget totals for the organizations mentioned in the Record for use in the Senate. We understand that the DCI responded in a memorandum classified SECRET and that the NRO was included in this SECRET document. While Senator Cranston is not a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, it is conceivable that he would see this SECRET document. In any event it is a matter of conjecture as to whether or not the DCI's letter was the source of the present compromise.

As a result of the item in the Congressional Record Mr. Mark Bender (Bedner ?) from the Congressional Quarterly staff has made inquiries regarding the NRO. He has called ASD(PA) and the CIA Legislative Staff. From both he received the same "we have no comment" reply. He reportedly remarked that the no comment reply may be more interesting than the NRO. We are now researching Mr. Bender to determine his background and his past treatment of items of this nature. At the
present time we recommend no action in connection with Mr. Bender’s inquiries. We will continue to closely monitor developments.

This situation is one more example of a continuing problem of exposure of what is still formally designated as a covert program. For some time now, we have been reacting to leaks such as this—leaks which I am sure are made more through carelessness or inadvertent action rather than by intent. They are serving, however, to take an inordinate amount of time in terms of follow-up Staff action and merely closes the door rather than prevents more disclosures. The Staff is not in the position to develop and implement an overall covert security environment for the HBO. That is the DCI’s province under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. Therefore, we have prepared the memorandum at the right asking that the DCI evaluate the impact of security compromises and determine where we should go from here.

John E. Kalpa, Jr.
Brigadier General, USAF