IMMEDIATE

ATTENTION:

1. Decisions on payload items threaten the corona launch schedule and therefore the availability of timely data to the intelligence community. Furthermore, parallel approaches to the payload contractors requesting same or similar technical data and services are embarrassing to the government and confusing to the contractors.

2. A series of recent events highlights this problem. On 4 February, with no prior consultation with CIA headquarters, the payload system integrator contractor, or the resident manager, it was ordered recovery vehicle forebodies replaced on defective ID7 system. It also directed that no missions would be flown in which forebodies would be scheduled wherein the age at recovery would exceed twelve months. This directive, issued without regard for program implications, would have caused corona operational stand down of three to four months. We ran an immediate investigation into shelf life process, testing, and telecom and tox of actions underway and pending, then issued directive to's the repeating competitive directions and requesting similar information.

In action, on being informed that the forebodies on mission 107 were considered not flightworthy, was to (a) direct place item in younger forebodies, (b) send the replaced items back for tests similar to those used to indicate average in the program, (c) direct to evaluate the shelf life of all items necessary to support mission requirement as indicated and (d) to assess program implications and suggest remedial measures to preserve program integrity and also initiated action with the ones to determine specifically the validity of the information on shelf life limitations in the data were collected on all forebodies shipped for units which were not flown for any reason, those units have been repaired, and subsequently flown.
LENGTH OF TIME UNITS WERE EXPOSED TO THE THERMAL ENVIRONMENT AND FINAL FLIGHT RELIABILITY.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA HAS ESTABLISHED FLIGHT ACCEPTABILITY RELIABILITY FOR FORECLES OF AT LEAST 17 MONTHS. A SEPARATE TEAM IS BEING DIRECTED ON IMPLEMENTATION. DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED TO BASE ON FORECLES AND OTHER SRV SHELF LIFE CRITERIA.

5. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, AND OTHER INSTANCES THEREIN SIMILAR, UNILATERAL PROGRAM OFFICE ACTION HAS PRODUCED CONSIDERABLE PROGRAM PERTURBATION. WE HAVE INFORMED 2551 THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADEQUATELY AUDED FAILURE HARDWARE ON A SCHEDULE RESPONSIVE TO TOTAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS RESTS BETWEEN 2551 AND HAVE DIRECTED THEM TO RESPOND TO DIRECTION RECEIVED IN ORDER THAT FURTHER EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PROGRAM DIFFICULTIES BE AVOIDED.

6. WITH THESE ACTIVITIES UNDERWAY AT THE SECRETARY, WE QUESTION THE ADVISABILITY OF THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE AT THIS TIME.

CFN 2611 GENER

1017 NOT FLIGHTWORTHY

1017 NOT FLOPN 17 MONTHS A SRV 241 2551 17 FEB"