We would like to discuss this paper with you as soon as possible, since Mr. Bissell notes that there is some urgency connected with moving toward an agreed position between our respective elements. I should note that Mr. Bissell has seen the attached.

We are hopeful that it will be regarded by you as being evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
The National Reconnaissance Office was established by joint agreement between the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency through the mechanism of a covert combination of certain elements within the Air Force and within the CIA. Through this combination and by virtue of the authority granted to the NRO by the aforementioned agreement, this office has thereby been given authority and responsibility over several ongoing reconnaissance programs. These programs are in different stages of development and operation. They have in certain cases been instituted, funded and managed, both technically and operationally, and protected security-wise in somewhat differing fashions.

It is the view of the CIA that changes should be instituted in management and assignment of responsibility for programs under NRO cognizance on a carefully considered and properly timed basis. It is the view also of the CIA that the working relationships established within the NRO itself and the assignment of authority and responsibility between the two parts of the office must remain sufficiently broad and flexible so that new programs not now well defined will not be forced into a pattern of management which would make difficult the technical direction, funding, operational control or the security of such programs.

Finally, in the view of the CIA, the division within the NRO on funding and technical direction should be that the Air Force assumes primary responsibility for all such "white" activities, i.e. procurements...
which are of extremely large scope or which require competitive bidding,
or for other reasons cannot be concealed from the normal Department of
Defense security system; and that the CIA will assume primary responsi-
bility for the so-called "black" procurements, which for reasons of
security must be concealed from all persons not knowledgeable of the
specific program involved.

Returning now to the ongoing projects mentioned previously, which
the National Reconnaissance Office will direct from here on, the following
specific assignments of primary responsibility within the NRO are reaffirmed:

**GNAM**. The management, technical direction, operational control
and security of project GNAM will remain as it has in the past under the
primary auspices of the CIA. The primary responsibility for the Air Force
variants of GNAM will, as they have in the past, be the primary concern
of the Air Force. In all matters of mutual interest and specifically on
the management of interrelated items such as the development of airframe,
of engines, and of major components, the project personnel will provide
crossflow of information between the Air Force and CIA with particular
attention being given to decisions which may have secondary impact
from one program to another. The project officers within CIA for the
basic GNAM system and within the Air Force for the Air Force adaptations
will be the focal point for this information crossflow.

**COCINA/HEAL/ANDON**. Over-all security aspects of this program will
continue as in the past within the framework of the agreed security system
under primary auspices of CIA. Launch scheduling and launching, orbital
and recovery operations will remain under primary cognizance of the Air Force. Primary cognizance for management and technical direction of hardware aspects will remain within the Air Force for boosters, orbital vehicles, and payload equipment within CIA for photographic payloads and sensors. At a suitable time, payload cognizance should shift to CIA and standardized sensor cognizance should revert to the Air Force when and if all revealing features can be later incorporated in a secured area. The CIA will continue primary cognizance of operational planning and control of payload operation and target coverage. As above, the Air Force and CIA project officers will be focal points for crossover of information within EEO.

Security aspects of this activity have been aligned with the procedures of the agreed-to uniform security system of EEO. The desirability of mutual use of certain assets for this project and Corona/MKUL/AEGIS, particularly in the areas of target planning and operations, is cognizance of CIA. No project officers, as such, are or will be designated within CIA for EAMS activities. In this case the focal points for crossover of information will be project officers within the Air Force and CIA.

In addition to the projects noted above, certain other activities, largely of an ELMF nature, will, if continued, fall under the cognizance
of the National Reconnaissance Office. These RELINT projects are under
individual scrutiny in order to reach a decision as to desirability of
continuance and appropriate division of management responsibility in line
with the assignment of "black" and "white" procurement and technical
direction functions.

Project RELINT, to the extent that this activity remains in being,
will continue in all aspects under primary cognizance of CIA. A uniform
system of security control for all projects falling under BNO cognizance
has been established. This system will dictate appropriate procedures
to be used by either Air Force or CIA security personnel and is in line
with policies established for the security restrictions which surround
highly sensitive activities of this nature. The Air Force and CIA parts
of the BNO are being linked by secure communication facilities for mutual
exchange of information relating to BNO activities.