

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA
~~TALENT-KEYHOLE~~
CONTROL SYSTEM

(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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18 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: "Fact Of" Paper

I met this afternoon with Captain Jemmings of State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research to discuss the outline of the "fact of" paper. Mr. Katz from the Arms Control Agency was in attendance as well as a "consultant" brought in by the State Department ostensibly to write a paper. I presented the attached outline as a firm DOD position of the issue and made the point clear that DOD strongly believes that there is no gain to be made by acknowledging the "fact of." Any paper resulting from this tasking should relate to the issues brought up in our outline. I further expressed the feeling that it appeared unnecessary to have a private consultant write such a paper. I also relayed General Allen's specific comments made to me about the "fact of" issue following his review of the outline. Captain Jemmings said that he would have to touch base with Mr. Hitchcock who is ill today and Mr. Hyland, the Director of the Bureau.

[Redacted Signature]

HAROLD S. COYLE, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director for
Plans and Policy

1 Attachment
Outline

cc: Dr. Wade, OSD(ISA)

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CONTROL SYSTEM

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
EXEMPT FROM GDS AND DOWNGRADING
SCHEMES AND DECLASSIFICATION
EXEMPTIONS
EXEMPTION CATEGORY [redacted]
EXEMPTION AUTHORITY [redacted]
EXEMPTION DATE [redacted]

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- I. What is the "Fact Of" policy?
 - A. Authorizes no open discussion of satellite reconnaissance.
 - B. Authorizes full discussion in proper forum to government policy makers.
- II. Why has there been a "Fact Of" policy?
 - A. Fear of international challenge to a non-legalized activity.
 - B. Fear of exposing capabilities and limitations to adversaries causing loss. - *Spy satellites are the only means of collecting such data*
 - C. Provides keystone for security management because it is clearly understood. - *single focus provided*
 - D. Allows legitimacy to be established over time. - *"reconnaissance" some forms open and secreted - spy satellites are the focus of "facto"*
- III. How has "Fact Of" served its purpose for 13 years?
 - A. No government official has acknowledged openly.
 - B. No "good" secrets are in the public domain--high awareness of policy *by officials*
 - C. No diplomatic protests lodged. - *no discussion leads to no response*
 - D. Has become a "non-secret" because of long term conduct and general public awareness of activity--all but officially knowledgeable are unaware of the policy.
- IV. What are the information factors relating to the "fact of" release } "facts about."
 - A. Public reaction. - *if only "fact of" public learns nothing new - the spy satellite program has never been denied*
 - B. Credibility changes. - *To be credible, more than "fact of" is needed*
 - C. Freedom of action for spokesmen. - *Discretion and full-backs lead to erosion*
 - D. Exposure to press demands more release. - *press expects to get spy satellite list*
 - E. Retention of "good secrets" impact. - *instead of single management control all can decide - 5:10*
 - F. Use of information for questionable leverage. - *public relations benefits usually are short lived - NACA April for example*
 - G. Civil and military programs bagged together. - *at the UN, spy satellites might be included in the discussions by general association with LANSAR*

V. What are the international political factors affecting the release of the "fact of?"

A. Soviet reactions

- 1. Military--closed society; information denial. *vs increasing targeting policy offends the Russians*
- 2. Political--Response mode/J example; *V-2 example*

B. Chinese reactions--Political.

C. Other international reactions

- 1. Sovereignty--UN debates on open programs. - *open "copying"*
- 2. Pressures for technology sharing. - *other countries would like spying materials - big issue*
- 3. Military--allies/non-allies.
- 4. Economic potential. - *big issue for the government*

D. Legitimacy of reconnaissance--confront/ *(the of see is frustrating sovereignty to some - U.S. and Russia work "together" in UN.)*

VI. What are the programmatic factors affecting the release of the "fact of"?

A. Facts about.

- 1. Enforcement of new rules outside of policy domain. - *people have left the system - hard to get things out of them*
- 2. Life of "good secrets." *1000 secrets highly perishable*
- 3. Restraining of discussion. - *"fact of" is psychological keystone*

B. Program management.

- 1. Contractor relationships--competition. - *delicate involvement*
- 2. Procurement apparatus. - *legal, but unstable, subjected to targeting by others*

C. Limitations of technology.

- 1. Intelligence can be denied. - *very critical to US effort*
- 2. Technology restraints.

D. "Fact Of" aids management. - *allows the government to do the work more efficiently and cost-effect.*

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VII. Summary and assessment of gains and losses.

- A. Gains \approx slight short term. ^{Tactic} - Public Relations mainly
Strategic.
- B. Losses \approx likely long term. - Program suffers degradation

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