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Functions and Responsibilities  
of the  
National Reconnaissance Office (TS)

The following plan for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is based upon the assignment of clear and specific responsibilities; it provides for joint participation but avoids assignment of split project responsibilities. It will insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in the establishment, management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).

The attached chart summarizes this plans assignment of key functions and responsibilities of each project of the NRP. The letters in parentheses indicate present assignment of responsibilities which must be changed to conform with the discussion below.

The major functional areas are discussed below as they ultimately should be, after which exceptions are identified which may occur during the transition period leading to the final desired organization.

1. Management. The management aspects have been broken into two major divisions: technical and financial.

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a. The technical management responsibility for all projects (black and white) ultimately should be assigned to the SAFUS/NRO. Specific technical responsibilities for each project, in the final solution, should be the sole responsibility of the Secretary and he should be responsible to 5412.

(1) ~~The Air Force should generate the~~ appropriate directives <sup>to be presented</sup> to transfer the total technical responsibility for the ARGON, MUR AL and Navy programs to the Air Force. To provide for continuity, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment development by agencies outside the NRO, a Navy and an Army representative <sup>s</sup> ~~would~~ would be assigned, on a full time basis, to an appropriate position <sup>a</sup> within the SAFUS/NRO. They would be technically qualified in electronic signal collection work and in mapping and geodesy, respectively, and have NRO project responsibilities in these areas. Since there are only two more shots and one unassigned payload in the CORONA program, no change should be made in the present technical management structure of that program.

(2) It should be clearly understood that assignment of the technical management responsibility to SAFUS in no way is intended to exclude the participation of the Agency. There should be established for each project a very small technical control unit (TCU), similar to the present Agency/Air Force configuration control board, with

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membership composed of the particular Air Force project director, a SAFUS/NRO representative and an Agency representative. Such a unit would provide for active participation in each project by each half of the NRO, while retaining clear, single lines of responsibility: in each case this group would be chaired by the Air Force project director, thereby pinpointing responsibility.

(3) For the area of electronic signal collection, it is necessary that the Agency immediately designate an individual with a prime responsibility to represent the Agency in the technical control units for signal collection projects. A firm liaison channel between the NRO and NSA will be required either as an adjunct to, or as a part of such a unit. Planning should encompass maximum utilization of the Navy technical resources to support the electronic signal collection programs.


b. The financial management area has been separated into two further divisions: funds and contracts.

(1) With respect to funds, the SAFUS/NRO should be the sole interface with the Agency for black funds for reconnaissance. Therefore, all such DOD funds should be channeled thru SAFUS. The origin of the funds within DOD for channeling thru SAFUS would be on an individual project basis in accordance with the 6 March 61 DOD directive, as influenced by the most appropriate conditions surrounding

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old operating projects. (The ARGON data exploitation fund requirement should be eliminated: the ARGON exploitation equipment and mission should be transferred from the present contractor to Army Map Service, under operational control of DIA, and eliminated as an item of the NRP.)

(2) With respect to contracts, all reconnaissance project contracts should be the responsibility of SAFUS. This is a necessary corollary to the assignment of technical management responsibility to SAFUS. This includes both the PCO and the ACO functions. Black contracts which provide cover for or enhance the security of projects should be the responsibility of the Agency. This includes  to provide cover for covert operations, and any other contractual action which is necessary for the NRP and which can be provided only by the Agency's unique statutory authority. The Agency should hold black project contracts only when statutory authority of SAFUS is not adequate to the task in question. However, in all such black project contracts the Agency should use an Air Force ACO. This would give the Agency a greater depth of experience in contract administration and at the same time make maximum use for the NRO of their statutory contract capabilities. Contract administration for the Navy program should be delegated to and remain with the Navy through CY 62, by which time that program, as a separate entity, will have been completed.

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2. Security. The total security for the National Reconnaissance Program should be administered in accordance with the rules and regulations laid down by the [REDACTED] security manual. The implementation of this manual should be the responsibility of the CIA. The CIA security officer should have as a deputy an Air Force officer assigned to the NRO (physically located in SAFMS). The Deputy should be responsible for compliance with the manual throughout all of DOD. On a project-by-project basis, the administration of the security systems should be the responsibility of the CIA, with the Deputy Security Officer administering the system for all personnel within DOD, through control officers in the JCS, Army, Air Force, and Navy staffs, the DIA and the NSA. For the collection programs, final need-to-know validation authority should become a responsibility of SAFUS, except for contractor or government personnel cleared personally by the Deputy Director, Plans, of the Agency. For products, the final need-to-know validation authority should be the Agency. The need-to-know responsibility for CORONA, ARGON, MURAL and the Navy program should remain as currently constituted until a detailed phasing program from the existing security system can be worked out on a project-by-project basis by the Director and Deputy Director of Security for the NRO.

3. Operations.

a. Scheduling. The launch schedule for all satellite reconnaissance efforts should be the sole responsibility of SAFUS. The

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CIA would have scheduling responsibilities to SAFUS in connection with any black project contracts which the Agency holds under the exception previously discussed. However, SAFUS would have the sole NRO responsibility for overall schedules.

b. Targeting. The existing capability for preparing computer programs to get coverage of specific targets will require reorganization.

(1) A member of the SAFUS/NRO should be designated as chairman of a Target Selection Group (TSG) which would have tri-Service and Agency representation on a full-time basis. The Target Selection Group should have available the complete schedules and technical capabilities of all of the sensor systems of all reconnaissance projects, and accounts of the complete coverage obtained by all sensor systems of these projects, on a continuous basis. This group would establish the pre-launch targeting selection for all reconnaissance projects of the NRP, and would transmit this information to a yet-to-be-established operations control room at the STC for satellite missions, and to designated operations points for other missions. The operations control room at the STC would control all satellite reconnaissance missions, responding to operational decisions from Washington, and engineering decisions from the project director.

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(2) The officer in charge of the operations control room at the STC would be sole responsible agent to assure necessary actions with the orbiting vehicle as well as with the ground environment to maximize the probability of satisfying the coverage of given targets established by the Target Selection Group.

(3) To provide retargeting subsequent to launch, there should be in the Pentagon a comprehensive display so that the Target Selection Group can monitor each mission and make decisions based on all factors involved, such as weather, target coverage, change in situation due to missed orbit, political situation, or new intelligence data. The decision as to which targets to cover would be made by the Target Selection Group and would be based on information from this display. Operational decisions based on engineering factors would be provided by the Project Director and would override conflicting instructions from the Target Selection Group. Responsibility for both the pre- and post-launch targeting responsibility would rest with the SA FUS/NRO, who would provide the chairman of the Target Selection Group.


(4) The on-orbit operation of each individual satellite should be the responsibility of SA FUS. Any required functions relating to on-orbit vehicle and payload operation, such as piggy-backs, orbit changes, filters, etc., would be the sole responsibility of the officer in charge of the STC control room.

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(5) The CORONA program, <sup>as nearly completed</sup> should be excepted from the above considerations, ~~since the program is nearly over~~. All other satellite reconnaissance should be changed to conform to the above pattern as soon as possible.



c. Recovery. Recovery as here used includes all types of data retrieval, i. e., either physical recovery or readout. There are two aspects which influence recovery; the operational aspect and the engineering aspect.

(1) Operational decisions as to the initiation of recovery (coverage, target, weather, etc.) should be the responsibility of the Target Selection Group and hence under the SA FUS/NRO.

(2) Engineering decisions relating to the capability for successful recovery, or if recovery should be attempted at all, should be the sole responsibility of SA FUS, as executed at the STC control

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room. Recovery as related to the existing Navy program is now administered wholly by the Navy and NSA. This should not be changed through the end of that program (end of CY 62).

d. Formatting. The formatting of the collected product falls into two distinct types: photographic and signal intelligence.

(1) Photographic formatting includes the initial chemical processing, titling, production and delivery to the user. The initial chemical processing should be the responsibility of the Agency for all satellite photographic systems. The production for all users (for all photographic satellite collection systems) should be the responsibility of SA FUS. The CORONA program should remain the complete responsibility of the CIA since there are only two more CORONA flights.

(2) In the area of the signal collection systems, the formatting responsibility should be the responsibility of SA FUS. However, formatting responsibility for the present Navy program should remain with NSA and the Navy through the end of that program (end of CY 62).


e. Engineering Analysis. Engineering feedback from operating systems is required to correct the problems that exist on the operating system as well as to provide information for new systems. Since SA FUS would be responsible for the technical management of all collection systems, the Secretary should also be responsible for the engineering analysis of all collection systems, with participation by the Agency. The Technical Control Unit previously described could be used

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for both technical decisions regarding program as well as for engineering analysis, thereby keeping all parties appropriately informed and fully utilizing the technical capabilities of the interested agencies. The CORONA program and the Navy program would be exceptions, since the CORONA program has only two more flights and the Navy program extends only through CY 62. However, the Air Force and Agency should participate in the engineering analysis of the Navy program.

4. Communications. In general, the communications fall into two distinct and separate areas. Each half of the NRO should have responsibility for its white communications, and the Agency should have



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made that due to the nature of this project that the product should come under the same security system as all other satellite reconnaissance data, and therefore a black communication system will be required to the Global Weather Central.

5. The responsibility for advanced plans (post CY 62) for all satellite reconnaissance projects should be assigned to the Director, SA FSP/NRO. To provide for consideration of all possible ways of conducting future reconnaissance projects, a Navy officer with appropriate technical background and experience should be assigned on a full time basis to the SA FSP/NRO for NRO advanced planning duty. To assure the most efficient utilization of current capabilities and flexibility, as well as advanced plans, the Agency should assign contract, legal, communications, security, and planning personnel to the Director, SA FSP/NRO.

6. The USIB would establish or validate all requirements for the NRP and establish broad project and overall target priorities. However, they would not determine schedules, or determine targets for particular missions. COMOR would not be involved with the NRO or NRP, except as required to advise USIB in the determination of NRP requirements and broad priorities. Selection of targets for specific missions and target decisions during conduct of missions would be made by the Target Selection Group previously described, using USIB requirements, priorities and target lists.

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