QUESTION 4: The DOD's role in space is projected to expand rapidly during the next five years or so, as anti-satellites and various highly classified programs are funded. What lessons have been learned over the years, from the reconnaissance satellite programs as a whole, that may be applied to DOD's overall role in space as that particular role increases. For example:

- Should significant thought and emphasis be given to "doctrine, tactics and strategy" for a coherent overall space program before large increase of funds are provided?

- Given limited financial sources, should a few space programs be amply funded rather than many programs be funded at a low rate?

In other words, do you have any general comments or advice with regard to sound management for a rapidly expanding space programs for DOD?

ANSWER: The basic concepts of how to develop, acquire and operate satellite systems, whether specifically for DOD or for overall reconnaissance purposes, are basically the same. The lessons learned from one are being applied to the other. DOD's role in space may be expanding but it would be incorrect to characterize DOD as not having a vast background in space and space-related programs. One of the primary purposes of the DRMO being an executive within the DOD structure is to draw upon space expertise in DOD and to share NRO expertise with DOD. The selection of the DRMO as the program manager for DRSF is based upon insuring the lessons learned from reconnaissance programs are applied to specific DOD needs.

The need to provide significant thought to "doctrine, tactics and strategy" is underway. DOD was a major participant in the recent completion of the new National Space Policy and conducted its own DOD Space Policy Study to revise/consolidate DOD Space Policy. Also, the Air Force is in final stages of preparing AFM 1-6 entitled "Space Doctrine."
The issue of the allocation of scarce resources to a few as opposed to many programs is a faulty dilemma. The allocation of resources must be based on prioritized requirements for capabilities coupled with a timeline for the advent of these capabilities. In some cases a few programs may require a steep funding curve and in other cases many programs can be developed simultaneously under basic funding levels. Each year this process, as you are aware, is reviewed in the DOD PPBS process in concert with the NFIP process.
HAC/Organization

**QUESTION 94:** In the past, this Committee has inquired about this organizational composition and whether or not one NRP program office would be a more cost effective and administratively sounder way of conducting the country's costly satellite reconnaissance efforts. To what extent is the separate program offices organization continuing to exist merely because "We have always done it this way"?

**ANSWER:** As is frequently the case with any organization, the structure of the NRO was affected by circumstances which preceded its creation. Prior to 1962, the CIA had several satellite programs under development and the military departments were developing potential booster systems (ICBM programs). To insure the experience and capabilities of the CIA and DOD were properly used, the NRO was established with several Program Offices. The functions of the NRO, and its basic organization, have been evaluated numerous times beginning in 1962 by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, in 1965 by the rewrite of the DOD/CIA Memorandum of Agreement, in 1974 by the NSC, and in 1980 during the transition by the current Administration. The DNRO has been, with the advice and guidance of the SECDEF and DCI, the overall supervisor of Program Office activities and has assigned Program Office responsibilities based on the skills inherent in respective programs and the technology based in each office. Further, the NRO disestablished the Program D activities when all aircraft operations were transferred from the NRO to the Air Force.

Therefore, the basic assumption that our structure exists merely because "We have always done it that way" is not correct. The programs resident in our offices are not static and not assigned because they are only to be done by a specific Program Office. Our structure has changed when dictated by the environment.
HAC/Organization

QUESTION 9B: What do you perceive to be the advantages and disadvantages of a one program office organization as opposed to the existing three program offices?

ANSWER: The most generally held belief about advantages of an NRO with only one Program Office is that consolidation would produce a more unified, guided program. This, however, presupposes a homogeneous intelligence community with identical intelligence requirements to be met by a single office. It also assumes that a more streamlined method for guidance, control and feedback would result from a consolidation. Neither case is correct.

The intelligence community is an extremely heterogeneous grouping with widely divergent intelligence collection requirements. The basic NRO tenet of maintaining and exploiting the resident skills and technology pursuits from a broad-based set of Program Offices has served well in meeting these divergent requirements. The issue of potentially better guidance and control by a single office is greatly offset by the direct interface between the Program Directors and the DHRO and the overall "cradle to grave" responsibility inherent in each office. This allows a continued responsibility for success or failure of a program and for immediate interface with the Director. On balance we see no major advantage to a single Program Office and perceive a major disadvantage of confusion and disruption that could result from a major reorganization.
QUESTION 10A: The Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) aggregation of programs includes the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) as a major function program. The NRO Director serves as the DRSP program manager. Does the DRSP comprise, in essence, a fourth NRO program office?

ANSWER: No. DRSP represents an amalgamation of activities and funds managed separately by the DNRO. The Assistant DNRO for Military Support, through the Defense Support Project Office manages the DRSP activities and funds separate from the NRP. DRSP programs are managed in close coordination with the DRSP Review Group which consists of flag officer or senior civilian representatives from each of the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Staff. Associate members are drawn from other defense agencies for meetings that affect their areas of responsibility. The functions of the Review Group include developing DRSP budget guidance, providing service and agency coordination of DRSP activities, and facilitating any special management arrangements necessary for the effective execution of DRSP activities. The DNRO has the option of using NRO program offices or service elements for studies, developments, and/or procurements. A proper security level is established for each DRSP activity based on the technology involved and the environment in which it is conducted. This approach enables an optimum application of expertise, resources, technology and security for each DRSP activity.
QUESTION 10B: The Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) aggregation of programs includes the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) as a major function program. The NRO Director serves as the DRSP program manager. Are you satisfied with the DRSP as it is presently structured? What changes would you recommend to make it more responsive to both tactical commanders and NRO requirements?

ANSWER: In general the structure of the Defense Support Project Office is sufficient to accomplish its mission today. The staff may need to be augmented in the future as projects and new capabilities are acquired.
QUESTION 11A: The Director, NRO develops special management arrangements necessary for the effective execution of DRSP programs in conjunction with participating Departments and Agencies. What specific special management arrangements have been developed to date?

ANSWER: None. The same management arrangements with which the NRP is executed are working extremely well for the DRSP.
QUESTION 12A: Program A (Air Force) and Program B (CIA) can be said to be in competition for new programs and funding. Do you believe the Director of NRO can effectively referee this competition?

ANSWER: The simple answer is yes, the DNRO can and does manage competition for resources between program offices. Further, the concept of technology competition provides impetus to seek innovative, workable ideas. The DNRO, for example, has competed program concepts between Program Offices. One example was [redacted] and [redacted] and the [redacted]. Overall, competition which is correctly channeled and monitored is healthy in a research and development oriented organization. It provides the best route to systems which effectively satisfy stated requirements.
QUESTION 12B: Isn't the Director's staff made up generally of people loaned from the agencies participating in the NRP? Can they be objective in evaluating competing proposals?

ANSWER: The NRO Staff is primarily comprised of Air Force officers assigned to the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (81%). Some personnel are assigned to the NRO Staff from the agencies participating in the NRP to insure that disciplines resident in those agencies are available to support the NRO (i.e., CIA, NSA, DMA, Army and Navy). These individuals bring their host agency's points of view and expertise to the Staff and very quickly become completely integrated into a "joint" national effort without parochial advocacy. Since the NRO cuts across the Departmental structure, the Staff can be and has been judged to be objective in evaluating competing proposals. Our performance has been rated by others as consistently outstanding.